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This PhD thesis provides an extended evaluation of evolutionary debunking arguments in 
meta-ethics. Such arguments attempt to show that evolutionary theory, together with a 
commitment to robust moral objectivity, lead to moral scepticism: the implausible view 
that we lack moral knowledge or that our moral beliefs are never justified (e.g. Joyce 2006, 
Street 2005, Kahane 2011). To establish that, these arguments rely on certain epistemic 
principles. But most of the epistemic principles appealed to in the literature on 
evolutionary debunking arguments are imprecise, confused or simply implausible. My 
PhD aims to rectify that. 
 
Informed by debates in cutting-edge contemporary epistemology, Chapter 1 distinguishes 
three general, independently motivated principles that, combined with evolution, seem to 
render knowledge of robustly objective moral facts problematic. These epistemic 
principles state that (i.) our getting facts often right in a given domain requires explanation 
– and if we cannot provide one, our beliefs about that domain are unjustified; (ii.) higher-
order evidence of error undermines justification; and (iii.) for our beliefs to be justified, 
our having them must be best explained by the facts they are about. Chapters 2-4 develop 
and critically assess evolutionary debunking arguments based on those principles, showing 
that only the one inspired by (iii.) succeeds. 
 
Chapter 2 investigates the argument that evolution makes explaining why we get moral 
facts often right impossible. I argue that Justin Clarke-Doane’s recent response (2014, 
2015, 2016, 2017) works, yet neglects an issue about epistemic luck that spells trouble 
for robust moral objectivity. Chapter 3 discusses the argument that evolution provides 
higher-order evidence of error regarding belief in robustly objective moral facts. I show 
that such an argument falls prey to Katia Vavova’s (2014) self-defeat objection, even if 
evolutionary debunkers tweak their background view on the epistemic significance of 
higher-order evidence. Chapter 4 develops the argument that evolution, rather than 
robustly objective moral facts, best explains why we hold our moral beliefs. I offer a 
systematic, comprehensive defence of that argument against Andreas Mogensen’s (2015) 
charge of explanatory levels confusion, Terrence Cuneo’s (2007) companion in guilt 
strategy, and David Enoch’s (2012, 2016) appeal to deliberative indispensability. 
 
Chapter 5 brings everything together. It investigates whether robust moral objectivity 
survives the worry about epistemic luck raised in Chapter 2 and the explanatory challenge 
developed in Chapter 4. Making progress, however, requires a better idea of how we form 
 
true, justified beliefs about and acquire knowledge of robustly objective moral facts. Since 
it offers the most popular and best-developed epistemology of robustly objective morality, 
my inquiry in Chapter 5 focuses on contemporary moral intuitionism: the view that moral 
intuitions can be the source of basic moral knowledge. I argue that its success is mixed. 
While moral intuitionism has the conceptual tools to tackle the problem of epistemic luck 
from Chapter 2, it cannot insulate knowledge of robustly objective moral facts against the 
sceptical worry raised by the evolutionary debunking argument developed in Chapter 4. 
Thus, evolutionary theory, together with a commitment to robust moral objectivity, does 




Is morality a matter of mere taste? Or is it, as many would claim, objective? Those of us who 
lean towards the latter believe that it is a matter of moral fact that, say, killing is wrong. What is 
more, we take ourselves to know that moral fact. However, some philosophers and biologists 
have recently suggested that these commitments are incompatible with evolutionary theory. 
Even if there are objective moral facts, they argue, we did not evolve to find them out. Instead, 
we evolved to survive. Given that evolution doesn’t favour our finding out about moral facts, 
how could we ever know any? How could we know, for example, that killing is wrong? So, 
evolution seems to undermine our putative knowledge of objective morality. 
My PhD thesis evaluates this evolutionary critique in three steps. First, it clarifies the epistemic 
principles (about knowledge, justification, evidence, etc.) on which this critique rests. Since 
those principles are often imprecise or implausible, I propose three more compelling ones. For 
instance, my first epistemic principle states that our getting moral facts mostly right requires 
explanation – which evolutionary theory renders impossible. Second, my thesis develops and 
critically assesses the evolutionary critique of objective moral knowledge in light of those more 
compelling epistemic principles. As I argue, evolutionary theory does threaten objective moral 
knowledge. For our moral beliefs to be justified, our having them would have to be best 
explained by objective moral facts. But that is not the case, for evolutionary facts best explain 
our moral beliefs. Third, the thesis investigates how defenders of objective moral knowledge 
could respond to this evolutionary challenge. Making progress requires a better idea of how we 
acquire such knowledge. Since it offers the most popular and best developed account of 
objective moral knowledge, my inquiry focuses on contemporary moral intuitionism: the view 
that moral intuitions can be the source of basic moral knowledge. However, I argue that moral 
intuitionism lacks the conceptual resources to tackle the evolutionary challenge. Thus, the 
evolutionary critique has been vindicated: evolutionary theory does undermine our knowledge 







CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
 
1.  In tr oduct ion  
 
My PhD thesis provides an extended evaluation of evolutionary debunking arguments in 
meta-ethics. Such arguments attempt to show that evolutionary theory, together with a 
commitment to robust moral objectivity, leads to moral scepticism: the implausible view 
that we lack moral knowledge or that our moral beliefs are never justified. The idea is 
that, even if there are robustly objective moral facts, we did not evolve to find them out. 
Rather, we evolved to survive. And while our survival may require certain moral beliefs, it 
does not require or even encourage ones that would constitute knowledge of robustly 
objective moral facts. In that manner, awareness of the evolutionary origins of our capacity 
to form moral beliefs is supposed to lead to scepticism about robustly objective morality. 
 
To get from robust moral objectivity and evolution to moral scepticism, these arguments 
rely on certain epistemic principles. But most of the epistemic principles appealed to in the 
literature on evolutionary debunking arguments are imprecise, confused or simply 
implausible. As a result, most of these arguments aren’t epistemologically sound and 
therefore fail. My PhD thesis aims to reconsider the evolutionary threat to knowledge of 
robustly objective moral facts in light of more precise and plausible epistemic principles. 
To achieve that, I proceed in three steps. Chapter 1 distinguishes three epistemic 
principles that, combined with evolution, do indeed seem to render knowledge of 
objective moral facts problematic. These principles are informed by cutting-edge debates 
in contemporary epistemology, from the nature of reliability to the epistemic significance 
of higher-order evidence and the relevance of explanation to justification. Then, Chapters 
2 to 4 develop new and improved evolutionary debunking arguments based on those 
principles. Finally, Chapter 5 brings everything together: it investigates whether there is 
any way for a commitment to robust moral objectivity to survive in the face of these 
arguments. In the end, I think that these new and improved evolutionary debunking 
arguments don’t imperil the mere possibility of robustly moral knowledge. However, they 
undermine any claim to know what robust morality is substantively like. So, evolutionary 
theory, together with a commitment to robust moral objectivity, does lead to an 
implausible form of moral scepticism. 
 
This chapter – as just mentioned – takes the first step towards a comprehensive assessment 
of evolutionary debunking arguments in meta-ethics. Its aim is to set the stage, clarify the 
theoretical background, introduce the state of the literature and motivate my emphasis on 
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three specific epistemic principles. Its structure is as follows. I first define robust moral 
realism, the view that conceives of moral facts as robustly objective (§2). Then, I sketch 
the basic evolutionary challenge to robust moral realism (§3), before identifying a lacuna, 
namely the lack of compelling underlying epistemic principles, and proposing in generic 
terms how to fill it (§4). I conclude with a preview of the remainder of my PhD thesis 
(§5). 
 
2.  Robus t  Mor a l  Rea l i sm 
 
Robust moral realism is the meta-ethical view that there are mind-independent moral facts 
which cannot be reduced to natural facts, yet are in principle knowable.1 For taxonomical 
purposes, it proves helpful to think of any meta-ethical view as addressing four key aspects 
of moral thought or discourse: its psychology, semantics, metaphysics and epistemology.2 
Robust moral realism is no different. First, the view is an instance of cognitivism in moral 
psychology: the doctrine that moral judgments are beliefs as opposed to desires or other 
conative states. Second, robust moral realism subscribes to truth-conditional moral 
semantics: moral concepts get their meaning by purporting to refer to robust moral 
properties. Third, the view is metaphysically committed to the existence of robust moral 
facts. What are robust moral facts? To begin with, such facts are objective or mind-
independent: they hold independently of whether we form beliefs about them. Further, 
those facts are ‘robust’: they resist reduction to or identification with facts as described 
by the natural and social sciences. By implication, they are also typically assumed to lack 
causal powers. Fourth and finally, robust moral realism is a form of moral non-scepticism: it 
holds that we can have knowledge of robust moral facts, at least under epistemically 
favorable conditions.3 Together, I take those four core commitments to characterize 
robust moral realism and thus provide the theoretical background for my investigation. 
 
Before proceeding, two points about the scope of my inquiry are in order. First, for the 
purposes of my argument, I take the psychology, semantics and metaphysics of robust 
moral realism for granted. As far as I am concerned, moral judgments are indeed beliefs 
whose constituent concepts at least sometimes refer to robust moral properties. However, 
                                                
1 Prominent contemporary defenders of the view include Cuneo 2007, Enoch 2012, Fitzpatrick 2008, 
Huemer 2005, Oddie 2005, Parfit 2013, Shafer-Landau 2003, and Wedgwood 2007. I prefer ‘robust’ to 
‘non-naturalist’ due to the difficulties involved in defining the latter. See Ridge 2018. 
2 See Chrisman 2016: Introduction for more on that. 
3 For Chapters 2 to 4, where I assess different strands of evolutionary debunking arguments, we don’t need 
to assume anything more specific about how exactly we form true, justified beliefs about and know moral 
facts. In other words, my assessment is largely neutral with respect to the correct first-order moral 
epistemology. That changes in Chapter 5, however, where I examine whether moral intuitionism has the 
conceptual tools to tackle any residual epistemic worries raised (or inspired by) evolutionary debunking 
arguments. 
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I want to question the epistemological core commitment of robust moral realism, namely 
moral non-scepticism. More specifically, my PhD thesis asks: assuming (possibly for 
reductio) the existence of robust moral facts, evolutionary explanations of how we form 
moral beliefs and certain independently plausible epistemic principles, can we ever know 
or even justifiably believe in robust moral facts? 
 
Second, my inquiry will be limited to robust moral realism as the target of evolutionary 
debunking arguments. Admittedly, that goes against some recent developments in the 
relevant literature. Some have argued that the evolutionary challenge (or something 
inspired by it) also arises for other meta-ethical views, including moral naturalism and 
quasi-realism.4 But there is a good methodological reason for my focus on robust moral 
realism. After all, I intend to figure out whether evolutionary debunking arguments raise 
an epistemic problem at all. To do that, it seems promising to start with a meta-ethical 
view that is as metaphysically extravagant as robust moral realism, thus offering the 
evolutionary debunker a comparably easy target.5 It is only after (if at all) having 
successfully isolated the epistemic worry inspired by evolutionary theory that we should 
concern ourselves with the vulnerability other meta-ethical views. So, my investigation 
examines evolutionary debunking exclusively against the backdrop of robust moral 
realism.6 
 
3.  Evo lu t iona r y  Debunk ing  Ar guments  
 
Robust moral realism has long been criticized on epistemological grounds.7 However, an 
empirically informed epistemological challenge has recently garnered significant 
philosophical attention.8 Evolutionary debunking arguments attempt to show that knowledge 
                                                
4 See, for example, Barkhausen 2016 and Golub 2017, respectively. 
5 This echoes Bedke (2014), claiming that robust moral realism is ‘a nice test case for seeing that whether 
there is an epistemic problem at all’ (2014: 6). 
6 I recognize that evolutionary debunking arguments are often developed not just to criticize robust moral 
realism, but to motivate alternative meta-ethical views such as moral constructivism (e.g. Street 2006, 2008) 
or moral error theory (e.g. Joyce 2006). However, my thesis focuses on the complex task of establishing the 
viability of these arguments against robust moral realism. What exactly follows for the broader meta-ethical 
landscape lies beyond its scope. 
7 See, for example, Mackie 1977 on the epistemological queerness of robust moral facts. 
8 The two most influential contributions to date are Joyce (2006) and Street (2006). Since their defense of 
evolutionary debunking arguments, the meta-ethical literature on the merit of these arguments has 
exploded. (According to Google Scholar, more than 15100 articles with keywords ‘evolutionary debunking’ 
were published between 2005 and 2018.) To name just a few: Bedke 2008, Berker 2014, Brosnan 2011, 
Copp 2008, Enoch 2011: Ch. 7, Fitzpatrick 2015, Joyce 2008 & 2014, Kahane 2011, Parfit 2013, Schafer 
2010, Shafer-Landau 2012, Skarsaune 2011, Street 2008 and Wielenberg 2010. There also have been 
several recent contributions to the very renowned Oxford Studies in Metaethics, including Bedke (2014), 
Sinclair (2018) and Vavova (2014). For more literature, see Chapters 2 to 4. 
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of robust moral facts stands in tension with evolutionary theory. These arguments share 
the following general structure:9 
 
(1) There are robust moral facts. 
(2) Evolutionary theory explains how we form beliefs, including moral beliefs. 
(3) If evolutionary theory explains how we form moral beliefs, we cannot justifiably 
believe or know robust moral facts. 
(4) Therefore, we cannot justifiably believe or know robust moral facts. 
 
The first premise simply reiterates the metaphysical commitments of robust moral 
realism: that there are moral facts, that those facts are objective, and that they are robust. 
As mentioned above, I shall take that for granted. So, the first premise does no more than 
articulating the dialectical background. 
 
Meanwhile, the second premise appeals to the evolutionary explanation of moral beliefs. 
Very roughly, such an explanation states that we believe what we believe, morally 
speaking, in virtue of natural selection.10 For instance, we believe that incest is morally 
wrong or that we have special moral obligations to family members because thinking with 
those moral concepts proved adaptive or helped our ancestors survive.11 Now, the 
evolutionary explanation of our moral beliefs differs significantly from that of our 
perceptual beliefs about, say, mid-sized objects. It is overwhelmingly plausible that 
evolution has selected for their truth. After all, having true perceptual beliefs would have 
enhanced the fitness of our ancestors, helping them locate food and detect environmental 
                                                
9 My template follows Kahane (2011) – with two major differences. First, he takes the first premise to say 
that robust) moral realism is correct. Given my definition of robust moral realism as epistemologically 
optimistic, that would make above template a reductio ad absurdum. That, though, seems too strong to me: 
evolutionary debunking arguments don’t show that robust moral realism is absurd. Rather, they show, if 
successful, that robust moral realism faces a significant epistemological challenge. Second, Kahane spells out 
the third premise in terms of off-track evolutionary influence. Tracking, however, suggests Nozick’s (1981) 
sensitivity, a modal condition on knowledge. Even though I discuss a modal interpretation of premise 3 in 
Chapter 2, I don’t think all evolutionary debunking arguments rely on modality. Therefore, my template 
opts for a more open formulation of premise (3). 
10 This is obviously loose talk: it is implausible that evolution explains particular moral beliefs. Rather, it 
explains our dispositions to apply moral concepts (e.g. Joyce 2001, 2006) or basic evaluative dispositions 
that shape our moral beliefs (e.g. Street 2006, 2008, 2011). However, I follow the literature on evolutionary 
debunking in assuming that this complication doesn’t matter for my argument above.  
11 I will have more to say about the nature of such evolutionary explanations in Chapter 4. However, for 
my purposes, their exact details don’t really matter for the most part – as long as such explanations don’t 
refer to robust moral facts. By side-stepping the empirical details and focusing instead on the epistemic 
significance of evolutionary explanations, I follow most of the literature on evolutionary debunking. (See, 
for example, Berker 2014.) But for more on evolutionary moral psychology, see Fraser 2014, Joyce 2006: 
Chs. 1-4, and Mogensen 2014: Ch. 1 & 2. 
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threats. So, the evolutionary explanation of perceptual beliefs refers to perceptual facts.12 
However, importantly, the evolutionary explanation of moral belief doesn’t avert to robust 
moral facts. After all, evolution hasn’t selected for true moral beliefs, but for those that are 
most fitness-enhancing. As Richard Joyce (2006) writes: ‘[w]hether we assume that the 
concepts right and wrong succeed in denoting properties in the world, or whether we think 
that they suffer from a referential failure that puts them on a par with the concepts witch 
and ghost, the plausibility of the hypothesis concerning how moral judgments evolved 
remains unaffected’ (183). Similarly, Sharon Street (2008) writes that ‘…the best 
explanation of why we tend to value our survival is not that it’s independently true that 
our survival is valuable ... but rather, much more simply, that creatures who valued their 
survival tended to do what promoted it, and therefore left more descendants’ (209). So, 
as the second premise states, evolutionary forces, not robust moral facts, explain why we 
hold certain moral beliefs. 
 
The third premise articulates an epistemic principle that ties the evolutionary explanation 
of moral belief to the defeat of moral justification or knowledge.13 More specifically, it 
says that if evolutionary theory explains how we form moral beliefs, then those beliefs 
cannot constitute knowledge or even count as justified. But why not? There are various 
ways of spelling that out. To illustrate, here are the two most influential recent 
formulations of the epistemic principle. 
 
First, Joyce (2006: 179-84) compares becoming aware of the evolutionary origins of our 
moral beliefs to finding out that we have been slipped belief pills: pills that made us form 
the true belief that, say, Napoleon lost at Waterloo. While this realization doesn’t show 
that our belief about Napoleon’s campaign is false, it seems to defeat its justification or 
‘…undermine your faith in your belief that Napoleon lost Waterloo’ (179). And once we 
become aware of their evolutionary origins, moral beliefs are no different: we should 
‘…cultivate agnosticism regarding all positive beliefs involving these [moral] concepts 
until we find some solid evidence either for or against them’ (181). In both cases, 
therefore, finding out about the origins of your beliefs defeats their justification. 
 
Second, Street (2006, 2008) argues that evolutionary explanations of moral belief raise a 
puzzle for the robust moral realist. In particular, they must specify the relationship 
between our evolved moral attitudes and the robust moral truth. But tackling that task 
lands them in a ‘Darwinian dilemma’. Either, robust moral realists could deny that the 
                                                
12 The same evolutionary vindication might extend to basic scientific, arithmetic and logical beliefs, given 
that reliable formation of such beliefs plausibly proved fitness-enhancing as well. See Joyce 2006: Ch. 6 for 
more. 
13 We usually distinguish between rebutting and undermining defeaters. Putative evolutionary defeaters are 
most plausibly thought of as the latter, not the former. (See, for instance, Mogensen 2015.) So, in what 
follows, I shall mean that by ‘defeater’, dropping the qualifier. 
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relationship between evolved moral beliefs and robust moral truths is anything other than 
random. That, though, is highly problematic: it forces the robust moral realist to 
acknowledge that ‘our normative judgments are in all likelihood hopelessly off track’ (208) 
– or means that ‘‘an astonishing coincidence took place […], that as a matter of sheer 
luck, evolutionary pressures affected our evaluative attitudes in such a way that they just 
happened to land on or near the true normative views among all the conceptually possible 
ones’ (ibid.). Since both implications seem implausible, this amounts to the first horn of 
the dilemma. Alternatively, the robust moral realist could posit a positive relationship 
between our evolved moral beliefs and robust moral truths: that it was somehow adaptive 
for our ancestors to grasp or track robust moral truths. But that is scientifically untenable: 
as stated above, evolutionary explanations of moral belief do not avert to robust moral 
facts. Evolution hasn’t selected for true moral beliefs, but for those that are most fitness-
enhancing. This constitutes the second horn of the dilemma. Caught between a rock and 
a hard place, robust moral realists seem forced to conclude that we cannot justifiably 
believe or know robust moral facts. 
 
Together, premises (1) – (3) imply moral scepticism: we cannot justifiably believe or know 
robust moral facts. So, knowledge of robust moral facts seems incompatible with 
evolutionary theory. But, of course, moral scepticism is unacceptable to robust moral 
realists. As we saw in §2, their view is committed to a form of moral non-scepticism, 
according to which we can have robust moral knowledge in epistemically favorable 
circumstances. So, evolutionary debunking arguments give us reason to reject robust 
moral realism – or, at least, to deem it significantly less attractive than initially thought. 
 
4.  A La cuna  – And  How to  Fi l l  I t  
 
Despite its initial plausibility, the evolutionary debunking argument above isn’t sound. 
The problem lies with premise (3), the epistemic principle tasked with licensing the 
inference from the existence of robust moral facts and evolutionary explanation to moral 
scepticism. As it turns out, most attempts at substantiating that principle found in the 
literature are imprecise, confused or simply implausible. To begin to see that, I want to 
revisit and closely examine the two influential recent proposals introduced above. 
 
Recall that Joyce (2006) compares becoming aware of the evolutionary origins of our 
moral beliefs to finding out that we have been slipped pills making us form the true belief 
that Napoleon lost at Waterloo. In both cases, he argues, what we find out defeats the 
beliefs’ justification. But what seems to defeat the pill-induced beliefs is our finding out 
about their groundlessness. Our evolved moral beliefs, though, do have grounds.14 For 
instance, take my belief that pain is pro tanto bad. That belief has a multitude of grounds: 
                                                
14 See White 2010: 575f. 
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that pain hurts, that most people don’t like it, that it seems intuitively bad, that denying 
the truth of its contents strikes most as absurd, and so forth. So, Joyce seems to appeal 
to an implausible epistemic principle. 
 
Similarly, the first horn of Street’s (2006, 2008) Darwinian dilemma alleges that it is 
conceptually possible, given evolution, that our moral beliefs are adaptive, yet massively 
false – and that we have no good independent reason to rule that out. So, robust moral 
realists should become moral sceptics. However, her argument relies on an epistemic 
principle familiar from arguments for scepticism about the external world: if you have no 
good independent reason to think that your perceptual beliefs are true, you cannot 
rationally maintain them.15 Those arguments, though, develop their threat without relying 
on evolution (or any other empirical assumption) and they don’t just apply to moral or 
normative beliefs. So, the epistemic principle that Street appeals to seems imprecise, 
confused and ill-suited for evolutionary debunking. 
 
Evolutionary debunkers are thus in desperate need of more compelling ways of spelling 
out premise (3) of their argument. That is the lacuna. To fill that lacuna, I propose that we 
examine three clear, precise and more plausible epistemic principles which might work 
for evolutionary debunking arguments. Together with evolutionary theory, these 
principles indeed pose a threat to knowledge of robust moral facts. The principles I have 
in mind are informed by ongoing debates in contemporary epistemology about whether 
moral reliability requires explanation (which evolution complicates), whether higher-order 
evidence of error (which evolution arguably provides) undermines justification and 
whether robust moral facts earn their epistemological keep by being cited in the 
explanation of moral beliefs (which evolutionary explanations threaten). Evolutionary 
debunkers should rely on something like one of these epistemic principles as premise (3) 
of their argument – and may sometimes implicitly do. For instance, the intuitive force of 
Joyce’s (2006) belief-pill analogy above plausibly comes down to receiving higher-order 
evidence of error that undermines justification. It is just that he fails to make that explicit. 
Street (2006, 2008) can be charitably recast as questioning whether robust moral realists 
can explain why they are morally reliable. But what would evolutionary debunking 
arguments based on these three principles look like? The final section introduces them in 
more detail and provides guidance to Chapters 2 to 5.  
 
5.  Cha p te r  P r ev i ews  
 
To conclude Chapter 1, I shall briefly elaborate on each epistemic principle – and, by 
doing so, preview the remainder of my PhD thesis. 
 
                                                
15 See Elga ms, Vavova 2015:15 and White 2010: 604.  
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The first epistemic principle states that reliability about a given domain requires 
explanation – and that, if we fail to provide one, our beliefs about that domain are 
unjustified. When combined with the thought that evolution complicates such an 
explanation for belief in robust moral facts, this principle threatens to undermine the 
justification of moral beliefs, robustly construed. Chapter 2 closely examines that form of 
the evolutionary debunking argument. 
 
To see in brief how this evolutionary debunking argument works, assume that most of 
our moral beliefs are true or that we are mostly morally reliable: we get things mostly right 
about morality. What explains our success? On reflection, it is difficult to see how robust 
moral realists could explain such success.16 To start with, robust moral facts – by 
definition – don’t cause our moral beliefs. So, we can neither directly perceive (see, hear, 
smell, etc.) them and nor rely on empirical investigation of the world to find out about 
them. Further, robust moral facts cannot depend on our moral beliefs. After all, they are 
objective: they hold independently of what we think of moral matters. So, they cannot be 
a function or construction of our moral beliefs. Finally, evolution cannot explain our moral 
reliability either: evolution favors adaptive, not true, moral beliefs. But if we cannot explain 
why we get robust moral facts mostly right, why think that we do? It looks like we are no 
longer justified in holding our moral beliefs. Moral scepticism follows. 
 
But what exactly does ‘explaining reliability’ mean? Or, put differently, what form would 
such an explanation take? Justin Clarke-Doane (2015, 2016, 2017, forthcoming) has 
argued that a good explanation of moral (mathematical, logical, etc.) reliability would show 
that our moral (mathematical, logical, etc.) beliefs are stable in a certain way. More 
specifically, our moral beliefs would have to be both sensitive to the robust moral facts 
(such that if those facts changed, so would our beliefs) and safe from error (such that they 
could not easily be false).17 But, Clarke-Doane continues, our moral beliefs already are. 
After all, they are sensitive to the robust moral facts by default: since such facts hold 
necessarily, they could not possibly change. So, any true moral belief must be sensitive as 
well. Similarly, our moral beliefs are safe from error: they are true (as we assume) and 
could not easily have evolved differently. So, our moral beliefs could not easily be false. 
In short, according to Clarke-Doane, once we realize what a good explanation of moral 
reliability looks like, it also dawns on us that we already have one. As a result, any 
evolutionary debunking argument based on the idea that evolution makes explaining 
moral reliability very hard does not work. 
 
Clarke-Doane’s attempt at securing the sensitivity and safety of our robust moral beliefs 
raises various questions. For instance, does it really succeed? Is the task of showing that 
                                                
16 Consequently, this line of argument is often called the reliability challenge. For more, see Chapter 2. 
17 For more technical definitions of these modal conditions on knowledge, see Chapter 2.  
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our moral beliefs are sensitive and safe really all there is to explaining moral reliability? Or 
are there residual epistemic worries in the vicinity? And does this task plausibly underlie 
evolutionary debunking arguments? So, further discussion seems required, which Chapter 
2 of my PhD thesis provides. In it, I argue that Clarke-Doane’s response succeeds against 
evolutionary debunking, but neglects an issue about epistemic luck that spells trouble for 
robust moral realism. 
 
The second epistemic principle says that higher-order evidence of error undermines 
justification. When combined with the idea that evolution provides us with such higher-
order evidence regarding belief in putative robustly objective moral facts, this principle 
quickly leads to moral scepticism. Chapter 3 investigates whether such an evolutionary 
debunking argument is viable. 
 
What is higher-order evidence of error? Higher-order evidence of error is evidence that 
something is wrong with one’s first-order evidence or cognitive functioning. Suppose that 
you are a competent meteorologist, reliably predicting the weather for your local TV 
station, based on data from the national weather service. You predict that there will be 
light rain in your area tomorrow afternoon. But then you learn that a fellow meteorologist 
from another local TV station disagrees, despite being equally reliable and using the same 
data as you. Here, finding out about that disagreement gives you higher-order evidence 
of error: it tells you that there is something wrong with your first-order evidence, namely 
the data from the national weather service, or how you assessed it.18 Now, what does this 
evidence do to your belief that it is going to rain tomorrow afternoon? Many believe that 
such higher-order evidence of error defeats the justification of your belief.19 After all, your 
fellow meteorologist is in the same epistemic situation as you – and you are therefore 
both equally likely to be mistaken. As a result, you should be significantly less confident 
in your own prediction of the tomorrow afternoon’s local weather. 
 
But why think that evolution provides us with higher-order evidence of error with respect 
to our moral beliefs? To see why, it helps to consider a more general phenomenon first: 
sometimes, thinking about the causes of our beliefs (or, their etiology) can provide us 
with higher-order evidence of error.20 Suppose that you grow up in a liberal community, 
coming to hold corresponding political beliefs. Once you attend university, though, you 
                                                
18 For more on peer disagreement, see Christensen 2007, Elga 2007, Feldman 2006, or Kelly 2005.  
19 This view is often called Conciliationism. For Conciliationism regarding peer disagreement, see, for 
instance, Christensen 2007, Elga 2007 or Feldman 2006. For Conciliationism regarding higher-order 
evidence more generally, see Christensen 2010 and Lasonen-Aarnio 2014. Conciliationism is by no means 
universally accepted. For criticism, see Kelly 2005, 2010 or Lackey 2008. I will have more to say about 
Conciliationism in Chapter 3. 
20 Often, these appeals are either fallacious or innocuous (see Dworkin 1996). But there are genuinely 
problematic cases covered by an emerging literature, starting with Cohen’s (2000: 16-19) and culminating 
(so far) in White 2010 and Vavova 2018. For more, see Chapter 3. 
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realize that you could easily have grown up in a conservative community instead. In that 
case, you would hold politically conservative beliefs now. So, you hold liberal beliefs just 
because you grew up in a liberal community. That insight seems unsettling, should give you 
pause and forces you to re-examine your first-order evidence in support of your political 
convictions. Here, then, thinking about the causes of your beliefs gives you higher-order 
evidence of error.21 And many have thought that this evidence defeats the justification of 
your politically liberal beliefs. Importantly, our moral beliefs are like your political beliefs 
in that respect: we hold them just because we evolved in certain ways. Had we evolved in 
different ways, we would hold different moral beliefs. For instance, we might have 
evolved to believe that we have a moral obligation to kill our firstborns. Again, that insight 
seems unsettling, forcing us to re-examine our first-order moral evidence. So, thinking 
about the evolutionary origins of our moral beliefs gives us higher-order evidence of 
error.22 And that evidence defeats the justification of our moral beliefs. As a result, moral 
sceptics looms. 
 
This evolutionary debunking argument looks attractive, drawing on interesting 
observations from recent debates about the nature of higher-order evidence and the 
epistemic significance of etiology. Still, it has not received much attention. To date, only 
Bogardus (2016) and Mogensen (2016) have put forth an argument along those lines. So, 
again, further discussion seems required, which I offer in Chapter 3. I argue that such an 
argument ultimately cannot avoid Katia Vavova’s (2014) self-defeat objection, even if the 
evolutionary debunker adopts an attractive alternative background view on the epistemic 
significance of higher-order evidence of error. 
 
The third and final epistemic principle I consider states that, for our beliefs to be justified, 
our having them must be best explained by the facts they are about. When combined with 
the idea that evolution, not robust moral facts, provides the best explanation of our moral 
beliefs, this principle can quickly lead to moral scepticism: our moral beliefs are 
unjustified. Chapter 4 develops and critically assesses an evolutionary debunking 
argument along those lines. 
 
The principle articulates a plausible explanatory constraint on justified belief. For instance, 
consider your perceptual belief that there is a coffee mug on the desk in front of you. If it 
turned out that the fact that there is indeed a coffee mug on the desk in front of you did 
not best explain why you hold the corresponding belief, your belief would – intuitively – 
not be justified. The same seems to hold true for our scientific beliefs. Suppose you form 
                                                
21 There is a nascent debate about what kind of higher-order evidence etiology provides. According to some, 
it is peer disagreement, according to others, fallibility. See Chapter 3 for more. 
22 Again, contributors to the literature disagree about whether evolutionary theory provides evidence of 
possible moral peer disagreement or evidence of moral unreliability for robust moral realists. We shall engage 
with that issue in depth in Chapter 3. 
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the belief that a proton is in the cloud chamber, based on your observation of a vapor 
trail (which you know to reliably indicate that). Here, your belief is best explained by the 
fact that there is indeed a proton in the cloud chamber. So, it seems plausible that, for our 
beliefs to be justified, they must best explained by the facts they are about. But what about 
our (robustly) moral beliefs? Here, matters get slightly more complicated. Suppose you 
believe that killing your own children would be a serious moral wrong (at least ceteris 
paribus). What best explains that belief? To start with, it seems implausible that your belief 
is directly caused by the robust moral fact that killing your own children is seriously wrong. 
After all, such facts don’t have causal powers. So, you cannot perceive moral wrongness. 
But neither is it plausible that you rely on empirical investigation of the world to figure it 
out. Instead, what best explains your moral belief might be evolution: killing your own 
children would not be adaptive, for it ends their survival prospects. So, more generally, 
facts about evolution, not robust moral facts, seem to best explain why we hold our moral 
beliefs. That, though, once again quickly leads to moral scepticism, given that, for our 
beliefs to be justified, the facts they are about must figure in best explanation of why we 
have them.23 
 
Surprisingly, despite its apparent simplicity, few have examined this evolutionary 
debunking argument in depth.24 So, the discussion I provide in Chapter 4 is pressing. 
More specifically, I offer a systematic, comprehensive defense of an argument along those 
lines, showing that neither Andreas Mogensen’s (2015, 2016) recent observations about 
the nature of evolutionary explanation, nor Terrence Cuneo’s (2007) companion in guilt 
strategy nor David Enoch’s (2012, 2016) appeal to deliberative indispensability should 
make us doubt its soundness. 
 
By the end of Chapter 4, I will have completed the second step of my investigation. More 
specifically, I will have developed and critically assessed three new versions of the 
evolutionary debunking argument, based on clear and independently plausible epistemic 
principles. My discussion will have shown that anybody committed to robust moral 
objectivity faces two distinct epistemic worries. The first, articulated in Chapter 2, is 
loosely inspired by evolutionary debunking and centers on epistemic luck. Meanwhile, the 
second, as discussed in Chapter 4, is directly raised by evolutionary considerations, 
focusing on whether robust moral facts figure in the best explanation of why we hold our 
moral beliefs. 
 
Chapter 5 investigates whether robust moral realism can deal with both the worry about 
epistemic luck raised in Chapter 2 and the explanatory challenge developed in Chapter 4. 
However, making progress on that issue requires a better idea of how we form true, 
                                                
23 Of course, this is an evolutionary version of Harman’s (1977) challenge.  
24 Woods 2016 is the notable exception. More on him follows in Chapter 4. 
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justified beliefs about and acquire knowledge of robust moral facts. Since it is the most 
popular and best-developed moral epistemology available to robust moral realism, my 
inquiry in Chapter 5 focuses on contemporary moral intuitionism, the view that moral 
intuitions can be the source of basic moral knowledge. I argue that its success is mixed. 
While moral intuitionism has the conceptual tools to tackle the problem of epistemic luck 
developed in Chapter 2, it cannot insulate robust beliefs about substantive moral matters 
against the worry raised by best evolutionary explanation argument in Chapter 4. As a 
result, robust moral realism is saddled with unacceptable moral scepticism: we cannot 
justifiably believe substantive facts about morality, robustly construed. While evolution 
doesn’t imperil the mere possibility of robustly moral knowledge, it undermines any claim 
to know what robust morality is substantively like. 
 
Admittedly, the discussion of my PhD thesis will be most directly relevant to those 
invested in the debate about evolutionary debunking specifically or the viability of robust 
moral realism more generally. Still, the dialectic of Chapters 2 to 5 should also, more 
broadly, be of interest to meta-ethicists or epistemologists who don’t follow the 
evolutionary debunking debate or who think that robust moral realism is a non-starter for 
other reasons. How so?  
 
As we have seen, my discussion will revolve around three general, independently plausible 
epistemic principles, having to do with the nature of reliability to the epistemic 
significance of higher-order evidence and the relevance of explanation to justification. 
Importantly, those principles are central to any foundational debate in the epistemology 
of the normative and, more generally, the apriori. For example, it would be fruitful to ask 
whether reliability about logic requires explanation – or what role prudential facts exactly 
play in the formation of beliefs about prudential value. Further, my investigation doesn’t 
just appeal to those principles in order to gauge the viability of different evolutionary 
debunking arguments. Rather, by examining how those principles work (or don’t work) 
in the context of evolutionary debunking, we also generate insights into how to formulate 
them most compellingly – and how to apply them to other domains. Put differently, 
through applying these general epistemic principles extensively to the evolutionary 
debunking of robust moral belief, we find ways of refining them. For instance, if my line 
of argument in Chapter 2 is correct, ‘explaining reliability’ is best understood as a 
requirement on normative or apriori knowledge, not justified normative or apriori belief. 
In that manner, my discussion should be of interest to anyone working on the 
epistemological foundations of the normative and, more generally, the apriori. 
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CHAPTER 2: EXPLAINING RELIABILITY 
 
1 .  In t r oduct ion  
 
Evolutionary debunking arguments attempt to show that the evolutionary theory, when 
combined with a commitment to robust moral objectivity, leads to moral scepticism: the 
view that we lack moral knowledge or that our moral beliefs are never justified. But which 
epistemic principle licenses that inference? Recently, a promising suggestion has garnered 
significant philosophical attention: the fact that we are reliable in a given domain requires 
explanation – and if we cannot provide one, our beliefs about that domain are unjustified.1 
When combined with the idea that reflection on evolution undermines such an 
explanation in the moral case, this principle implies moral scepticism. 
 
In response, Justin Clarke-Doane (2015, 2016, 2017, forthcoming) has argued that 
evolutionary considerations do not undermine an explanation of reliability in the moral 
case. According to him, a good explanation of moral reliability requires that our robust 
moral beliefs be modally stable. More specifically, our moral beliefs would have to be both 
sensitive to the robust moral facts (such that if those facts changed, so would our beliefs) 
and safe from error (such that they could not easily be false). But, Clarke-Doane continues, 
our moral beliefs already are: they are trivially sensitive, given that robust moral facts hold 
necessarily, and safe, given their actual truth and the fact that they could not easily have 
evolved differently. In short, once we realize what a good explanation of moral reliability 
looks like, it also dawns on us that we already have one. 
 
In this chapter, my aim is to argue that Clarke-Doane’s line is mistaken: as moral instances 
of Gettier (1963) cases illustrate, robust moral beliefs can be epistemically lucky – and 
therefore insensitive and unsafe. That insight, in turn, allows me to recast the principle 
that reliability requires explanation. Its explanatory demand isn’t trivial. Rather, it forces 
robust moral realists to offer an account of why their moral beliefs, even if these are 
necessarily true and justified, aren’t epistemically lucky. And if they fail to do so, they 
cannot claim to know robust moral facts. However, as I shall argue, reconceiving of the 
principle in that manner has significant implications for evolutionary debunking. Since 
the principle doesn’t plausibly combine with evolutionary considerations to yield moral 
scepticism, it cannot serve as the key premise of an evolutionary debunking argument. So, 
                                                
1 For some relevant references, see footnote 2 below. ‘Robust moral belief’ is a shorthand for ‘moral belief 
about (or purporting to be about) robust moral facts’. ‘Robust’ doesn’t imply anything about its epistemic 
credentials. 
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my response to Clarke-Doane highlights a worry about epistemic luck widely overlooked 
by robust moral realists. But, more importantly, my discussion shows that evolutionary 
debunking arguments, conceived as challenges to explain the reliability of moral belief, 
fail. As a result, we need a different epistemic principle for evolution to debunk robust 
moral knowledge. 
 
Here is my plan. In §2, I introduce the principle that reliability requires explanation and 
explain its putative role in evolutionary debunking arguments. In §3, I present Clarke-
Doane’s criticism in more detail. In §4, I argue – contra Clarke-Doane – that robust moral 
beliefs aren’t already modally stable and proceed to spell out the implications for our 
understanding of the principle that reliability requires explanation. In §5, I show that the 
reconceived principle cannot plausibly serve as the key epistemic premise of the 
evolutionary debunking argument developed in §2. In §6, I defend my line of argument 
against two recent alternative formulations of the principle by Kieran Setiya (2013) and 
Matt Bedke (2014), respectively. 
 
2 .  Evo lu t iona r y  Debunk ing  a nd  Exp l a in ing  Mor a l  
Re l i a b i l i ty  
 
Evolutionary debunking arguments attempt to show that knowledge of robust moral facts 
stands in tension with evolutionary theory. To succeed, these arguments must rely on 
epistemic principles that license the inference from the commitment to the robust 
objectivity of moral facts and the evolutionary explanation of moral belief to moral 
scepticism. However, as we saw in Chapter 1, identifying such principles proves harder 
than perhaps initially thought. 
 
In response, many have recently made the following promising suggestion: reliability 
requires explanation – and if we fail to provide one in the moral case, our moral beliefs 
are unjustified. When combined with the thought that evolution renders such an 
explanation impossible, this principle would force the robust moral realists to embrace 
moral scepticism. Put more formally, the resulting argument reads as follows:2 
 
                                                
2 Both proponents and critics of evolutionary debunking seem to advance an argument along those lines, 
either explicitly (e.g. Bedke 2014, Clarke-Doane 2012 & 2013 & 2015, Enoch 2010 & 2012: Ch. 7, Schechter 
2010, Setiya 2013: Ch. 2-4) or implicitly (e.g. Berker 2014, Copp 2008, Schafer 2010, Shafer-Landau 2012, 
Street 2006 & 2008). However, there is disagreement about the exact role played by evolutionary 
explanations in the argument. See below for more on that. 
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(1) If we fail to explain why we are reliable in a given domain, we cannot justifiably 
believe facts about that domain. 
(2) Evolutionary explanations of moral belief make it impossible to explain why we 
are reliable with respect to morality, robustly construed. 
(3) Therefore, we cannot justifiably believe robust moral facts.3 
 
In the remainder of this section, I shall briefly explain what these premises mean, why 
they might be true – and how they jointly seem to entail the conclusion. 
 
The first premise articulates the principle at the heart of the so-called reliability challenge 
to robust forms of realism about the apriori.4 To understand how that challenge arises in 
the moral case, assume first that most of our moral beliefs are true or that we are mostly 
morally reliable: we get robust moral facts mostly right. What explains that? On reflection, 
that is difficult to see. To start with, robust moral facts – by definition – don’t cause our 
moral beliefs. So, we cannot directly perceive (see, hear, smell, etc.) them. And since they 
– by definition – aren’t reducible to or identical with scientific facts, we cannot rely on 
scientific theorizing to find out about them either. Further, robust moral facts cannot 
depend on our moral beliefs. After all, they are objective: they hold independently of what 
we think of moral matters. So, they cannot be a function of our moral beliefs. But if we 
cannot (even in principle) explain why we get robust moral facts mostly right, why think 
that we do? It looks like we are no longer justified in holding our robust moral beliefs. 
Moral scepticism seems to follow. 
 
Three aspects of the epistemic principle that makes up the first premise are worth 
elaborating on. As already mentioned, the principle is broad in scope: it applies generally 
to robust forms of realism about the apriori. After all, explaining why one’s beliefs are 
mostly true seems puzzling for any domain populated by facts with certain putative 
metaphysical characteristics. More specifically, explaining reliability seems problematic 
when the facts we attempt to form beliefs about lack causal powers and hold 
independently of what we think about them. In addition to robust moral facts, robust 
mathematical, logical, modal and perhaps even epistemic facts fit that bill. And the 
literature bears that out: the contemporary philosophical discussion of the principle starts 
                                                
3 For the sake of argument, the evolutionary debunker allows the robust moral realist to assume that robust 
moral facts exist. Further, we may assume that evolutionary theory indeed explains how we form moral 
beliefs. 
4 See references in fn. 2 for the reliability challenge to robust moral realism. In addition, the principle also 
raises a challenge for robust mathematical (e.g. Clarke-Doane 2012 & 2013 & 2015 & 2016 & 2017 & 
forthcoming) and logical (e.g. Schechter 2010 & 2013) realism. 
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with the Field-Benaceraff challenge to robust mathematical realism – and much of the 
most recent discussion, including Justin Clarke-Doane’s (2012, 2014, 2015, 2016, 2017, 
forthcoming) contribution presented in §3 below, still primarily engages with that. So, 
the principle isn’t restricted to the robust moral domain, but seems perfectly general. 
 
Second, the principle is forceful, for it doesn’t depend on an idiosyncratic epistemological 
background picture. Therefore, it cannot be easily dismissed. For example, it does not 
presuppose the causal theory of justification or knowledge.5 Rather, it only appeals to a 
plausibly necessary condition on justification: for a belief to be justified, it cannot be 
impossible to explain why it might be true or reliably formed. Similarly, the challenge 
does not assume the truth of externalism about justification, even though it is cashed out 
in terms of reliability.6 Of course, doing so would beg the question against many forms of 
robust moral realism. After all, many robust moral realists subscribe to epistemic 
internalism: they take justification to be a matter of what is reflectively accessible to an 
epistemic subject, not of whether her cognitive faculties are reliable.7 However, should the 
explanatory demand above indeed remain unmet, even epistemic internalists need to 
worry. For if we cannot explain why we get robust facts about the apriori mostly right, 
why think that we do at all? In other words, failing to explain reliability provides evidence 
that our belief-forming faculties about a given domain are unreliable. And while epistemic 
internalists can allow for unreliably formed, yet justified beliefs, they cannot plausibly 
argue that beliefs knowingly formed in an unreliable fashion are still justified.8 
 
Third and finally, the principle is distinctive. Most notably, it is not just a thinly veiled re-
statement of a more general or radically sceptical challenge for perceptual belief (about 
the external world). First, it is comparably easy to explain why our perceptual beliefs are 
reliably formed: they are caused by perceptual facts. So, in the case of perceptual beliefs, 
the antecedent of the conditional encoding the principle turns out to be false. Further, 
the principle does not invoke the possibility of massive, yet undetected error.9 Instead, the 
                                                
5 See Clarke-Doane 2017. In that respect, Field’s (1989) formulation of the challenge to robust mathematical 
realism improves on Benaceraff’s (1973). 
6 This point is widely accepted in the literature on evolutionary debunking and reliability challenges. See, 
for instance, Joyce 2006: 179-182 or Enoch 2010: 423f., respectively. For more on the distinction between 
epistemic internalism and externalism, see Pappas 2017. 
7 See Chapter 5 for further discussion of a prominent form of internalism in moral epistemology, namely 
moral intuitionism. 
8 Put differently, while reliability may not be necessary for justification, evidence of unreliability is surely 
sufficient for defeating justification, even for epistemic internalists. 
9 In addition to avoiding such sceptical hypotheses, the principle also doesn’t appeal to closure or evidential 
under-determination, as standard formulations of arguments for radical scepticism do. See, for example, 
Prichard 2005a. 
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principle grants the approximate truth and defeasible justification of beliefs about robust 
apriori facts.10 Then, it insists that, if the robust realist about the apriori cannot explain 
why her beliefs are formed reliably, that undermines the defeasible justification of those 
beliefs. So, the principle is moderately, not radically, sceptical – and therefore articulates a 
distinctive epistemic worry for robust realism about the apriori. 
 
The second premise states that evolutionary explanations of moral belief make it 
impossible to explain why we are reliable with respect to morality, robustly construed. 
How so? As we saw in Chapter 1, evolutionary processes favor adaptive, not robustly true, 
moral beliefs. So, evolution cannot explain why we would get robust moral facts mostly 
right. (In that respect, moral beliefs differ significantly from perceptual beliefs: having true 
perceptual beliefs would have enhanced the fitness of our ancestors. Therefore, evolution 
could explain why we get perceptual facts mostly right.) That, however, deepens the 
mystery of moral reliability. So far, we have seen that moral beliefs can neither be directly 
caused by nor themselves fix robust moral facts. But it gets worse: neither did our moral 
beliefs evolve to be about robust moral facts.11 By implication, it is even more difficult – 
perhaps impossible – to see why we would ever be reliable in our moral beliefs. 
 
Admittedly, some contributors to the literature doubt that the appeal to evolutionary 
theory in the second premise adds much to the challenge of explaining moral reliability. 
According to them, the evolutionary story serves a merely heuristic or illustrative purpose: 
it supplies some details as to why moral beliefs aren’t caused by robust moral facts. But, 
in principle, any other causal explanation that is indifferent to robust moral truth (e.g. 
cultural background, upbringing, neurochemistry) would do the trick. Therefore, the 
evolutionary debunking argument above, based on the principle that reliability requires 
explanation, is simply an instance of the more general challenge to moral reliability. As 
David Enoch (2010: 426) writes: ‘…[f]or robust [moral] realists, though, it is quite safe 
to assume that Street’s dilemma is merely a particular instance of the general 
epistemological challenge’.12 There is nothing distinctively evolutionary about it. 
 
But I think that this assessment is too hasty: on closer inspection, the evolutionary 
explanation of moral belief does indeed significantly complicate the explanation of moral 
reliability. After all, not all causal, putatively truth-indifferent explanations are created 
equal. Rather, some have the potential to serve as or, at least, facilitate an explanation of 
                                                
10 See Clarke-Doane 2017: 21 or Enoch 2010: 420. 
11 Of course, some robust moral realists question that assumption, developing so-called third-factor 
explanations of moral reliability. Chapter 5 will examine those in depth. 
12 Bedke 2014 and Klenk 2017 echo that sentiment. 
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reliability. And evolutionary explanations are amongst them: plausibly, an evolutionary 
story could be told about why we get robust logical or mathematical facts mostly right.13 
But, importantly, we couldn’t do the same with respect to our reliability about robust 
moral facts. So, the unavailability of an evolutionary explanation of moral reliability adds 
something to the challenge, making it even more difficult to meet. In that sense, the appeal 
to evolutionary theory in the second premise does play a distinctive role in motivating 
moral scepticism. 
 
Jointly, premises (1) to (2) seem to entail (3): that we cannot justifiably believe robust 
moral facts. So, justified belief about robust moral facts seems incompatible with 
evolutionary theory. But, of course, that kind of moral scepticism is unacceptable to 
robust moral realists. As we saw in Chapter 1, their view is committed to the claim that 
we can justifiably believe robust moral facts under epistemically favorable conditions. 
Therefore, robust moral realism is in trouble. 
 
But how compelling is the argument above really? In what follows, I shall first present a 
recent criticism of its key principle that reliability requires explanation, which evolution 
problematizes in the moral case (§3), before developing my conception of the principle in 
response (§4) and examining its suitability for evolutionary debunking (§5). 
 
3 .  Tr i v i a l i z ing  Mor a l  Re l i a b i l i ty  by  Moda l i z ing  I t  
 
In a recent series of papers, Justin Clarke-Doane (2015, 2016, 2017, forthcoming) has 
argued that evolutionary considerations do not undermine an explanation of reliability in 
the moral case.14 According to him, once we truly understand what a good explanation of 
moral reliability looks like, it also dawns on us that we already have one. As a result, any 
evolutionary debunking argument based on the idea that evolution makes explaining 
moral reliability impossible does not work. In this section, my aim is to present Clarke-
Doane’s argument in more detail, thus setting the stage for my critical assessment of it in 
the remainder of the chapter. 
 
Clarke-Doane’s argument proceeds in two distinct steps. First, he points out that it is 
unclear what exactly ‘explaining reliability’ means, even though the evolutionary debunker 
demands it and says that evolution makes such explanations impossible in the moral case. 
                                                
13 See Schechter 2013 for logic and Kitcher 2005 for mathematics. 
14 In an earlier paper, Clarke-Doane (2012) defends a sensitivity-based evolutionary debunking argument 
both against robust moral and mathematical realism. So, the series of more recent papers discussed in this 
chapter prove a significant departure from his earlier work. 
19  
To fill that lacuna, Clarke-Doane offers a distinctively modal interpretation of what it 
means to ‘explain reliability’.15 In more detail, he suggests that a good explanation of moral 
reliability would show that our moral beliefs are stable in a certain way. More precisely, 
our moral beliefs would have to be both sensitive to the robust moral facts and safe from 
moral error. Both sensitivity and safety are technical modal notions: a subject’s S belief 
that p is sensitive if and only if, were p false, S would not believe that p.16 And a subject’s 
S belief that p counts as safe if and only if, were S to believe p (in close-by possible worlds), 
p would be true.17 So, a good explanation of moral reliability would demonstrate that our 
moral beliefs change in accordance with the robust moral facts and couldn’t easily be false. 
Conversely, if we lacked such an explanation, we would have reason to believe that our 
robust moral beliefs were insensitive and/or unsafe. And that, in turn, might defeat their 
justification.18 
 
Second, Clarke-Doane argues that our moral beliefs are already modally stable – and we 
thus have a good explanation of why we get the robust moral facts mostly right. To begin 
with, our moral beliefs are trivially sensitive to the robust moral facts. Recall that a belief 
that p is sensitive just in case, were p false, we would not believe p. But if p is a basic, 
metaphysically necessary moral truth (e.g. killing sentient beings just for fun is morally 
wrong), there is simply no metaphysically possible world in which p is false (e.g. it is 
permissible to kill sentient beings for fun). And since we may assume that our moral belief 
that p is true, it must therefore also be sensitive. In short, our moral beliefs are sensitive 
to the robust moral facts by default: since such facts hold necessarily, they could not 
possibly change. So, any true moral belief must be sensitive as well.  
 
Similarly, our moral beliefs are safe from error, given their truth and evolutionary history. 
To see why, recall that a belief that p is safe just in case, were we to believe that p (in close-
by possible worlds), p would be true. But, as mentioned in §2, we may assume that our 
moral beliefs are actually true. Moreover, we have a perfectly plausible evolutionary 
explanation why we end up holding the moral beliefs that we do – and could not have 
ended up with radically different explanatorily basic moral beliefs. (For example, given 
our evolutionary past, we could not easily have ended up believing that pleasure was pro 
tanto bad, that suicide was morally required or that parents don’t have moral obligations 
to look after our children.) Putting those two claims together, we would hold that same 
                                                
15 He takes his proposal to be perfectly general, covering the demand to explain mathematical and logical 
reliability as well. However, for ease of exposition, I shall focus on moral reliability in the main text. 
16 For sensitivity as a condition on knowledge, see Nozick 1981. 
17 For safety as a condition on knowledge, see Pritchard 2005b, Sosa 1999, and Williamson 2000. 
18 I will have to say more about which necessary condition on defeat Clarke-Doane takes to underlie the 
reliability challenge below. 
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true moral beliefs in close-by possible worlds – which is tantamount to saying that our 
robust moral beliefs are safe.19 So, according to Clarke-Doane, our moral beliefs are both 
sensitive to the robust moral facts and safe from error. In other words, they are modally 
stable. But that is all a good explanation of moral reliability requires. So, our moral 
reliability has been explained – and our robust moral beliefs therefore remain justified. 
 
What does Clarke-Doane take his argument to show more generally? It trivializes the 
explanatory demand raised by the principle that, if we fail to explain why we are reliable 
in a given domain, we cannot justifiably believe facts about that domain. More precisely, 
for the principle to have any undermining force, he thinks that it would need to turn on 
the following necessary condition on defeat: ‘If information, E, undermines all of our 
beliefs of a kind, D, then it does so by giving us reason to doubt that our D-beliefs are 
both sensitive and safe’ (2016: 31). But this condition – which we might call Modal 
Defeat20 – is never met for robust moral beliefs, for we can show that they are both sensitive 
and safe. We thus don’t have reason to doubt their modal stability. So, reliability is easy 
to explain in the moral case, in spite of evolutionary considerations. By implication, any 
evolutionary debunking argument based on the idea that evolution makes explaining 
moral reliability impossible must fail. 
 
Clarke-Doane’s attack on the principle that reliability requires explanation is thought-
provoking, but I don’t think it succeeds. While I am on board with his distinctively modal 
interpretation of what it means to ‘explain reliability’, I think we should resist the second 
step of his argument, namely that our robust moral beliefs are already modally stable. To 
make visible why our robust moral beliefs are more modally precarious than Clarke-Doane 
admits, I argue in §4 below that robust moral beliefs can be epistemically lucky. 
 
4 .  Mor a l  Re l i a b i l i ty ,  Moda l  S ta b i l i ty  a nd  Ep i s temic  Luck  
 
In this section, I argue – contra Clarke-Doane – that robust moral beliefs aren’t already 
modally stable, despite being necessarily true, defeasibly justified and evolved (§4.1). 
Then, I spell out the implications for our understanding of the principle that reliability 
                                                
19 Admittedly, I doubt that all our basic – let alone most non-basic – moral beliefs can plausibly be explained 
in evolutionary terms. However, I shall grant Clarke-Doane that assumption for the sake of argument. My 
criticism follows in §4 and §5 below. 
20 Clarke-Doane (2015, 2016, 2017, forthcoming) calls this condition ‘Modal Security’. But that strikes me 
as misleading: the condition concerns defeat, not justification, knowledge, ‘modal security’ – or any other 
positive epistemic status for that matter. And that distinction is important, if often missed (see, for instance, 
Mogensen ms: Ch. 4). For criticism of ‘Modal Security’, see Woods 2016. 
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requires explanation (§4.2). I conclude by defending my line of argument against a 
potential worry (§4.3). 
 
4.1.  Epistemic Luck and Modal Instability 
 
As we saw in §3 above, Clarke-Doane argues that our moral beliefs are already modally 
stable: they are both sensitive to the robust moral facts and safe from error. Thus, we 
already are in possession of a good explanation of why we get the robust moral facts mostly 
right. However, Clarke-Doane’s line of argument strikes me as fishy. But why? Here’s a 
hunch: it seems problematic that the modal status of the truths we form beliefs about or 
their evolutionary history guarantees our infallibility. After all, reliability is a property of 
belief-forming processes, not (true) propositions or belief contents – or, for that matter, 
evolutionary processes. So, the combination of metaphysics and evolutionary history 
should not fix epistemology in that manner.21  
 
But why exactly not? One way to corroborate this hunch and start developing a response 
would be to show that robust moral beliefs can be epistemically deficient, despite being 
necessarily true, defeasibly justified and evolved. For if they could be epistemically 
deficient, evolutionary history and the metaphysics of robust moral truth would no longer 
fix our moral epistemology. But in what sense are such robust moral beliefs epistemically 
deficient? Despite being necessarily true, defeasibly justified and evolved, robust moral 
beliefs can be epistemically lucky, as illustrated by moral Gettier (1963) cases. Epistemically 
lucky beliefs, however, are both insensitive and unsafe – and therefore modally unstable.22  
So, Clarke-Doane’s argument is unsound: our robust moral beliefs aren’t already modally 
stable. But if they don’t already exhibit modal stability, their reliability hasn’t been 
explained yet. 
 
Why think that robust moral beliefs can be epistemically lucky? We should think that moral 
beliefs can be epistemically lucky if we can, as mentioned above, find moral Gettier (1963) 
cases. In such cases, our moral beliefs are true and justified, yet lucky – and therefore not 
knowledge. So, are there moral Gettier cases? In my view, there are, even though they are 
rather hard to find.23 To begin, let’s examine a non-moral Gettier case that illustrates more 
                                                
21 See also Besson 2009: 5 for a similar point regarding metaphysics. 
22 See Pritchard 2005b: 133-41 and Orozco 2011 for more on kinds of epistemic luck. Most of them (e.g. 
capacity, evidential and content luck) don’t undermine knowledge and/or modal stability. The same holds 
for the lucky use of a reliable method, as I shall argue in §6.1. below. However, veritic luck, i.e. that it is a 
matter of luck that the agent’s belief is true, plausibly precludes knowledge, as illustrated by Gettier-style 
cases. Hence it is the focus of this section. 
23 There are – in my estimation – two main reasons for this. First, many consider moral testimony to be 
epistemically problematic. That rules out testimony-style moral Gettier cases modeled after Besson’s (2009) 
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generally that even beliefs about necessary, namely mathematical, facts can be 
epistemically lucky. Consider: 
 
Broken Calculator: you rely on your very trustworthy pocket calculator to 
form a belief about the product of ’11 x 12’. You type it in and your calculator 
gives you the correct answer, namely ‘132’. But, unbeknownst to you, your 
calculator has recently broken and generates random results.24 
 
This case seems to show that we can form true, justified, yet epistemically lucky, 
mathematical beliefs, even though mathematical facts hold necessarily. After all, your 
mathematical belief is true and necessarily so: 11 x 12 equates 132. Further, your belief is 
justified: up until now, using your calculator has been a highly reliable method of 
mathematical belief-formation. However, your mathematical belief is also epistemically 
lucky, given that you are using an unknowingly broken calculator. Had you typed in 
another set of multiplying factors or used the calculator at another time, you might have 
gotten a different, incorrect answer. So, you were lucky that you got it right – and thus, 
intuitively, you don’t know that 11 x 12 equates 132. 
 
The Broken Calculator scenario above provides us with a model for Gettier cases about 
necessarily true beliefs: combine the bad luck of a usually highly reliable, yet broken, 
method of belief-formation with the good luck of correct belief. So, can we come up with 
a structurally similar case for robust moral beliefs? I think we can. However, before we 
can construct a moral analogue to Broken Calculator, we need to fix our method of moral 
belief-formation. For the time being, let’s just stipulate that a basic form of moral 
intuitionism is true: intuiting certain true moral propositions is sufficient for moral 
justification and knowledge.25 Thus, we get:  
 
Brain Lesion: suppose that you highly reliably intuit (and thus know) various 
moral truths. However, curiously enough, you have never thought about 
whether honesty is a virtue or not. One night, without realizing, you suffer a 
                                                
Gettier cases for logic. Second, since moral facts hold as a matter of metaphysically necessity (and we 
quantify over metaphysically possible worlds), we struggle to construct Goldman’s (1976) Fake-Barn-style 
Gettier cases. After all, there are no metaphysically possible worlds in which, say, torturing children is 
morally permissible (you are surrounded by fake barns) even though it seems impermissible (you seem to 
look at a real barn) and actually is (you are looking at the only real barn in miles). As a result, we have to 
settle for Gettier-style cases for moral belief modelled after broken calculator scenarios, as I do below. 
24 See Huemer 2005: 123, Miscevic 2007: 49, 56, Pritchard 2012: 10, Roland & Cogburn 2011: 4. 
25 For a comprehensive characterization and in-depth critical assessment of moral intuitionism, see Chapter 
5. 
23  
brain lesion, which has the following effect: you find intuitively compelling 
any moral proposition you entertain. Luckily for you, though, the first moral 
proposition you entertain the next morning is that honesty is a virtue, which 
is necessarily true.26 
 
This case, as Broken Calculator above, seems to show that we can form true, justified, yet 
epistemically lucky, moral beliefs. And that is so even though robust moral facts hold as a 
matter of metaphysical necessity. After all, your moral belief is true and necessarily so: 
honesty is indeed a virtue. Further, your belief is justified: up until now, intuiting moral 
truths has been a highly reliable method of moral belief-formation, often resulting in 
robust moral knowledge. However, your moral belief is also epistemically lucky, given that 
you – without realizing – suffer from a brain lesion that makes you find intuitively 
compelling any moral proposition you entertain. So, if you had considered a moral 
falsehood (e.g. it is morally required to kill one’s first born), you would have formed a 
corresponding false moral belief. So, you were lucky that you got it right – and thus you 
don’t know that honesty is a virtue. 
 
What does epistemic luck have to do with modal stability, though? In both Broken 
Calculator and Brain Lesion, you don’t know due to epistemic luck. That lack of 
knowledge, however, can plausibly be explained by the lack of modal stability: your beliefs 
are neither sensitive to the robust mathematical or moral facts nor safe from error. To 
begin with, your method of belief-formation in both scenarios isn’t appropriately sensitive 
to the facts. Had you typed in a different multiplication (e.g. 11 x 11 = 132) or considered 
another moral proposition (e.g. it is morally required that one kill one’s firstborn), you 
would have still believed them, despite their falsity. Put more formally, it is not the case 
that, if p were false, you would not believe that p. So, it looks as if robust mathematical 
and moral beliefs could be insensitive.27 Further, both cases also seem to show that 
necessarily true belief and evolution are not sufficient for safety. After all, we could easily 
                                                
26 A word on the choice of candidate moral proposition: nothing hinges on it. According to Huemer (2005: 
102), there is a moral intuition with the content to that effect, where intuition is an apriori, basic (i.e. non-
inferential) source of knowledge about necessary moral truths. However, my case can be run with any moral 
proposition that the moral intuitionist wants to classify as intuitive, apriori and necessary (e.g. suffering is 
bad). For more on moral intuitionism, see Chapter 5. 
27 Importantly, neither your mathematical belief in Broken Calculator nor your moral belief in Brain 
Lesion is vacuously or trivially sensitive (or safe), just because its content is a metaphysically necessary 
truth. We can see that by plausibly relativizing sensitivity (and safety) to the basis or method of belief 
formation (cf. Pritchard 2012: 10). Interestingly, Clarke-Doane seems to think that, in this context, method-
relativization only works for safety, yet not sensitivity. This strikes me as implausible, as I discuss further in 
§4.3 below. 
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add an evolutionary story about why we hold core mathematical and moral beliefs (such 
as that 11 x 12 = 132 or that honesty is a virtue). If we did so, however, both the method 
in Broken Calculator and Brain Lesion would remain unsafe: based on it, in close-by 
possible worlds, you could easily form false mathematical or moral beliefs such as that 11 
x 12 does not equate 132 or that being insensitive to others is virtuous. 
 
In sum, Clarke-Doane is wrong: our moral beliefs are not already modally stable, despite 
being necessarily true, defeasibly justified and evolved. Rather, as illustrated by Brain 
Lesion above, they can be both insensitive to the robust moral facts and unsafe from error. 
As a result, we still lack a good explanation of why we get the robust moral facts mostly 
right. 
 
4.2.  Reviving the Principle That Reliability Requires Explanation 
 
What does my line of response imply for our understanding of the principle that reliability 
requires explanation? To begin with, we remain committed to the distinctively modal 
interpretation of ‘explaining reliability’. According to that interpretation, a good 
explanation of moral reliability amounts to establishing that our robust moral beliefs are 
modally stable. However, my response developed above shows that – pace Clarke-Doane 
– the explanatory demand the principle articulates isn’t trivial. Rather, it forces robust 
moral realists to put forth an account for why our moral beliefs aren’t epistemically lucky. 
If they failed to do so, then they wouldn’t have an account of why our moral beliefs are 
modally stable – and thus in the market for moral knowledge. In other words, the 
challenge to explain moral reliability turns out to be an instance of the more general 
problem of epistemic luck.28 But robust moral realists haven’t done anything yet to address 
that worry – and their moral beliefs are thus still at risk. So, the principle that reliability 
requires explanation is far from toothless: if we fail to explain moral reliability, we cannot 
know robust moral facts. 
 
Reviving the principle that reliability requires explanation along the lines of epistemic luck 
is attractive. Remarkably, it manages to be both reasonably conservative and original. How 
so? First, my understanding preserves most of the distinctive features of reliability 
challenges, as explicated in §2. Reconceived as a puzzle about epistemic luck, the principle 
is still broad in scope: it applies to other forms of robust apriori realism. For instance, we 
can construct Gettier-style scenarios for robust mathematical beliefs, as illustrated by 
Broken Calculator above. Further, the principle doesn’t rely on an idiosyncratic 
                                                
28 See Setiya 2013: Chs. 3 & 4 for a somewhat similar claim. However, as we shall see in §6.1. below, Setiya 
relies on a different, non-modal notion of epistemic luck that isn’t illustrated by Gettier cases. 
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epistemological background picture. After all, it doesn’t presuppose the causal theory of 
justification or knowledge (since Brain Lesion and similar cases don’t appeal to any causal 
requirements) and it proves problematic for both epistemic internalists and externalists 
(for both camps struggle equally with finding an anti-luck condition on knowledge).29 
Finally, the principle doesn’t give rise to a form of radical scepticism, for it allows that the 
beliefs in question be (necessarily) true and defeasibly justified. (However, as I shall argue 
in §5 below, it is questionable whether the principle, together with evolutionary 
considerations, leads to the moderately sceptical conclusion that we lack moral knowledge.) 
In sum, my conception of the principle that reliability requires explanation is reasonably 
conservative.30 
 
Second, my suggestion is also original: the issue of epistemic luck has been widely 
overlooked in contemporary moral epistemology. In fact, there is almost no discussion of 
epistemic luck and moral knowledge, whether in the context of explaining reliability or 
beyond.31 Further, there is very little discussion of epistemic luck in the context of non-
inferential apriori knowledge more generally (e.g. logic, mathematics or modality).32 That 
is surprising, given the importance of epistemic luck to discussions in mainstream 
epistemology, especially scepticism and the analysis of knowledge.33 So, my conception of 
the principle that reliability requires explanation doesn’t just withstand Clarke-Doane’s 
criticism and preserve features that many hold distinctive, but it also broaches an 
underexplored issue in the epistemology of the apriori. 
 
4.3.  A Worry About Counterpossibility 
 
Before assessing whether my revived principle plausibly underlies the evolutionary 
debunking argument presented in §2 above, let me address a potential worry. Some might 
feel that my argument in §4.1 and §4.2 above ignores the elephant in the room: the 
                                                
29 For more on this so-called Gettier problem, see Ichikawa & Steup 2018. 
30 In addition to preserving much of what is commonly thought as distinctive about the reliability challenge, 
my conception of its underlying principle also neatly accommodates the nearly ubiquitous talk of 
‘coincidence’ and ‘luck’ found in the relevant literature. See, for example, Bedke 2009 & 2014, Street 2006 
& 2008, Schafer 2010 and Schechter 2010 & 2013. 
31 Huemer (2005: Ch. 5) is the only one who – to my knowledge – gestures towards an epistemic luck 
conception of explaining reliability. More on him follows in Chapter 5. Meanwhile, Setiya (2013: Ch. 3 & 
4) is the only one who discusses epistemically lucky moral belief in depth. 
32 To my knowledge, exceptions include Huemer 2005: Ch. 5, Miscevic 2007, Roland & Cogburn 2011 and 
Besson 2009. Williamson 2013 and, in response, Cohen & Comesana 2013, discuss whether Gettier cases 
can be formalized via epistemic logic. However, importantly, their discussion features perceptual Gettier 
cases only. 
33 See, for instance, Greco 2003, Pritchard 2005b, Riggs 2007, Sosa 1999, Unger 1968 and Zagzebski 1994. 
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problem of counterpossibles.34 According to David Lewis’ (1973) standard semantics for 
counterfactuals, counterfactuals with necessarily false antecedents (e.g. ‘If we can square 
the circle, pigs can fly’) or necessarily true consequents (e.g. ‘If Freddie Mercury has a 
moustache, triangles have three sides’) are trivially true.35 Jeffrey Roland & Jon Cogburn 
(2011) have argued that counterfactual formulations of sensitivity and safety face an 
instance of this problem, given necessary truths. After all, both ‘if it were not true that p, 
S would not believe that p’ and ‘if S believes that p (in close-by possible worlds), p is true’ 
are trivially satisfied because there is no world in which p is false and any close-by possible 
world in which S believes that p is also a world in which p is true. Now, why is that 
problematic for me? My argument against Clarke-Doane crucially depends on the idea 
that moral beliefs about necessary robust moral truths can be epistemically lucky – and 
thus insensitive and unsafe. But if Roland and Cogburn are correct, that is just plainly 
impossible, at least within the standard Lewisian semantics for counterfactuals.36 So, my 
argument is in trouble. 
 
In response, we can point out that a potential solution to the problem, at least for 
sensitivity and safety, is already implicit in Brain Lesion above. In particular, we can 
relativize these modal conditions to processes or methods of belief-formation. Doing so is 
compelling on independent grounds: many proponents of both sensitivity and safety 
already understand them as relativized to methods. Accordingly, a belief is method-sensitive 
if and only if were p false, S would not believe that p via method m.37 Alternatively, a 
belief is method-safe if and only if S believes that p (in close-by possible worlds) via method 
m, p is true.38 Importantly, robust moral beliefs in Brain Lesion fail both of these 
conditions, despite the metaphysical necessity of robust moral truth: due to the brain 
lesion as a method of belief-formation, one would believe that, say, courage is not a virtue 
despite its falsity and one would believe it in close-by possible worlds despite its falsity. 
So, it appears that the problem of counterpossibles can be addressed, at least for sensitivity 
and safety.39 
                                                
34 See Brogaard & Salerno 2013. 
35 See also Stalnaker 1968. 
36 Clarke-Doane’s claim that necessarily true robust moral beliefs are trivially sensitive is an expression of 
this problem. Curiously, he doesn’t seem to consider that instance problematic. However, he oddly enough 
thinks that trivial satisfaction is a genuine worry for safety – that can be addressed by appeal to method-
relativization I mention below (see Clarke-Doane 2017). Admittedly, I don’t really know what to make of 
this inconsistency. 
37 See, for instance, Nozick 1981, Luper 1987 or Becker & Black 2012: 88.  
38 For method-safety, see Dunaway 2017, Pritchard 2012: 10 or Williamson 2000. 
39 If method-relativization should fail as a response, other options are available. First, we might – following 
Bedke (2014) – understand the relevant modality as conceptual or epistemic. Doing so, however, would 
need to avoid the overgeneralization worry developed for his proposal in §6.2 below. Second, we could 
understand reliability and epistemic luck non-modally. Alternatives include primitivism (e.g. Comesana 2005), 
27  
 
Where are we now? In this section, I have developed an argument to the effect that robust 
moral beliefs aren’t already modally stable, despite being necessarily true, defeasibly 
justified and evolved. That, in turn, allowed me to revive the principle that reliability 
requires explanation along the lines of epistemic luck. The resulting principle proved 
attractive, simultaneously being original and preserving distinctive features commonly 
associated with reliability challenges. I concluded by defending my line of argument 
against a potential worry about counterpossibility. So far, so good. But can my 
understanding of the principle that reliability requires explanation plausibly serve as the 
key epistemic premise of the evolutionary debunking argument presented in §2? 
 
5 .  Rev i s i t ing  Evo lu t iona r y  Debunk ing  
 
In this section, I examine whether my conception of the principle that reliability requires 
explanation can serve as the key epistemic premise of the evolutionary debunking 
argument presented in §2. I argue that it cannot: on my conception, the principle doesn’t 
plausibly combine with evolutionary considerations to yield moral scepticism. Still, it 
raises a separate, forceful worry about epistemic luck that robust moral realists must deal 
with. 
 
Recall that we are interested in the soundness of the following evolutionary debunking 
argument:  
 
(4) If we fail to explain why we are reliable in a given domain, we cannot justifiably 
believe facts about that domain. 
(5) Evolutionary explanations of moral belief make it impossible to explain why we 
are reliable with respect to morality, robustly construed. 
(6) Therefore, we cannot justifiably believe robust moral facts. 
 
So far, my aim has been to closely examine premise (2). In §3, I presented Clarke-Doane’s 
criticism: that ‘explaining reliability’ should be construed modally and that our robust 
moral beliefs are already modally stable (in spite of evolutionary considerations). In §4, I 
argued against the latter claim: robust moral beliefs can be epistemically lucky and 
                                                
conditional probability (e.g. Roush 2005), or virtue epistemology (e.g. Miscevic 2007). Any of these 
alternatives would allow me to argue – contra Clarke-Doane – that necessarily true and defeasibly justified 
robust moral beliefs can be epistemically deficient due to epistemic luck. Finally, we might – following 
Mogensen (2015: Ch. 3) – be more quietist about the problem of counterpossibles, construing it as semantic and 
metaphysical, not epistemological. In that case, there might be no need for solving it in our context. 
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therefore modally unstable. That insight informed a novel conception of (1): to explain 
our reliability in a given domain means showing that our beliefs about that domain aren’t 
epistemically lucky. Now, can we plausibly plug that understanding of the principle that 
moral reliability requires explanation into above argument? Will it help us motivate (2) 
and allow us to conclude (3)? 
 
To answer these questions affirmatively, the evolutionary debunker might pursue the 
following line of reasoning: evolutionary considerations show that robust moral beliefs are 
epistemically lucky and therefore modally unstable. Modally unstable beliefs, however, 
cannot constitute knowledge. So, evolutionary considerations show that we cannot have 
knowledge of robustly moral facts.40 But why think that evolutionary considerations reveal 
robust moral beliefs to be epistemically lucky? In response, the evolutionary debunker 
might compare the realist’s epistemic position to Brain Lesion, with evolutionary 
influence playing the role of the brain lesion, ‘Gettierizing’ all her moral beliefs. After all, 
our evolved capacities for moral thought make for an unreliable method of forming beliefs 
about robust moral facts. So, her moral beliefs, despite being true and justified (as we may 
assume), would be epistemically lucky. And since those beliefs are only true as a matter of 
luck, they are also modally precarious: they are insensitive to robust moral facts and unsafe 
from error. So, she cannot know robust moral facts due to her evolutionary past – just as 
the epistemic subject in Brain Lesion cannot know that honesty is a virtue due to her 
cognitive impairment.41 
 
But I doubt that this line of reasoning survives critical scrutiny. To see why, we must first 
take another look at how exactly Brain Lesion works. In that case, you form the 
(necessarily) true, justified, yet epistemically lucky moral belief that honesty is a virtue. 
Since that belief is lucky, it doesn’t – intuitively – count as moral knowledge. That lack 
of knowledge, in turn, can be plausibly explained by its lack of modal stability. For 
instance, your belief isn’t safe from moral error. Or, more precisely, your moral belief in 
Brain Lesion is method-unsafe: if, in close-by possible worlds, you formed beliefs about 
relevantly similar moral propositions based on relevantly similar method, your beliefs 
                                                
40 Of course, that line of thinking doesn’t support the argument above – but one about knowledge defeat. (1) 
and (3) would have to be reformulated accordingly. More about that follows in fn. 41 below. 
41 Some might worry that this line of reasoning is a non-starter, for an appeal to epistemic luck doesn’t really 
vindicate the argument above. After all, the argument concerns defeat of justification, while epistemic luck 
(as illustrated by Gettier-style cases) undermines only knowledge. I agree that, epistemically speaking, not 
being able to even justifiably believe robust moral facts is much worse than merely not being able to know 
them. Still, if the evolutionary debunker managed to establish that there is no knowledge of robust moral 
facts, that would still spell serious trouble for robust moral realists. So, this line of reasoning is well worth 
examining. And if it should succeed, we simply adjust the argument above to reflect that. 
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would be false. After all, you form moral beliefs based on a brain lesion with the following 
effect: you find intuitively compelling any moral proposition you entertain. So, you could 
easily have ended up falsely believing that, say, being insensitive to others is virtuous. That 
is how – in maximal detail – the knowledge-defeating luck in Brain Lesion works. 
 
However, it is unclear whether the case of evolved moral belief works in the same manner. 
After all, for the scenario to work just like Brain Lesion, our evolved moral beliefs, despite 
being true and justified, would need to be unsafe. In other words, we would need to end 
up with false moral beliefs in close-by possible worlds. However, there is reason to think 
that we would not.42 After all, our evolutionary counterparts inhabiting those close-by 
possible worlds would share our evolutionary history to a non-trivial degree – and thus 
employ methods of (moral) belief-formation sufficiently similar to ours.43 But if they 
employ sufficiently similar methods, they plausibly end up believing similar things about 
fundamental moral matters. In particular, it seems plausible that employing those 
methods would not result in holding radically different explanatorily basic moral beliefs. 
For instance, they wouldn’t believe that pain was pro tanto good, that parents should 
neglect their children, or that suicide is morally required. But given that our explanatorily 
basic moral beliefs are true (as we may assume in analogy with the Brain Lesion case) and 
given that theirs are sufficiently similar, it looks like our evolutionary counterparts 
inhabiting close-by possible worlds wouldn’t believe many moral falsehoods. But if they 
don’t, we couldn’t easily have ended up – evolutionarily speaking – with false moral 
beliefs. Therefore, our robust moral beliefs are not method-unsafe. And if they are not 
method-unsafe, they cannot count as epistemically lucky in the same way as those in the 
Brain Lesion scenario. So, the line of reasoning sketched out above doesn’t withstand 
critical scrutiny.44Evolutionary considerations don’t show that robust moral belief is 
epistemically lucky and therefore modally unstable. Thus, knowledge of robust moral facts 
survives. 
 
In sum, once we factor in my worry just developed, the epistemic luck conception of the 
principle that reliability requires explanation seems unsuitable to serve as the key epistemic 
                                                
42 For a similar worry about whether evolutionary luck implies epistemic luck, see Dunaway 2017. 
43 As we saw in §4.3, that is also what the most compelling, method-relative formulation of safety entails. 
When assessing whether a given belief is safe, we must factor in how it is formed – and keep that way of 
forming belief fixed across possible worlds. Further, if these evolutionary counterparts didn’t employ 
sufficiently similar methods, they would inhabit farther-off possible worlds – which would no longer be 
relevant to safety. 
44 Perhaps, as I argue, evolutionary considerations don’t impugn the modal stability of beliefs about robust 
moral facts. But even if they are reliably formed, aren’t we lucky that we ended up with a reliable method 
of moral belief-formation? And wouldn’t that kind of epistemic luck undermine knowledge as well? §6.1. 
examines such a line of response in detail. 
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premise of the evolutionary debunking argument above. After all, the principle doesn’t 
plausibly combine with evolutionary considerations to yield moral scepticism. It is 
important to highlight the significance of this finding. As we saw in §2, many contributors 
to the literature – explicitly or implicitly – understand evolutionary debunking arguments 
as an instance of the challenge to explain why we get the robust moral facts mostly right. 
But if explaining moral reliability indeed consists in showing why our robust moral beliefs 
aren’t epistemically lucky, as I have argued, that cannot be correct. However evolutionary 
debunking arguments work, they don’t plausibly depend on the principle that reliability 
requires explanation. To realize their sceptical dreams, evolutionary debunkers must look 
elsewhere. 
 
However, despite dodging this particular evolutionary debunking threat, robust moral 
realists aren’t completely off the hook yet. On reflection, the challenge to explain moral 
reliability, even construed as an instance of the problem of epistemic luck, proves 
troublesome for some popular views in moral epistemology. Take, for instance, moral 
intuitionism. As seen above, moral intuitionism is, very roughly, the view that true, 
intuitively justified moral belief is sufficient for moral knowledge. However, as Brain 
Lesion shows, moral beliefs can be true and intuitively justified, yet epistemically lucky 
and thus not moral knowledge. So, intuiting certain moral truths cannot be sufficient for 
moral knowledge. On the face of it, moral intuitionism seems incorrect. Therefore, even 
though it only concerns the analysis of moral knowledge, ‘explaining reliability’ in the 
relevant sense proves challenging for some views in moral epistemology. However, a 
discussion of whether and, if so, how moral intuitionism can handle this worry about 
epistemic luck has to wait until Chapter 5.45 
 
Where does this leave us? In this section, I have argued that my conception of the principle 
that reliability requires explanation cannot plausibly serve as the key epistemic premise of 
the evolutionary debunking argument presented in §2. Still, it raises a separate, yet 
forceful worry about epistemic luck that robust moral realists must deal with. In the next 
and final section, I shall round out my discussion by defending my diagnosis against two 
recently advanced alternatives. 
                                                
45 Admittedly, that changes the scope of the reliability challenge somewhat: it is no longer a challenge for 
robust moral realism simpliciter, but to certain views in moral epistemology often endorsed by robust moral 
realists (such as moral intuitionism). However, in my view, that is fairly unproblematic: methodologically 
speaking, it seems plausible that the force of any epistemological challenges to robust moral realism 
ultimately depends on what specific epistemological commitments the view entails (above and beyond the 
epistemic principle connecting evolutionary explanation to moral scepticism and optimism about moral 
knowledge). So, we can expect the following: the better we understand a given epistemological challenge, 
the more specific it will be. Given that, it is somewhat unsurprising that the reliability challenge only applies 
to a subset of robust moral realist views. 
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6 .  Evo lu t iona r y  Mor a l  Scep t i c i sm a t  La s t ?  
 
If I am right, the principle that reliability requires explanation holds little promise for 
evolutionary debunkers. But is that true? In this section, I critically assess two recently 
advanced characterizations of the principle that challenge my diagnosis. While the first 
one introduces a different kind of epistemic luck (§6.1), the second one develops the idea 
that all our moral beliefs can be insensitive to the robust moral facts (§6.2). In both cases, 
we would end up with moral scepticism about robust moral belief on evolutionary 
grounds. 
 
6.1.  Being Morally Reliable by Accident – and Moral Scepticism 
 
Some might worry that my argument ignores a kind of epistemic luck that, when 
combined with evolutionary theory, does lead to moral scepticism. How so? Masahiro 
Yamada (2011: 81, 97, 98-102) has recently argued that the lucky or accidental use of a 
reliable method of belief-formation undermines knowledge. To illustrate, consider the 
following case: suppose that you would like to weigh yourself after a strenuous workout 
at the gym. To do so, you can choose between two scales: a blue one on the right and a 
red one on the left. You decide to flip a coin, end up choosing the blue one, weigh yourself 
and come to believe that your weight is 75 kg. However, unbeknownst to you, the red 
scale (that you did not use) was actually broken, making it lucky or accidental that you 
ended up using the functioning one. According to Yamada, this type of lucky or accidental 
use of a reliable method of belief-formation (namely the blue scale) undermines 
knowledge. After all, it does not seem right, intuitively, to say that you would know your 
own weight in such a situation. And, importantly, Yamada’s kind of epistemic luck differs 
from the one found in Gettier-style scenarios such as Brain Lesion: you are lucky to have 
ended up with a reliable method, not lucky that your belief is true (despite being 
unreliably formed). 
 
Now, why is this relevant to the principle that reliability requires explanation – and 
evolutionary debunking? Kieran Setiya (2013: Ch. 3) has recently suggested that this kind 
of epistemic luck animates the challenge to explain moral reliability faced by (robust) 
moral realists. But if it did, Setiya argues, the challenge would combine with evolutionary 
theory to imply scepticism about moral knowledge. To see how he gets there, note first 
that evolution did not select for moral reliability. So, moral realists cannot argue that we 
use our methods of moral belief-formation because they are reliable. But neither can moral 
realists argue that our moral belief-forming methods are reliable because we use them, 
given that moral facts hold independently of what we believe about them. So, it looks as 
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if it were lucky or accidental that we use the (reliable) moral belief-forming methods that 
we in fact use. But, as we have just seen, such epistemic luck undermines knowledge, 
implying scepticism about robust moral knowledge. 
 
What lesson does this appear to hold for my argument in §5? Contrary to what I suggest, 
the epistemic luck conception of the principle that reliability requires explanation can 
serve as the key epistemic premise of the evolutionary debunking argument presented in 
§2. To see that, we simply need to acknowledge the existence of a particular kind of 
epistemic luck: being reliable about moral matters by accident. But once we do that and 
factor in our evolutionary history, we end up with a genuine evolutionary debunking 
argument. 
 
But this line of criticism strikes me as implausible. Importantly,it is at best unclear 
whether we really intuitively lack knowledge in Yamada’s case above. After all, it seems to 
me that as long as you end up using the reliable scale, whether luckily or not, your belief 
about your weight is knowledge.46 To strengthen my point, consider an analogous case 
about testimony, put forth by Tamar Gendler and John Hawthorne (2005: 346): ‘You 
enter a room and ask someone the time. She replies truthfully and correctly, and she is 
extremely reliable. But your informant happens to be surrounded by a roomful of 
compulsive liars.’ In this case, according to them, you know what time it is, even though 
you are lucky to have used a reliable method, namely a sincere and competent instead of 
compulsively lying testifier.47 So, it is at best unclear whether the lucky or accidental use 
of a reliable method undermines knowledge. But, of course, if that is correct, Setiya’s 
suggestion does not get off the ground. 
 
6.2.  Being Forgetful About Robust Moral Reality – and Moral Scepticism 
 
Others might worry that my argument overlooks ways of demonstrating the modal 
instability of moral beliefs that do not rely on epistemic luck and do lead to moral 
scepticism on evolutionary grounds. How so? Matt Bedke (2014: 18-29) has recently 
argued that all our moral beliefs are insensitive to the robust moral facts – and that this 
                                                
46 I am not alone. Schafer (2014) seems to share my intuition here. Further, in a slightly different context, 
Goldberg (2010: 116) argues that such luck would not undermine perceptual justification.  
47 Kvanvig (2004: 198) appeals to a similar case in which you luckily end up with an accurate history book. 
However, according to him, even though you would understand history, you would not know it, exactly 
because of epistemic luck. But, in my view, his case features evidential luck, not the lucky use of a reliable 
method. And it is almost universally agreed that evidential luck does not undermine knowledge. In support 
of my point, see Jenkins (2006: 147) regarding luckily obtained, truthful wartime diaries. 
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defeats their justification.48 His argument proceeds in two distinct steps. First, he identifies 
a sufficient condition on defeat of justification, which he calls obliviousness. Your belief 
that p based on justification J is oblivious to the target fact p when, were p not the case (as 
a matter of conceptual possibility): (i.) you would still believe that p; (ii.) you would have 
the same justification J for believing that p; and (iii.) the same causal explanation for why 
you believe that p and have justification J would hold. Once you become aware that your 
belief that p is oblivious, its justification J has been defeated.49 Second, he argues that 
robust moral beliefs are oblivious and thus lack justification. To establish that, Bedke 
appeals to a sceptical hypothesis: a scenario in which we are, without realizing, radically 
deceived about the nature of reality. In particular, he assumes that the basic moral facts 
are different than we prima facie justifiably believe them to be (e.g. pain is good, there are 
no moral facts at all). Then, he asks: what would we believe, what justification would we 
have, and what would explain what we believe in that case? His answer is sobering: we 
would have the same robust moral beliefs, justification and causal explanation (because 
we could hold the natural world fixed). So, our moral beliefs are oblivious to the robust 
moral facts – which defeats their justification. 
 
Before explaining the relevance of Bedke’s argument for our dialectic in more detail, two 
features are worth highlighting. To start with, obliviousness is in effect the negation of 
sensitivity. Still, it differs in the following ways: obliviousness is a sufficient condition on 
defeat of justification, not a necessary condition on knowledge, and it asks us to quantify 
over conceptually, not metaphysically, possible worlds.50 Further, Bedke claims that 
perceptual beliefs aren’t oblivious. For instance, take your belief that you have hands. In 
a relevantly different, yet close-by possible world, you wouldn’t have hands. But that 
means that the causal explanation of your perceptual belief wouldn’t be the same as in the 
actual world. This violates clause (iii.) of the definition of obliviousness. So, your 
perceptual beliefs aren’t oblivious. As a result, despite relying on a sceptical hypothesis, 
Bedke’s argument doesn’t imply radical scepticism about the external world. 
 
                                                
48 More precisely, Bedke targets robust normative beliefs more generally. In what follows, however, I shall 
only be interested in assessing whether his argument applies to a sub-set of robust normative beliefs, namely 
robust moral ones. 
49 There is further wrinkle: Bedke (2014) takes obliviousness to underlie or explicate his argument from 
coincidence. But since obliviousness, not coincidence, seems to do all the epistemological work, we can 
forget about that complication. 
50 Understanding modal conditions such as sensitivity as quantifying over conceptually possible worlds is 
one way of avoiding their trivial satisfaction. However, as I shall argue in this section, such an appeal is 
problematic. A more plausible way of avoiding trivial satisfaction is to understand modal conditions as 
relativized to methods or processes of belief-formation. See §4.3. above for more. 
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What implications does Bedke’s argument have for the principle that reliability requires 
explanation – and evolutionary debunking? If he is correct, our robust moral beliefs – 
contra Clarke-Doane – aren’t already modally stable. Rather, they are all insensitive to the 
robust moral facts. That, in turn, furnishes us with another epistemically problematic 
sense of ‘explaining reliability’: for their moral beliefs to remain justified, robust moral 
realists must explain why they aren’t oblivious. If it turned out that we were indeed 
forgetful about robust moral reality, moral scepticism would ensue. Moreover, 
interpreting the principle in terms of obliviousness would render it suitable as the key 
epistemic premise of the evolutionary debunking argument presented in §2. After all, the 
principle lends support to a genuinely sceptical conclusion: if we cannot explain why our 
beliefs aren’t oblivious, we cannot justifiably believe robust moral facts. And, importantly, 
to reach that conclusion, the principle plausibly combines with evolutionary 
considerations: at least part of the complete causal explanation of our robust moral beliefs, 
encoded in clause (iii.) of the obliviousness condition, will be that we evolved to hold 
them. Therefore, Bedke’s argument from obliviousness seems to provide us with the 
materials for a genuine evolutionary debunking argument. 
 
Of course, these implications spell trouble for the argument I developed above. In §4, I 
argued that robust moral beliefs can be epistemically lucky and therefore modally 
unstable. That informed the following epistemically problematic sense of ‘explaining 
reliability’: for their moral beliefs to amount to knowledge, robust moral realists must 
explain why they aren’t lucky. But, as I showed in §5, the problem raised by epistemic 
luck doesn’t plausibly combine with evolutionary considerations to yield moral 
scepticism. This makes the epistemic luck conception of the principle that reliability 
requires explanation ill-suited for running an evolutionary debunking argument. But if 
Bedke is right, my argument settles for too little. In particular, it ignores a sense in which 
‘explaining reliability’ is suitable for evolutionary debunking. So, is Bedke right? 
 
However, Bedke’s argument faces a serious issue, having to do with its scope. In particular, 
it appears that many non-moral, non-normative beliefs are also oblivious (or insensitive 
across conceptually possible worlds) and therefore unjustified. That, however, means that 
Bedke’s argument overgeneralizes, collapsing into more radical scepticism. 
 
To see why, consider first perceptual beliefs about ordinary objects such as footballs.51 The 
property of being a football, understood as an ordinary perceptual object, supervenes (in 
virtue of metaphysical necessity) on various atomic and non-atomic properties. In that 
                                                
51 See Clarke-Doane 2013, 2015, 2017 as well as Korman 2014 for this point. 
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way, being a football resembles moral properties such as being wrong, which also supervene 
(in virtue of metaphysical necessity) on non-moral properties.52 Now, ontological nihilists 
about ordinary objects argue that it is at least intelligible or conceptually possible that 
ordinary objects don’t exist, while their subvening properties do.53 So, if ontological 
nihilism about ordinary objects is true, it looks as if our perceptual beliefs about ordinary 
objects such as footballs are oblivious. After all, given the truth of ontological nihilism, 
even if ordinary objects did not exist (as a matter of conceptual possibility), we would 
probably still believe that they do, have the same justification for believing that they do 
and the same causal explanation for why we believe that they exist would hold.54 So, 
Bedke’s argument seems to generalize to perceptual beliefs about ordinary objects – and 
thus leads to more general scepticism. That, though, is unacceptable to both Bedke, as 
seen above, and anyone interested in the viability of the reliability challenge to robust 
moral realism. 
 
Now, few think that ontological nihilism about ordinary objects is plausible. For that 
reason, let’s consider an example that doesn’t presuppose its truth, namely beliefs about 
phenomenal mental properties. It seems conceptually possible that there be zombies: exact 
neurophysical duplicates of human beings that lack phenomenal consciousness.55 Further, 
we would not be able to identify zombies, given that they are exact duplicates of ordinary 
human beings. Finally, if we were zombies ourselves, we would probably not realize that 
we lack phenomenal consciousness. Rather, we would take ourselves to experience the 
world as it is.56 Jointly, these claims seem to imply that our beliefs about our own 
phenomenal mental states might be oblivious. After all, given the conceivability of 
zombies, even if phenomenal mental properties did not exist (as a matter of conceptual 
possibility), we would probably still believe that they do, have the same justification for 
believing that they do and the same causal explanation for why we believe that they exist. 
So, Bedke’s argument seems to overgeneralize yet again. 
                                                
52 Of course, the exact modal nature of moral supervenience remains a question of active debate. See, for 
instance, Rosen forthcoming. However, for the purposes of my argument, let’s just assume that the relevant 
modality is metaphysical necessity. This accords well with various forms of robust moral realism. 
53 See, for instance, Van Inwagen 1990. 
54 Admittedly, it remains questionable whether the same causal explanation of our perceptual beliefs and 
their justification holds even in cases in which there are no ordinary objects. In particular, that might depend 
on whether the subvening properties have sufficient causal powers. However, importantly, if Bedke thinks 
that is the case for subvening non-normative properties, it is unclear why it should not also extend to 
subvening non-perceptual (or non-phenomenal) properties (at least not without further argument). 
55 Anybody other than analytic reductionists and functionalists about the mental should be able to accept 
that. For a highly influential argument against physicalism based on the stronger claim that zombies are 
metaphysically possible, see Chalmers 2009.  




In light of this serious issue, it seems reasonable to reject Bedke’s argument – and thus his 
interpretation of the principle that reliability requires explanation. Similarly, Setiya’s 
argument, based on the idea that we are morally reliable by accident, should be rejected, 
for it proved problematic as well. As a result, my diagnosis developed in §4 an §5 still 
stands: the principle that reliability requires explanation should be interpreted as an 
instance of the problem of epistemic luck and thus holds little promise for evolutionary 
debunkers. 
 
7 .  Conclu s ion  
 
In this chapter, I defended the principle that moral reliability requires explanation against 
Clarke-Doane’s criticism. More precisely, I argued that – contra Clarke-Doane – our 
robust moral beliefs aren’t already modally stable. Rather, as moral instances of Gettier-
style scenarios illustrate, such beliefs can be epistemically lucky – and therefore insensitive 
to the robust moral facts and unsafe from moral error. That, in turn, informed a novel, 
attractive conception of the principle that reliability requires explanation: it demands that 
robust moral realists offer an account for why their moral beliefs, despite being necessarily 
true and defeasibly justified, avoid epistemic luck. 
 
However, while my defence of the reliability challenge highlighted a worry about 
epistemic luck widely overlooked by robust moral realists, it held little promise for 
evolutionary debunkers. After all, my conception of the principle that moral reliability 
requires explanation doesn’t plausibly combine with evolutionary considerations to yield 
moral scepticism. Therefore, it cannot serve as the key premise of an evolutionary 
debunking argument. 
 
Where does that leave us? For evolutionary debunkers, my discussion means that they 
must look elsewhere for an epistemic principle that licenses the inference from the 
commitment to the existence of robust moral facts and evolutionary explanations of moral 
belief to moral scepticism. Chapters 3 and 4 will be dedicated to that quest. In contrast, 
robust moral realists (and especially moral intuitionists) must tackle the worry about 
epistemic luck I raised in §4.1. above. Chapter 5 will discuss whether and, if so, how they 
could do that successfully. 
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CHAPTER 3: HIGHER-ORDER EVIDENCE OF ERROR 
 
1 .  In tr oduct ion  
 
Evolutionary debunking arguments attempt to show that the evolutionary theory, when 
combined with a commitment to robust moral objectivity, leads to moral scepticism: the 
view that we lack moral knowledge or that our moral beliefs are never justified. But which 
epistemic principle licenses that inference? In Chapter 2, we discussed and rejected the 
principle that reliability requires explanation. In this chapter, we focus on another 
promising suggestion: that higher-order evidence of error defeats justification. If evolution 
provided such evidence about belief in robustly moral facts, that principle would quickly 
lead to moral scepticism. Tomas Bogardus (2016), Andreas Mogensen (ms, 2017) and – 
at least on Katia Vavova’s (2014) compelling reconstruction – Sharon Street (2006) have 
all put forth versions of an argument along those lines. This chapter examines their 
argument closely. 
 
In response, robust moral realists such as Vavova (2014) have objected that this 
evolutionary debunking argument is self-defeating. To see how that threat materializes, 
note first that the epistemic principle above characterizes Conciliationism, a view on the 
epistemic significance of higher-order evidence of error.1 This view, in turn, is typically 
motivated by Independence, the principle that we should assess higher-order evidence of 
error with respect to p independently of our original first-order evidence, beliefs or 
reasoning in support of p.2 To respect this principle when assessing evolutionary higher-
order evidence of error, the robust moral realist would need to set aside all her moral 
evidence, beliefs and reasoning. But doing so risks setting aside too much to know whether 
she is genuinely mistaken about morality or not. So, the evolutionary debunking 
argument above seem to defeat itself. 
 
The literature lacks any discussion of whether evolutionary debunkers can handle this self-
defeat objection.3 My overall aim in this chapter is to argue that they cannot, thus filling 
that lacuna – and vindicating Vavova’s worry. To achieve my aim, I proceed in two steps. 
                                                
1 See Christensen 2007 and Elga 2007 for peer disagreement and Christensen 2010 for other kinds of 
higher-order evidence of error. Further references follow in §2. 
2 See Christensen 2011 or Lord 2014. 
3 De Cruz et al. 2011, Kyriacou forthcoming and Sterpetti 2015 discuss a self-defeat worry for evolutionary 
debunking arguments. However, their discussion isn’t set within a higher-order evidence framework and 
fails to engage at all with Vavova’s (2014) specific objection. 
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First, I propose a novel, prima facie promising strategy for avoiding self-defeat. Then, I 
show that evolutionary debunkers face insuperable difficulties trying to successfully 
implement that strategy. As a result, the evolutionary debunking argument based on the 
principle that higher-order evidence of error defeats justification fails. 
 
What does the strategy (that constitutes the first step of my argument) look like? It consists 
in endorsing an alternative (background) view on the epistemic significance of higher-
order evidence of error. More specifically, to avoid self-defeat, evolutionary debunkers 
should replace Conciliationism with a view that (A) rejects Independence and therefore 
allows first-order moral evidence into the picture, yet (B) still yields the verdict that 
evolutionary higher-order evidence can defeat the justification of first-order moral beliefs. 
Thomas Kelly’s (2010) Total Evidence View promises to fit the bill. According to it, your 
total evidence determines whether your belief that p is justified or not. The total evidence 
includes both your first-order evidence (in support of p) and the second-order evidence 
of peer disagreement (regarding p). Therefore, Kelly’s (2010) view clearly satisfies (A): it 
rejects Independence, affording our first-order moral evidence, beliefs and reasoning a role 
in determining whether a given belief is justified or not. 
 
Meanwhile, whether Kelly’s (2010) view satisfies (B) is more complicated, as I show in 
the second step of my argument. To establish (B), evolutionary debunkers must argue 
that the total evidence available to the robust moral realist, consisting of her first-order 
moral evidence and the evolutionary higher-order evidence of error, defeats the 
justification of her moral beliefs. But, on reflection, evolutionary debunkers cannot 
discharge this argumentative burden. The exact reason for their failure depends on the 
kind of higher-order evidence of error that evolutionary considerations allegedly provide. 
Debunkers such as Street (2006), for whom evolutionary considerations supply evidence 
of moral unreliability, struggle with evidential weight. In contrast, debunkers such as 
Bogardus (2016) and Mogensen (ms, 2017), who construe evolutionary considerations as 
evidence of moral peer disagreement, are committed to a pair of inconsistent assumptions 
about evolutionary counterparts. Either way, evolutionary debunkers who rely on the 
epistemic principle that higher-order evidence of error undermines justification struggle 
to implement (B) of my proposed strategy. By implication, their arguments cannot avoid 
self-defeat. 
 
This chapter is structured as follows. §2 presents the evolutionary debunking argument 
based on the principle about higher-order evidence of error in more detail, while §3 turns 
towards characterizing the self-defeat objection. Then, §4 unveils my two-part strategy 
for dealing with self-defeat. The remainder of the chapter explores whether evolutionary 
debunkers can make good on that strategy. §5 argues that the first part is easy to pull off, 
39  
but both §6 and §7 raise concerns about the implementation of the second part, having 
to do with evidential weight and whether evolutionary counterparts qualify as epistemic 
peers. §8 concludes. 
 
2 .  Evo lu t iona r y  Debunk ing  a nd  Higher -Or der  Ev idence  
 
Recently, some philosophers have argued that insights from evolutionary theory debunk 
beliefs in robust moral facts. To make their case, a few of these evolutionary debunkers 
rely on the principle that higher-order evidence of error defeats justification. Despite some 
differences in detail, the arguments sketched by Tomas Bogardus (2016), Andreas 
Mogensen (ms, 2017) and – at least on Vavova’s (2014) compelling reconstruction – 
Sharon Street (2006) share the following structure: 
 
(1) Higher-order evidence of error about your beliefs that p, q, etc. defeats their 
justification.4 
(2) Evolutionary considerations provide robust moral realists with higher-order 
evidence of error about their moral beliefs. 
(3) Therefore, evolutionary considerations defeat the justification of the robust moral 
realists’ moral beliefs. 
 
This piece of reasoning, if sound, forces moral realists into moral scepticism: even if robust 
moral facts exist, we couldn’t ever form justified beliefs about them. In the remainder of 
this section, I shall explain in more detail what these premises mean, why they might be 
true – and how they jointly seem to entail the conclusion. 
 
2.1.  Higher-Order Evidence of Error and Defeat 
 
To begin with, the first premise introduces the notion of higher-order evidence of error. 
Such evidence of error indicates that one suffers from some epistemic malfunction.5 Here 
are two familiar examples:  
 
Offside Call: In my spare time, I enjoy attending football games with my best 
friend Julian. We are both equally good at spotting whether a forward is 
                                                
4 Plausibly, the higher-order evidence of error would also need to be good, strong or weighty enough. Most 
common cases, including the ones below, intuitively meet that threshold. For more on the issue of evidential 
weight in more controversial cases such as evolutionary debunking, see my discussion in §6 below. 
5 See Christensen 2010 and Lasonen-Aarnio 2014. Some higher-order evidence is evidence of epistemic 
success, not error (e.g. visiting your optometrist might confirm your visual reliability). 
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offside or not. Last Sunday, though, we disagreed: while Julian judged that 
our forward started from an offside position and the resulting goal was thus 
irregular, it seemed to me that our forward timed his run well and was onside.6 
 
Hypoxia: While climbing the Dufour peak in the Swiss Alps, the weather 
suddenly turns near the summit. I stop briefly to calculate whether there is 
enough time to reach the peak and start the climb down before the snow 
storm hits. After going over my calculations several times, I am rather 
confident that I should be able to make it. However, I suddenly remember 
that, given the high altitude, I am very likely to suffer from mild hypoxia (or 
lack of oxygen), which undetectably impairs one’s reasoning, leading to 
stupid, yet fatal mistakes.7 
 
In the first case, I receive evidence of peer disagreement: Julian and I are equally good at 
making offside calls, but disagree about whether our forward was offside or not this time. 
Since we cannot both be right (but are equally good at making offside calls), one of us 
must be in error, which might very well be me. In contrast, the second case features 
evidence of unreliability: hypoxia makes it very likely that my reasoning (about time, in 
this case) is mistaken.8 
 
The first premise doesn’t just introduce higher-order evidence of error, but it also 
articulates a view about its epistemic significance. Conciliationism says that higher-order 
evidence of error defeats the justification of relevant first-order beliefs.9 Originally, this 
view was defended in the context of peer disagreement, recommending that one conciliate 
(hence its name) upon receiving evidence of peer disagreement such as in Offside Call.10 
However, it can easily be generalized, resulting in a view that says that any kind of higher-
order evidence of error defeats justification.11 For instance, it would say that, in Hypoxia, 
learning of my likely reason-distortion defeats the justification of my belief that I have 
enough time to reach the Dufour Peak and return safely. So, Conciliationism is a 
                                                
6 See Elga 2007 for a structurally similar case. 
7 See Elga ms and Lasonen-Aarnio 2014. 
8 Other kinds of higher-order evidence of error include following incorrect epistemic rules, following correct 
epistemic rules incorrectly, etc. For more, see Lasonen-Aarnio 2014: 315. Evolutionary debunkers focus on 
the two featured in the main text, though. 
9 Nothing below hinges on characterizing Conciliationism in terms of justification defeat. Instead, it could 
be defined in other epistemic terms (e.g. rationality, reasonability, confidence). 
10 See Christensen 2007, Elga 2007, Feldman 2006 and Matheson 2015. 
11 See, for example, Christensen 2010, Lasonen-Aarnio 2014 or Vavova 2018. 
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moderate form of scepticism: according to it, higher-order evidence of error defeats 
justification, yet only the justification of our relevant first-order beliefs, namely those we 
have such evidence about.12 
 
Conciliationism is prima facie attractive.13 First, it accommodates our intuitions: in both 
Offside Call and Hypoxia, it seems intuitively appropriate to revise our beliefs in light of 
the higher-order evidence of error – which Conciliationism respects. Second, the view also 
plausibly explains our intuitions. For instance, given that Julian and I are equally like to 
get offside calls right and that there must be a mistake either on his or my part in Offside 
Call, we both have reason to think that we have made a mistake, which may well be 
enough to defeat the justification of our relevant beliefs. Similarly, given my medical 
condition in Hypoxia, it is significantly more likely that I have made a justification-
defeating mistake in my time management. Third, Conciliationism is motivated by a 
seemingly plausible principle for correctly evaluating evidence. According to 
Independence, we should assess higher-order evidence of error with respect to p 
independently of our original first-order evidence, beliefs or reasoning in support of p.14 
To see why that seems plausible, reconsider Offside Call: once I learn that Julian, an 
epistemic peer, disagrees with me, it would be intuitively wrong or irrational to dismiss 
his judgment by relying on my initial perceptual seeming that the forward wasn’t offside. 
(Similarly, for Hypoxia: sticking with my original reasoning would be epistemically 
problematic in the face of significant risk of altitude-induced distortion of reasoning.) But 
once we accept Independence, Conciliationism straightforwardly follows: if it is rational to 
bracket one’s first-order evidence and thus only the higher-order evidence of error matters, 
it will defeat the justification of our relevant first-order beliefs.15 
 
2.2.  Evolution and Higher-Order Evidence of Error 
 
The second premise states that evolutionary considerations provide robust moral realists 
with higher-order evidence of error about their moral beliefs. To see why, it is helpful to 
take a slight detour and introduce a more general epistemological phenomenon first. 
Consider:  
 
                                                
12 For that very reason, the argument does not collapse into an argument for radical external world 
scepticism. After all, evolutionary considerations don’t provide higher-order evidence of error about our 
perceptual beliefs. For more on that, see Vavova’s 2014: §3 & §4. 
13 See Matheson 2015. 
14 See Christensen 2011 in the context of peer disagreement. For criticism, see Lord 2014. Both evolutionary 
debunkers and their critics endorse Independence. See Bogardus 2016: 656 and Vavova 2015: 12. 
15 For more on that implication, see Christensen 2009: 758f. 
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Liberal Community: You grow up in a liberal community, acquiring 
corresponding political beliefs (such as that government should levy high 
taxes, that social security is important, etc.). Later in life, you realize that you 
could easily have grown up in a conservative community instead. In that case, 
you would hold conservative beliefs now (such as that government should 
minimize their interference with the free market, etc.). So, you hold liberal 
beliefs, in some sense, just because you grew up in a liberal community.16 
 
The realization you have in this case strikes many as unsettling and epistemically 
problematic. In fact, becoming aware of an irrelevant influence on your beliefs seems, 
intuitively, to have defeating force: your political convictions no longer seem to enjoy the 
same level of justification once you realize that, in a sense, you only hold them because 
you grew up in a liberal community (and would hold contrary beliefs, had you grown up 
in a conservative community instead). This case is an instance of a more general 
epistemological phenomenon that has recently garnered increased philosophical attention, 
namely the problem of irrelevant influence.17 An irrelevant influence is a factor that 
influences our beliefs, but doesn’t bear on their truth.18 For instance, in the case above, 
the irrelevant factor might be political indoctrination, which is an anti-reliable method of 
belief-acquisition, likely leading to a high proportion of false to true beliefs.19 So, even 
though those indoctrinating practices have influenced your political beliefs, they don’t 
aim at truth – and therefore don’t bear on the truth of your beliefs. 
 
Any case of irrelevant influence will vary along (at least) three dimensions: the nature of 
the factor in question, the nature of its influence on our beliefs, and the class of our beliefs 
under influence. To begin with, many different factors can irrelevantly influence our 
beliefs, including genetics, gender, personality traits, cultural and socio-economic 
                                                
16 For a similar case, see Cohen 2000. I am using the American sense of ‘liberal’ and ‘conservative’ here, not 
the European one. 
17 Since the relevant literature has been emerging only recently, there isn’t one universally accepted label for 
the phenomenon yet. For instance, while Mogensen (2017) calls it contingency anxiety, Ballantyne (2013) 
terms it the historical variability problem. In addition, the literature circumscribes the scope of the 
phenomenon in different ways. For instance, while some focus only on political beliefs (e.g. DiPaolo & 
Simpson 2016), others include any beliefs based on non-contingent background features such as genetics 
or species membership (e.g. Vavova 2018). In the rest of this chapter, I shall adopt Vavova’s (2018) label, 
which seems most inclusive: the problem of irrelevant influence. For more, see Ballantyne 2013, Cohen 2000, 
DiPaolo & Simpson 2016, Dworkin 1996, Elga ms, Mogensen 2017, Rosen 2001, Schechter ms, 
Schoenfield 2013, Sher 2001, (and especially) Vavova 2018 and White 2010.  
18 See Vavova 2018: 134. For an alternative definition in terms of arbitrary background factors, see Mogensen 
2017. 
19 For more on a diagnosis along those lines, see DiPaolo & Simpson 2016. 
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background, class and education. In Liberal Community above, the irrelevant factor 
probably amounts to a combination of class, socio-economic background and education. 
Further, irrelevant factors can influence our beliefs in different ways.20 Often, irrelevant 
factors are part of a causal explanation of why we hold certain beliefs. For instance, Liberal 
Community seems to be such a case: growing up in a liberal community at least partially 
causally explains why you have liberal political convictions. But that is not the only way 
irrelevant factors can influence our beliefs. In other cases, the relationship between 
irrelevant factors and our beliefs seems best described as counterfactual: we only believe 
that, say, Swiss folk music is beautiful because we were born and raised in Switzerland. 
Had we grown up in the USA instead, we would find it revolting or, at best, curious. 
Again, there is also a hint of that in Liberal Community above.21 After all, had you grown 
up in a conservative community instead, you would hold conservative beliefs about 
politics now. Finally, irrelevant factors don’t just influence our political beliefs, as seen 
above. Rather, they can also influence our moral, philosophical, aesthetic and religious 
beliefs.22 For instance, you might believe that allowing your disabled newborn to die of 
hypothermia is morally wrong only because you don’t live in ancient Sparta, that virtue 
epistemology is an implausible view of knowledge only because you didn’t attend Rutgers, 
that opera is beautiful only because of your upper-middle class background, or that there 
is no God only because you didn’t grow up in an Amish community. 
 
But not all irrelevant influence on our beliefs is epistemically problematic. Consider: 
 
TV Love: Your college crush happened to think that ‘The Wire’ was the best 
TV show ever made. In an effort to impress her, you binge-watched the series, 
which had hitherto been unknown to you, trying to keep up with the 
complexities of the narrative. While your crush was eventually short-lived, 
you have been in love with ‘The Wire’ ever since. Later in life, you realize that 
you could easily have had a crush on a different person in college – and 
therefore loved another TV show. So, you think that the ‘The Wire’ is great, 
in some sense, just because of your college crush.23 
 
                                                
20 See Vavova 2018: 136.  
21 Perhaps, irrelevant factors can even non-counterfactually relate to our beliefs. Consider: ‘if it were not for 
x, I would not exist today’. For more, see Vavova 2018: 136. 
22 For more on the scope of the problem, see especially Ballantyne 2013. 
23 This case is inspired by Mogensen 2017: 595.  
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In this case, your feelings towards your college crush irrelevantly influence your belief that 
‘The Wire’ is a great TV show. After all, your crush partially explains why you hold this 
aesthetic belief, yet doesn’t bear on its truth.24 However, there doesn’t seem anything 
epistemically fishy here: intuitively, realizing that you only love ‘The Wire’ because of 
your college crush doesn’t have any defeating force. So, not all irrelevant influences on 
our beliefs are epistemically problematic. This, though, leads to an important question: 
when exactly is irrelevant doxastic influence epistemically problematic – and, if so, why? 
According to most contributors to the literature, irrelevant influence on our political, 
moral, philosophical, religious or aesthetic beliefs is epistemically problematic when and 
because it provides us with higher-order evidence of error.25 So, the epistemic difference 
between Liberal Community and TV Love comes down to this: while the former case 
features higher-order evidence of error, the latter does not. 
 
What kind of higher-order evidence of error can becoming aware of irrelevant influences 
on our beliefs provide? There are at least two well-developed answers in the literature.26 
According to the first, as defended by Tomas Bogardus (2016) and Andreas Mogensen 
(ms, 2017), becoming aware of irrelevant influences provides evidence of possible peer 
disagreement. Their account plausibly explains some of the core cases of epistemically 
problematic irrelevant influence, including Liberal Community above. After all, once you 
realize that you would have held contrary political convictions if you had been raised in a 
conservative community instead, you also acknowledge the existence of substantive 
political disagreement between – what seem to be – epistemic peers. Further, their account 
also plausibly explains why there is nothing epistemically worrisome about TV Love: there 
is no (or only little) peer disagreement about the aesthetic qualities of ‘The Wire’.27 So, 
you shouldn’t worry about the irrelevant influence of your crush on your aesthetic beliefs 
about a TV show that is universally critically acclaimed. 
 
                                                
24 At least assuming some form of aesthetic realism. However, even given a form of aesthetic response-
dependence, her approval of the TV show probably doesn’t bear on the truth of your aesthetic belief.  
25 See especially Ballantyne 2013, Mogensen 2017 and Vavova 2018. For a dissenting voice, see Dworkin 
1996. 
26 In addition to the two accounts discussed in this chapter, some have argued that irrelevant influences 
provide evidence that we are violating our own standards of reasoning (e.g. Elga ms, Schoenfield 2013), 
that our beliefs are causally arbitrarily such that we could easily have ended up in an equally good epistemic 
position that would have supported contrary beliefs (e.g. Ballantyne 2013) or that we cannot explain moral 
reliability (e.g. Schechter ms). However, in what follows, I shall focus on the two most well-developed 
accounts found in the literature. 
27 For some – probably defeasible – evidence, see: http://www.metacritic.com/tv/the-wire (August 21, 
2018).  
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According to the second answer, as defended by Katia Vavova (2014, 2018), becoming 
aware of irrelevant influences provides evidence of unreliability. Such evidence, as Hypoxia 
shows, tells us that our beliefs have been formed in ways that make them probably false. 
Again, her account plausibly diagnoses what is troublesome about Liberal Community 
(and other core cases): tight-knit political communities raise the risk of indoctrination, a 
highly unreliable (or even anti-reliable) method of acquiring beliefs.28 Further, her account 
can explain why irrelevant influences are sometimes unproblematic. For instance, TV 
Love does not seem to feature any evidence of unreliability. After all, your crush might 
have motivated you to engage with ‘The Wire’ in the first place, she isn’t the reason why 
you think that the show is amazing. So, your college crush didn’t impair your ability to 
form true aesthetic beliefs – and you therefore need not worry about its irrelevant 
influence. 
 
Now, it should become clear why evolution provides robust moral realists with higher-
order evidence of error. After all, our discussion seems to establish that, if irrelevant 
influences are epistemically worrisome, they provide higher-order evidence of error. 
Evolution, though, seems to irrelevantly influence our moral beliefs in a problematic way. 
Therefore, evolution provides higher-order evidence of error. To see how evolutionary 
debunking can be construed as an instance of the problem of irrelevant influence, consider:  
 
Evolutionary History: You believe that parents are morally obliged to look 
after their children (at least ceteris paribus). But you realize that, had humans 
evolved differently, you would hold different moral beliefs now. For instance, 
if looking after one’s offspring would not have boosted reproductive fitness, 
you would now believe that we have a moral obligation to kill our first-borns. 
So, you hold your moral beliefs, in some sense, just because we humans 
evolved in certain ways. 
 
In this case, evolution works as an irrelevant influence: even though it at least partially 
explains why we hold our moral beliefs, it does not bear on their truth, since it concerns 
boosting reproductive fitness. The irrelevant evolutionary influence on our moral beliefs 
also seems to be epistemically problematic: for many of us, it has, intuitively, defeating 
force – and therefore, following the line of thought above, provides us with higher-order 
evidence of error. 
 
                                                
28 An anti-reliable method of belief-formation is likely to lead to false beliefs. In contrast, an unreliably 
formed beliefs are equally likely to be true or false. See DiPaolo & Simpson 2016. 
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But what kind of higher-order evidence of error does evolution provide the robust moral 
realist in Evolutionary History? Plausibly, that depends on which more general account 
of the problem of irrelevant influences we endorse. For Bogardus (2016) and Mogensen 
(ms, 2017), evolutionary considerations amount to evidence of possible peer disagreement: 
evidence that robust moral realists could disagree with their evolutionary counterparts 
about fundamental moral matters (such as the wrongness of incest or slavery, our 
obligations towards our children, that ethnicity doesn’t matter to moral standing). After 
all, robust moral realists must realize that, had humans evolved differently, they would 
hold different moral beliefs now. Suppose robust moral realists believe that incest is 
morally wrong, based on a corresponding moral intuition. Their evolutionary 
counterparts might disagree: since incest did not hamper their reproductive fitness, they 
don’t believe that it is morally impermissible. Rather, they believe that it is perfectly 
morally alright, based on their corresponding moral intuition. In that manner, 
evolutionary considerations amount to evidence of possible peer disagreement.  So, for 
Bogardus (2016) and Mogensen (ms, 2017), robust moral realists find themselves in a 
situation similar to Offside Call. 
 
In contrast, according to Sharon Street (2006), robust moral realists face a scenario similar 
to Hypoxia.29 For her, evolutionary considerations provide robust moral realists with 
evidence of moral unreliability.30 After all, when robust moral realists reflect on the 
evolutionary origin of our moral beliefs, they must realize that evolution selects for 
adaptive, not true, moral beliefs.31 For instance, suppose you believe that you have special 
moral obligations to your family, based on a corresponding moral intuition. But then you 
realize that we evolved to survive, not to track robustly moral truths, and that it is therefore 
likely that your belief is false. So, moral realists have good reason to think that their moral 
beliefs have been unreliably formed: they are the upshot of a process that was not designed 
to get at robust moral truth. In that way, evolutionary considerations provide moral 
realists with evidence of moral unreliability. 
 
With both premises in place, we are now able to secure the sceptical conclusion of the 
argument above. To do that, we first take the view that higher-order evidence of error 
defeats justification. Then, we add the claim that that evolutionary considerations provide 
such evidence about moral beliefs, understood to be about robust moral facts. We end up 
                                                
29 At least in some moods. In other moods, Street’s (2006, 2008) argument is more plausibly reconstructed 
along the lines of a reliability challenge to (robust) moral realism. See Chapter 2 for more on that. 
30 See also Vavova 2014. However, she ultimately thinks that robust moral realists cannot recognize 
evolutionary evidence of moral unreliability as such, as I shall explain in §3 below. 
31 See Fraser 2014 for empirical details. 
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with the conclusion that evolutionary considerations defeat the justification of beliefs in 
robust moral facts. Therefore, evolutionary considerations seem to saddle robust moral 
realists with an uncomfortable moral scepticism. Even if robust moral facts exist, we do 
not and cannot form justified beliefs about them. 
 
3 .  The  Thr ea t  o f  Se l f -Defea t   
 
One of the most powerful objections to the evolutionary debunking argument above is 
that it threatens to be self-defeating. To see how that threat materializes, recall that 
Conciliationism is typically motivated by Independence, the principle that we should assess 
higher-order evidence of error with respect to p independently of our original first-order 
evidence, beliefs or reasoning in support of p. To respect this principle when assessing 
evolutionary higher-order evidence of error, the robust moral realist would need to set 
aside all her moral evidence, beliefs and reasoning. Why? Because the debunker’s idea is 
that evolutionary considerations call into question all her robustly moral beliefs. But doing 
so risks setting aside too much to know whether she is mistaken about morality or not. As 
Katia Vavova (2014: 89-93), who develops this objection most clearly and forcefully, 
writes: ‘we cannot determine if we are likely to be mistaken about morality if we can make 
no assumptions at all about what morality is like’ (Vavova 2014: 92).32 After all, to see 
whether true robustly moral and adaptive moral beliefs do indeed come apart, as the 
evolutionary debunker has it, we need to know something about the contents of both of 
those sets. If we don’t know what robust morality is, how can we know whether we fall 
short of it? Or, if robust morality could be about anything, we have no reason to think 
that mind-independent moral truths and adaptive moral beliefs don’t coincide or overlap. 
So, the evolutionary debunking argument above seems to defeat itself.  
 
For illustration, consider an analogy with perception: to evaluate whether my perceptual 
beliefs about mid-sized objects in my immediate environment (e.g. tables, chairs, desk 
lamps, water bottles, coffee mugs) are indeed unreliably formed, I need to make some 
assumptions about the contents of my perception. For instance, I need to know very 
roughly what a chair looks like to make sure that my perceptual belief that there is a chair 
right in front of me is false. Similarly, Vavova (2014) points out: ‘I cannot show that I am 
not hopeless at understanding right and wrong without being allowed to make some 
                                                
32 Vavova frames her objection slightly differently: robust moral realists cannot recognize evolutionary 
evidence as good evidence of error – and that there are thus limits on our ability to get evidence of our own 
error, arising from the way such evidence works. However, her key move is denying that robust moral 
realists have a ‘good independent reason’ (92-96) to doubt their moral beliefs. So, it can be framed as an 
attack on Independence in the context of evolutionary debunking, as I do here. Thanks to Neil Sinclair for 
helpful discussion of this point. 
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assumptions about what is right and wrong’ (ibid.). For instance, consider my moral belief 
that racism is wrong. At the same time, I am aware of evolutionary explanations of racism: 
it is adaptive to be suspicious of those who look different to me. Here, the adaptive and 
true robustly moral beliefs come apart. However, importantly, to draw that distinction, I 
must already assume some robustly moral truths, including that racism is morally wrong.33 
 
It is important to appreciate how general this objection is. More precisely, the worry does 
not depend on a specific interpretation of premise (2), the claim that evolutionary 
considerations provide higher-order evidence of error. Sure, Vavova (2014) criticizes a 
version of the evolutionary debunking argument according to which thinking about the 
evolutionary origins of their moral beliefs provides robust moral realists with evidence of 
unreliability. But that, in my view, artificially restricts the scope of the objection, since we 
can easily generalize it to any evolutionary debunking argument from higher-order 
evidence of error, regardless of the kind of evolutionary higher-order evidence. After all, 
any such argument subscribes to the problematic commitments that the objection 
capitalizes on: evolution as providing higher-order evidence of error, Conciliationism and, 
especially, Independence. For instance, suppose that evolutionary considerations amount 
to evidence of peer disagreement, as Bogardus (2016) and Mogensen (ms, 2017) argue. 
Once the robust moral realist receives such evidence, she must once again set aside all her 
moral evidence, beliefs and reasoning to respect Independence. But doing so would make 
it impossible for her to assess whether she, as opposed to her evolutionary counterpart, is 
more likely mistaken about morality. Again, the evolutionary debunker ends up with self-
defeat. So, the threat is perfectly general – and therefore relevant to any evolutionary 
debunker relying on the notion of higher-order evidence of error.34 
 
                                                
33 Vavova also addresses some preliminary responses to her objection. For instance, what if the evolutionary 
debunker extends the scope of their attack to include evaluative in addition to moral beliefs? In that case, 
Vavova (2014: 87-89) argues, the evolutionary debunking argument defeats itself as well: now, to respect 
Independence, the moral realist cannot even rely on her beliefs about epistemic principles, including 
principles about how to evaluate evidence such as Independence or Conciliationism. What if the evolutionary 
debunker restricts the scope of their attack to deontological moral beliefs? In that case, Vavova (2014: 93-
95) argues, their argument either collapses into a more ambitious form (such as the one against robust moral 
realism) – or the evolutionary story turns out to be idle, given other worries about deontology. Finally, what 
if the evolutionary debunker insists that her conclusion is merely dialectical (such that it establishes moral 
constructivism, say), not sceptical? According to Vavova (2014: 89), that wouldn’t get them off the hook: 
even if the conclusion is dialectical, the inference of the argument must still go through. But it doesn’t, if 
her objection is correct and the argument is self-defeating. 
34 The self-defeat objection might be even more general still, arising for analogue arguments against robust 
construals of other putatively apriori beliefs about mathematics, logic, modality, epistemology or religion. 
Examining these analogue arguments, however, goes well beyond the scope of this chapter. 
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4 .  Avo id ing  Se l f -Defea t :  A Str a tegy  
 
As mentioned in the introduction, the literature doesn’t feature any discussion of how 
evolutionary debunkers could or should respond to this self-defeat objection. My aim in 
what follows is to address that shortcoming. I shall propose and subsequently evaluate a 
two-pronged strategy. To avoid self-defeat, evolutionary debunkers should replace 
Conciliationism (or premise (1) of their argument) with a view that (A) rejects 
Independence and therefore allows first-order moral evidence into the picture, yet (B) still 
yields the verdict that evolutionary higher-order evidence defeats the justification of first-
order moral beliefs.35 In this section, I shall briefly motivate both prongs, while the next 
section introduces Thomas Kelly’s (2010) Total Evidence View as a candidate framework 
that clearly satisfies (A). The final two sections will then focus on whether evolutionary 
debunkers could make good on (B) within Kelly’s framework, discussing evolutionary 
evidence of moral unreliability (§6) before delving into evolutionary evidence of moral 
peer disagreement (§7). 
 
To wit, three claims make up the evolutionary debunking argument: Conciliationism 
about higher-order evidence of error (including Independence), the claim that evolutionary 
considerations provide the robust moral realist with such evidence, and the sceptical 
conclusion. To avoid self-defeat, evolutionary debunkers must give up one of them. They 
cannot give up the last two. Without the distinctive claim about the evidential import of 
evolution, their argument would cease to be an evolutionary one. And without the sceptical 
conclusion, their argument wouldn’t be a debunking one. But Conciliationism and 
especially Independence appear to be the culprits: only if the robust moral realist is forced 
to assess the evolutionary evidence independently of all her first-order moral evidence does 
the argument threaten to defeat itself. Therefore, evolutionary debunkers should reject 
Conciliationism due to its commitment to Independence, while holding on to the claim 
that evolution provides higher-order evidence of error as well as the sceptical conclusion.  
 
But giving up on Conciliationism (or premise (1)) won’t be enough, of course. Rather, 
evolutionary debunkers also need a replacement, a view that licenses the inference from 
the claim that evolutionary considerations amount to higher-order evidence of error to 
                                                
35 Why not reformulate Independence instead of rejecting it? Because the most plausible ways of doing so 
strike me as highly problematic. For instance, evolutionary debunkers might first distinguish between 
substantive and formal assumptions about moral truth (e.g. Gert & Gert 2016, Sinclair forthcoming: 19-
22) – and then argue that Independence tells us to set aside only substantive, yet not formal, moral 
assumptions when assessing higher-order evidence of error. However, it remains unclear whether formal 
assumptions provide sufficient detail to assess whether moral realists are mistaken about morality. After all, 
those assumptions only describe the form of robust morality, not what robust morality actually looks like. 
We shall discuss that issue in more depth in Chapter 5. 
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the sceptical conclusion. More precisely, evolutionary debunkers must defend (or, at least, 
sketch) a view with two distinctive features: it must (A) reject Independence and thus allow 
first-order (moral) evidence into the picture, yet (B) still yield the verdict that 
(evolutionary) higher-order evidence defeats the justification of first-order (moral) beliefs. 
To successfully deal with the self-defeat objection, the view appealed to in premise (1) 
must satisfy both requirements. Are such views available? 
 
5 .  The  Tota l  Ev idence  Vi ew 
 
Fortunately for the evolutionary debunker, there are views on peer disagreement that 
promise to fit the bill. For instance, take the Total Evidence View, as developed by Thomas 
Kelly (2010: 33-44).36 This view states that your total evidence determines whether your 
belief that p is justified or not. The total evidence includes both your first-order evidence 
(in support of p) and the second-order evidence of peer disagreement (regarding p). 
Sometimes, the total evidence justifies your original belief and thus makes it reasonable 
for you to stick to your guns. Suppose that you – just like me above – disagree with Julian 
about a football matter. While you insist that there was no delay of game, Julian claims 
that there was – and that, rather absurdly, the goalkeeper, who isn’t on a yellow card, 
should be immediately sent off for it.37 Here, the total evidence, consisting of your 
perceptual experience and knowledge of the football rule book, justifies your belief that 
the goalkeeper shouldn’t be sent off for delay of game. But on other occasions, the total 
evidence may defeat the justification of your original belief – and therefore make it 
reasonable for you to change your outlook. Suppose that you are a sceptic about other 
minds, based on the relevant class of arguments. But then you find out that an 
overwhelming majority of professional philosophers disagree with you, having 
independently arrived at their view.38 Here, the total evidence, consisting of the 
arguments, your considered judgment as well as all the considered judgments of your 
                                                
36 Another example would be Jennifer Lackey’s (2008) Justificationism. However, those two views ultimately 
converge, according to Matheson (2015). So, I shall focus on the more widely discussed presentation. For 
the purposes of my argument in this chapter, I shall assume that Kelly’s view is generally plausible. For some 
common objections, though, see Kelly 2010: 42-64. 
37 In football, delay of game is, at best, worthy of a yellow card. Players get awarded yellow cards for bad 
fouls that don’t warrant immediate ejection. Two yellow cards, though, equal a red card, which signifies 
immediate rejection. This case is modelled after so-called Extreme Restaurant Cases. See Christensen 2007: 
199-203, Elga 2007: 490f, and Kelly 2010: 41f.  
38 See Kelly 2010: 37. To what extent the assumption of independent convergence holds is, of course, a 
psychological and sociological, not philosophical, matter. But for more on its epistemic importance, see 
Kelly 2010: 37-41. 
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peers, seems to justify the common-sense view that there are indeed other minds. So, it 
would be reasonable for you to conciliate – or even accept the common-sense view.39 
 
The Total Evidence View clearly satisfies the first requirement or (A) above. Unlike 
Conciliationism, this view rejects Independence: it affords our first-order evidence, beliefs 
and reasoning a role in determining whether a given belief is justified or not. In our 
context, that means that the robust moral realist no longer needs to set aside all her first-
order moral evidence, beliefs and reasoning when assessing evolutionary higher-order 
evidence of error. And since she is not forced to do that, she does not risk setting aside too 
much to know whether she is mistaken or not. Therefore, the Total Evidence looks like a 
suitable candidate for replacing premise (1) of the debunkers’ argument. 
 
But what about the second requirement or (B): does the view yield the verdict that 
evolutionary higher-order evidence of error defeats the justification of first-order robustly 
moral beliefs? Here, matters get more complicated. To establish that, evolutionary 
debunkers would need to argue that the total evidence available to the robust moral realist, 
consisting of her first-order moral evidence and the evolutionary higher-order evidence of 
error, does indeed defeat the justification of her moral beliefs. Can they do so? 
 
In what follows, I shall answer that question negatively. On reflection, the total evidence 
available to the robust moral realist does not defeat the justification of her moral beliefs. 
By implication, evolutionary debunkers cannot satisfy the second requirement or (B) of 
my strategy above. And since they cannot do that, their argument defeats itself. However, 
as I shall argue, the exact reason for why evolutionary debunkers fail to establish defeat 
depends on the kind of higher-order evidence that evolutionary considerations allegedly 
provide. As I shall discuss in §6, debunkers such as Street (2006), for whom evolutionary 
considerations supply evidence of moral unreliability, struggle with evidential weight. In 
contrast, I make the case in §7 that the evolutionary disagreement argument developed 
by Bogardus (2016) and Mogensen (ms, 2017) rests on a pair of inconsistent assumptions. 
 
6 .  Evo lu t ion  a nd  Mor a l  Unr e l i a b i l i ty  
 
Suppose Street (2006) is right: evolutionary considerations provide evidence of moral 
unreliability. Then, the total evidence available to the robust moral realist consists of both 
that evidence and our first-order moral evidence. Does that evidence defeat the 
                                                
39 Following Kelly (2010), my presentation of the view focuses on peer disagreement here. But, at least 
initially, the view seems to plausibly generalize to other kinds of higher-order evidence of error. For more 
on whether that impression withstands scrutiny, see §6 below. 
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justification of our moral beliefs? The answer seems to depend on the weight of the 
respective bodies of evidence. If the evolutionary evidence of moral unreliability 
outweighed our first-order moral evidence, our robustly moral beliefs would no longer be 
justified. If it didn’t, our robustly moral beliefs would remain undefeated. But how should 
we decide which antecedent of those two conditionals holds?  
 
To start with, we might appeal to brute intuition. After all, we seem to have widely shared 
intuitions about whether the first- or higher-order evidence has greater weight in some 
extreme cases. For instance, it is intuitive to think that the higher-order evidence of error 
outweighs our first-order evidence in Hypoxia. Conversely, it is natural to think that our 
first-order perceptual evidence outweighs the higher-order evidence of error gained by 
finding out that a very popular headache remedy caused hallucinations in 1 in 1 million 
test subjects. And there is some support for this line of thinking in the literature on peer 
disagreement. For instance, Kelly (2010) seems to advocate a form of epistemic 
particularism about the matter. When considering the question of whether the first- or 
higher-order evidence plays a greater role in fixing the reasonability of what to believe, he 
writes that ‘…the question of which counts for more – peer opinion, or the evidence on 
which the peers base their opinion? – is not, I think, a good question when it is posed at 
such a high level of abstraction’ (34). Rather, we have to examine cases and our intuitive 
verdicts about them individually. Similarly, Errol Lord (2014) sketches a test for evidential 
weight in the context of peer disagreement that seems driven by brute intuition. To 
determine whether one’s original reasons are strong or weighty enough to ground a 
permission to dismiss peer disagreement, we should ask: ‘do [those original reasons] put 
you in a position to think your peer is crazy or otherwise epistemically suspect?’ (Lord 
2014: 376, fn. 15; emphasis mine). And perhaps, his proposal can be generalized to 
evidence of unreliability: if your first-order evidence makes the source of the evidence of 
unreliability seem epistemically suspect, the former outweighs the latter.  
 
But I don’t think that an appeal to brute intuition will help the debunker. Unlike our 
widely shared intuitions about evidential weight in extreme cases, our intuitions about the 
weight of evolutionary evidence of moral unreliability vis-à-vis our first-order moral 
evidence strike me much more moot. To see that, it suffices to point to the persistent 
disagreement in the literature about the epistemic import of evolutionary biology for 
robustly moral belief – which seems at least partially fueled by conflicting intuitions about 
evidential weight. While evolutionary debunkers share the intuition that evolutionary 
evidence is weightier than moral evidence and therefore undermines robustly moral 
beliefs, robustly moral realists tend to lack the intuition – or explain it away as irrelevant. 
If that is correct, we have reached a dialectical stalemate, without making any progress in 
the matter at hand. So, an appeal to brute intuition won’t help evolutionary debunkers 
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such as Street (2006) to establish the claim that evolutionary evidence of moral 
unreliability outweighs our first-order moral evidence. 
 
Instead, the evolutionary debunker might look towards a more theoretical (or formal) 
notion of evidential weight. Unfortunately, there is remarkably little literature on how to 
measure and compare the weight of evidence – and no literature at all on how to apply 
such ideas to evolutionary debunking. Still, there are some suggestions worth exploring. 
For instance, take James Joyce (2005: 162-5): for him, the balance of total evidence favors 
whatever ordered sequence of propositions contains an estimated higher number of 
truths.40 Following his proposal, we estimate whether the first-order moral evidence or the 
evolutionary evidence of moral unreliability contains a higher number of truths. If we can 
reasonably expect the first-order moral evidence to feature more truths, the balance of 
total evidence favors the moral propositions making up that evidence. That would be bad 
news for evolutionary debunkers. Conversely, if we can reasonably expect the higher-order 
evidence of error to feature more truths, the balance of total evidence favors the 
propositions making up the higher-order evidence of error. That would be good news for 
debunkers such as Street.  
 
However, I doubt that evolutionary debunkers like Street (2006) can avail themselves 
readily of the resources that Joyce’s (2005) framework offers. First, we might worry 
generally that this probabilistic notion of evidential weight cannot successfully model 
interactions between bodies of evidence at different levels. After all, when weighing 
evidence from different levels, the estimates won’t be independent. Rather, the estimate 
of how many truths the first-order evidence contains will depend to some extent on our 
estimate of how many truths the higher-order evidence (of error) contains. That might 
complicate the formation of reasonable expectations. Further, that dependency might be 
especially pertinent in the context of evolutionary debunking. As Kevin Brosnan (2011: 
55) points out, it is impossible to estimate of how likely it is that moral truths obtain prior 
to evolutionary influence. After all, (almost) everybody accepts that our moral beliefs 
evolved – and that we thus cannot assess their truth prior to or independently of evolution. 
But if that is correct, how can we estimate how many truths the first-order moral evidence 
contains? Second, the specific application of Joyce’s account to evolutionary debunking 
might prove problematic also in another way. In particular, we might find it hard to 
                                                
40 J. Joyce (2005) distinguishes between the balance and weight of evidence. While the balance of evidence 
concerns whether a given body of evidence ‘points’ towards one set of propositions over another, its weight 
corresponds to the size of a body of evidence. Given his usage, an evolutionary debunker therefore requires 
a theoretical notion of evidential balance, not weight. However, since the distinction isn’t relevant in our 
discussion, I shall continue using them interchangeably. 
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estimate the number of basic moral truths. After all, there is plenty of disagreement about 
what they are and which one of them are properly basic, even amongst robust moral 
realists. So, how are we supposed to count the number of basic robustly moral truths? 
Given these significant issues, evolutionary debunkers most likely cannot borrow Joyce’s 
way of measuring the balance of total evidence. But if they cannot do that, they once again 
won’t be able to make good on the claim that the evolutionary evidence of moral 
unreliability outweighs our first-order moral evidence. 
 
In short, debunkers who construe evolutionary considerations as evidence of moral 
unreliability struggle at the first hurdle. To meet the second requirement or (B) of the 
strategy outlined in §4 and therefore avoid self-defeat, they must establish that the 
evolutionary evidence of moral unreliability outweighs our first-order moral evidence. But 
doing that, in turn, requires a plausible theoretical notion of evidential weight. Even 
though it might not be impossible to find such a notion, our discussion (and the dearth 
of literature on the subject) suggests that these evolutionary debunkers have their work 
cut out for themselves.41 It seems fair to conclude that any evolutionary debunking 
argument based on evidence of moral unreliability must defeat itself. 
 
7 .  Evo lu t ion  a nd  Mor a l  Di s a g r eement  
 
Suppose Bogardus (2016) and Mogensen (ms, 2017) are right:  evolutionary 
considerations amount to evidence of possible moral peer disagreement. Does the total 
evidence available to the robust moral realist in that case defeat the justification of our 
robustly moral beliefs?  
 
To answer that question affirmatively, evolutionary debunkers may proceed in two steps. 
First, they remind us of Kelly’s (2010: 42-44) diagnosis of Offside Call. There, Kelly 
argues, the total evidence available to me defeats the justification of my belief that the 
scorer was onside.42 Why that? Initially, Julian and I have different first-order perceptual 
evidence: while it appears to me that the forward was onside when he started his run, the 
opposite seems to be the case to Julian. This evidence justifies our initial perceptual beliefs, 
respectively. But once we become aware of our perceptual disagreement, we pool our first-
                                                
41 It might be unsurprising that Kelly’s (2010) view requires supplementation when generalizing it to higher-
order evidence of error other than peer disagreement (for which it was conceived and developed). In fact, it 
might even be unsurprising that any decent epistemic theory requires a notion of weight. (For an argument 
that any decent moral theory requires weighted notions such as normative reasons, see Lord & Maguire 
2016: 1-8.) What is surprising, however, is that supplementing Kelly’s view proves that hard. 
42 Of course, the total evidence also defeats the justification of Julian’s belief that the scorer was offside, as 
we shall see shortly. 
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order evidence and add the higher-order evidence of peer disagreement. The resulting 
total evidence neither supports my belief that the goal was scored onside – nor Julian’s 
belief to the contrary. Instead, we have a situation of evidential symmetry between myself 
and Julian. Therefore, neither his nor my initial belief is justified anymore. That is how 
the Total Evidence View diagnoses cases with the structure of Offside Call. 
 
In a second step, evolutionary debunkers can argue that possible moral peer disagreements 
with your evolutionary counterparts share the structure of Offside Call. Initially, we also 
have two different bodies of first-order evidence: while you have the moral intuition that 
you have special obligations to your family members, your evolutionary counterpart has 
the contrary moral intuition. Again, this evidence justifies our respective initial moral 
beliefs. But once you discover the moral peer disagreement and pool your first-order moral 
evidence, the total evidence – just as above – supports neither your belief that you have 
special moral obligations to your family members nor your evolutionary counterpart’s 
belief to the contrary. Therefore, the justification of both your and your counterpart’s 
initial moral beliefs have been defeated. And, of course, the same reasoning could be 
employed for any other basic moral intuition that seems prima facie compelling and could 
be subject to disagreement based on divergent evolutionary histories.43 
 
By following these two steps, evolutionary debunkers who construe evolutionary 
considerations as evidence of disagreement could argue that the total evidence available to 
the robust moral realist defeats the justification of her moral beliefs. Achieving that – 
without even requiring a theoretical notion of evidential weight – would be no mean feat. 
Rather, it would show that they make good on the second requirement or (B) of my 
strategy outlined in §4: that the Total Evidence View yields the verdict that evolutionary 
higher-order evidence defeats the justification of first-order robustly moral beliefs. As a 
result, these evolutionary debunkers would avoid self-defeat. 
 
To make this move work, however, evolutionary considerations must indeed amount to 
evidence of possible moral peer disagreement. (We cannot merely suppose that they do, 
as we have done up to this point.) But is that plausible at all? On reflection, I don’t think 
that it is: evolutionary considerations cannot amount to evidence of possible moral peer 
disagreement. But before developing an argument in support of my assessment, let me 
briefly address a red herring about whether merely possible disagreements have defeating 
force. 
 
                                                
43 For a similar line of thought, see Setiya 2013: Ch. 1. 
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Whether robust moral realists or not, we don’t actually disagree with anyone with a 
different evolutionary background. Rather, the disagreement is merely possible. Such 
disagreement, some might argue, isn’t epistemically significant, though. After all, we could 
– in principle – disagree about almost anything: that Edinburgh is the capital of Scotland, 
that I have hands, that 2 + 2 = 4, and so forth. Importantly, we don’t take the mere 
possibility of such disagreement as a reason to revise our corresponding beliefs. For 
instance, even if there could be someone who denies that 2 + 2 = 4, that alone doesn’t 
make it rational for me to stop believing in a simple arithmetic truth. So, if merely possible 
disagreements don’t have defeating force, why does moral peer disagreement with 
imaginary evolutionary counterparts? 
 
In response, Mogensen (ms, 2017) distinguishes between merely possible and arbitrarily 
absent disagreements. While the former lack epistemic significance, the latter still matter. 
How so? Importantly, even though we do not, we could easily disagree with an 
evolutionary counterpart about fundamental moral matters (such as the wrongness of 
incest, our obligations towards family members, and so forth). Such disagreement is just 
arbitrarily absent: its absence has nothing to do with the truth of the moral beliefs 
disagreed about. Therefore, it is still epistemically significant.44 In contrast, the truth of 
beliefs about simple arithmetic explains the absence of disagreements about whether 2 + 
2 = 4. So, disagreements about simple arithmetic are not arbitrarily absent, but merely 
possible – and thus not epistemically significant. By implication, the worry that merely 
possible disagreements lack defeating force is a red herring, at least in our context. 
 
However, as I shall argue now, evolutionary debunkers who construe evolutionary 
considerations as evidence of moral peer disagreement face a much more serious worry. 
For their argument to work, it must be plausible that evolutionary considerations amount 
to such evidence. In more detail, our evolutionary counterparts must not just disagree 
with us about fundamental moral matters, but also count as our epistemic and – in a sense 
to be explained presently – metaphysical peers. However, I doubt that entities can 
simultaneously satisfy both of those criteria. But if they cannot, evolutionary 
considerations cannot plausibly amount to evidence of moral peer disagreement. That, in 
turn, means that the evolutionary debunking argument from moral peer disagreement 
doesn’t get off the ground. 
 
                                                
44 Mogensen (2017) calls this the Arbitrary Absence Thesis: ‘Necessarily for any S1, S2, p: If S1 believes p and 
knows that S2 would believe some contrary of p if not for some condition C, which is arbitrary with respect 
to S1’s belief that p, S1 should be as confident of p as S1 ought to be of p if, all else being equal, S1 knew 
that S2 does believe some contrary of p.’ (Mogensen 2017: 598; emphasis mine). 
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To see how my worry arises, note that any evolutionary debunking argument based on 
moral peer disagreement rests on two crucial assumptions. First, it assumes that our 
counterparts have an alternative evolutionary history – and that this explains why they 
hold radically different moral beliefs or disagree with us about fundamental moral matters. 
To illustrate, consider an example introduced in §2 above. Suppose robust moral realists 
believe that incest is morally wrong and that their evolutionary counterparts morally 
disagree. What explains their disagreement is the difference in evolutionary past: while 
incest hampered our ancestors’ reproductive fitness, it did – by stipulation – not do so for 
our evolutionary counterparts.45 As a result, they don’t believe that incest is morally 
impermissible. Importantly, the assumption that differences in evolutionary trajectory 
explain differences in fundamental moral outlook is indispensable to the argument above: 
without it, the argument would cease to be distinctively evolutionary. Instead, it would 
just be a generic argument from moral peer disagreement against robust moral realism. 
 
Second, any evolutionary debunking argument based on moral peer disagreement 
presupposes that our evolutionary counterparts count as our peers. More precisely, those 
counterparts must be comparable to us both epistemically and metaphysically. 
Epistemically, they must be equally well placed to us: their evidence must be similarly 
strong and their intellectual abilities comparable.46 If their evidence was lacking or 
significantly impoverished and/or their reasoning capacities were impaired, we couldn’t 
consider them our epistemic equals. That we are epistemic peers is important. For if our 
evolutionary counterparts weren’t epistemic peers, their disagreement with us about 
fundamental moral matters wouldn’t defeat the justification of our robustly moral beliefs. 
Metaphysically, those counterparts need to partake in our robustly moral reality: the moral 
facts that hold in their world must significantly overlap with those holding in the actual 
world. Or, more poetically: we both must be bound by most of the same moral laws (and 
seeking to uncover them). Why that? Because we couldn’t have meaningful disagreement 
otherwise, let alone disagreement between epistemic peers. Rather, we would be talking 
past each other – just like two people ‘disagreeing’ over which ice cream flavor tastes best.47 
                                                
45 We can imagine and spell out the empirical details in various ways: perhaps those evolutionary 
counterparts reproduce very differently, or incest strengthens group cohesion which, in turn, increases 
survival prospects, etc. For the purpose of my worry, those details don’t matter. 
46 See Kelly 2005: 10. For criticism, see King 2012. 
47 Of course, this assumes – plausibly in my mind – a roughly subjectivist or response-dependent account 
of taste judgments. Further, note that most paradigmatic cases of peer disagreement discussed in the 
literature trivially meet the criterion of metaphysical peerhood – and therefore don’t spell it out. Take 
Offside above: it is uncontroversial that there is a mind-independent (yet perhaps not practice/institution-
independent) fact of the matter about whether the striker was offside or not. 
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So, the argument must assume that our evolutionary counterparts are peers, both 
epistemically and metaphysically. 
 
But, on reflection, those two assumptions are inconsistent – or, at least, stand in serious 
tension. Suppose that the first assumption is true: our counterparts radically disagree with 
us about moral matters because of their radically different evolutionary history. That 
seems to cast doubt on their putative status as both epistemic and metaphysical peers. To 
begin with, if their evolved moral beliefs are radically different to ours, yet still rationally 
formed, they probably rest on very different bodies of moral evidence, including moral 
intuitions and morally relevant non-moral facts.48 But if their evidence so significantly 
differs from ours that it becomes unintelligible to us and their moral outlook strikes us as 
completely alien, it seems difficult to count them as our epistemic peers.49 So, our 
evolutionary counterparts don’t seem equally well placed to us, epistemically speaking.  
 
Further, the first assumption also undermines their putative status as metaphysical peers. 
Suppose that our counterparts hold radically different moral beliefs due to alternative 
evolutionary pressures. If their moral beliefs are radically different, however, it seems 
plausible that other, morally relevant, non-doxastic features of their psychology would 
differ from ours as well. For instance, they might not be able to experience pain (or only 
certain kinds of pain) or they might lack the emotion of romantic love. But if our 
evolutionary counterparts experience and navigate the (moral) world so differently, why 
think that the same robust moral facts hold for them as for us? After all, many moral facts 
depend on the morally relevant, non-doxastic features of our psychologies (as even robust 
moral realists would admit).50 For instance, take the fact that needlessly inflicting pain on 
others is morally wrong. That fact only holds if there are subjects capable of experiencing 
pain. If our evolutionary counterparts couldn’t experience pain, they would not be bound 
by that moral fact. Similarly, if they were incapable of experiencing romantic love, many 
moral laws that specifically govern romantic interpersonal relationships wouldn’t apply to 
them. For instance, it might not be wrong for our evolutionary counterparts to cheat on 
each other. So, it seems plausible that, if our evolutionary counterparts had very different 
moral beliefs and thus different non-doxastic moral psychologies, the robustly moral facts 
that hold for them would differ as well. That, though, means that they cannot be our 
                                                
48 See Wedgwood 2010: 7. 
49 This point is exacerbated within the framework of the Total Evidence View: we are allowed to rely on 
our first-order moral evidence when assessing evidence of peer disagreement. But once we do, it becomes 
hard to regard our radically disagreeing evolutionary counterparts as epistemic peers – whether or not they 
share our evidence. Thanks to Camil Golub for this point. 
50 Not all, of course. For instance, it might be a fact that eco-systems have moral value. But their value 
wouldn’t directly depend on any feature of our non-doxastic moral psychologies. 
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peers, metaphysically speaking. After all, those counterparts do not partake in our robustly 
moral reality (or they aren’t bound by most of the same moral laws). 
 
In sum, it appears that the truth of the first assumption, namely that our counterparts 
have evolved to radically morally disagree with us, undermines the second assumption, 
namely that our counterparts are our peers, both epistemically and metaphysically. As a 
result, those two assumptions are inconsistent – or, at least, stand in serious tension. But, 
importantly, both assumptions are indispensable to any evolutionary debunking 
argument based on moral peer disagreement. We cannot just relax them.51 So, 
evolutionary debunkers such as Bogardus (2016) and Mogensen (ms, 2017) face a serious 
worry: it does not seem plausible that evolutionary considerations amount to evidence of 
moral peer disagreement. That, in turn, means that their argument doesn’t get off the 
ground. 
 
Where are we now? In this section, I sketched how evolutionary debunkers such as 
Bogardus (2016) and Mogensen (ms, 2017) can avail themselves of the resources of the 
Total Evidence View to get around the self-defeat objection. Their key move consists in 
establishing that moral disagreements with evolutionary counterparts are structurally 
similar to Offside Call – and then adopt Kelly’s (2010) diagnosis of such standard cases. 
However, that only works if we can plausibly suppose that evolutionary consideration 
supply evidence of moral peer disagreement. That supposition, though, strikes me as 
implausible. On reflection, we cannot simultaneously assume that our counterparts have 
evolved to radically morally disagree with us – and count them as our peers, both 
epistemically and metaphysically. So, their key move falters and, by implication, they 
cannot make good on the second part or (B) of my strategy. But if they cannot do that, 
the evolutionary debunking argument from moral peer disagreement defeats itself.52 
 
8 .  Conclu s ion  
 
In this chapter, I closely examined an evolutionary debunking argument based on the 
epistemic principle that higher-order evidence of error defeats justification. More 
precisely, I argued that any such argument ultimately cannot avert self-defeat. After 
presenting both the argument and the worry in more depth, my argument proceeded in 
                                                
51 As rehearsed above, if we relax the first one, the argument ceases to be evolutionary – and if we relax the 
second one, it ceases to be about disagreement between peers. 
52 Of course, the worry I develop in this section might actually be so powerful that it would undermine any 
evolutionary debunking argument from moral peer disagreement irrespective of self-defeat. After all, my 
worry targets the assumption at its very core: that evolutionary considerations amount to such evidence in 
the first place. 
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two steps. First, I sketched out an initially promising strategy against self-defeat: 
evolutionary debunkers should change their background view on the epistemic 
significance of higher-order evidence of error from Conciliationism to Kelly’s (2010) 
Total Evidence View. However, as I argued in a second step, both versions of the 
evolutionary debunking argument from higher-order evidence of error fail to take 
advantage of that switch. More specifically, both versions fall short of establishing that the 
total evidence available to the robust moral realist defeats the justification of their moral 
beliefs. Debunkers such as Street (2006), who construe evolutionary considerations as 
evidence of moral unreliability, lack a plausible theoretical notion of evidential weight. In 
contrast, the evolutionary disagreement argument developed by Bogardus (2016) and 
Mogensen (ms, 2017) rests on two inconsistent assumptions about the epistemic (and 
metaphysical) credentials of our evolutionary counterparts. 
 
What does that imply for the broader dialectic of my thesis? For robust moral realists, my 
discussion is good news: they don’t have to fear evolutionary debunking arguments from 
higher-order evidence of error. In contrast, evolutionary debunkers must look elsewhere 
for an epistemic principle that licenses the inference from the commitment to the 
existence of robust moral facts and evolutionary explanations of moral belief to moral 
scepticism. Chapter 4 aims to offer exactly that. 
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CHAPTER 4: EXPLANATORY DISPENSABILITY 
 
1 .  In t r oduct ion  
 
Evolutionary debunking arguments attempt to show that the evolutionary theory, when 
combined with a commitment to robust moral objectivity, leads to moral scepticism. 
However, it has proven difficult so far to find an epistemic principle that licenses this 
inference. In Chapter 2, we discussed and rejected the principle that reliability requires 
explanation. In Chapter 3, we closely examined the – ultimately inadequate – principle 
that higher-order evidence of error defeats justification. In this chapter, we focus on one 
final suggestion: that, for our beliefs to be justified, they must be best explained by the 
facts they are about. When combined with the idea that evolution, not robust moral facts, 
provides the best explanation of our moral beliefs, this principle implies moral scepticism: 
our moral beliefs are unjustified. 
 
My aim in this chapter is to offer a systematic, comprehensive defense of an evolutionary 
debunking argument inspired by that line of thinking.1 According to that specific 
argument, since robust moral facts are dispensable to the best (namely: evolutionary) 
explanation of our moral beliefs and there are no additional, non-abductive reasons to 
maintain them, those beliefs lose their justification. To establish its plausibility, I defend 
this evolutionary debunking argument against three powerful recent criticisms. More 
specifically, I argue that neither Andreas Mogensen’s (2015, 2016) worry about levels of 
evolutionary explanation, nor Terrence Cuneo’s (2007) companion in guilt strategy nor 
David Enoch’s (2012, 2016) appeal to deliberative indispensability should make us doubt 
its soundness. The upshot of my discussion is significant: at last, we have a compelling 
evolutionary debunking challenge to robust moral realism, inspired by the epistemic 
principle that, for our beliefs to be justified, they must be best explained by the facts they 
are about. 
 
Here is my plan. §2 presents the evolutionary debunking argument from explanatory 
dispensability in more detail. The remainder of the chapter then focuses on defending its 
premises. §3 argues that – contra Mogensen (2015, 2016) – we shouldn’t think of 
evolutionary explanations of moral belief as complementary to explanations in terms of 
robust moral facts. §4 shows why – contra Cuneo (2007) – robust epistemic facts aren’t 
                                                
1 Why only inspired? Because, unlike more basic explanatory dispensability arguments, it involves a burden 
shift: its sceptical conclusion is conditional on the lack of additional, non-abductive reasons for robust moral 
belief. §2 explains that feature in more detail. 
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explanatorily dispensable in the relevant sense and thus cannot serve as companions in 
guilt. §5 criticizes Enoch’s (2012, 2016) proposal that the deliberative indispensability of 
robust moral facts gives us additional, non-abductive reason to believe in their existence. 
§6 concludes. 
 
2 .  Evo lu t iona r y  Debunk ing  a nd  Exp l a na to r y  Di sp ens a b i l i ty  
 
Recently, some philosophers have argued that insights from evolutionary theory debunk 
belief in robust moral facts. To make their case, a few of these evolutionary debunkers, 
including Richard Joyce (2006: Ch. 6), Philipp Kitcher (2005: 163-85) and Jack Woods 
(2016), rely on a variation of the epistemic principle that, for our beliefs to be justified, 
they must be best explained by the facts they are about.2 Despite some differences in detail, 
their arguments share the following structure:3  
 
(1) Evolutionary, not robust moral, facts best explain why we hold certain moral 
beliefs and not others. (Or, robust moral facts are dispensable to the best 
explanations of our moral beliefs.)4 
(2) If our moral beliefs are not best explained by robust moral facts and there are 
no additional, non-abductive reasons for maintaining them, that defeats their 
justification. (Or, if robust moral facts are dispensable to the best explanation of 
our moral beliefs and there are no additional, non-abductive reasons for 
maintaining them, that defeats the justification of those beliefs (that purport to 
represent them).) 
(3) There are no additional, non-abductive reasons for maintaining moral belief, 
robustly construed. 
(4) Therefore, (attention to) facts about evolution defeat(s) the justification of our 
moral beliefs, robustly construed. 
 
This is – what we might call – the best evolutionary explanation argument against robust 
moral realism. If sound, it forces moral realists into moral scepticism: we cannot ever form 
                                                
2 The original principle can be found in Harman (1977). The variation below features an additional reasons 
clause and is inspired by Woods (2016). See also fn. 3. 
3 Woods (2016) clearly develops an argument similar to the one below. In contrast, both Joyce (2006) and 
Kitcher (2005) can be charitably interpreted as advancing something to that effect – instead of a more basic, 
question-begging version without appeal to the additional reasons clause in premises (2) and (3). For more 
discussion of evolutionary debunking from explanatory dispensability, see also Ruse 1986, Bogardus 2016: 
fn. 26 as well as Clarke-Doane 2015 & 2016. 
4 Some might feel queasy about explanatory (in)dispensability talk. I employ it to formulate above argument 
because large swaths of the literature are couched in it. However, if you have reservations about it, simply 
ignore the second half of each premise and the conclusion. 
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justified beliefs about robustly moral facts. In the remainder of this section, I shall explain 
in more detail what these premises mean, why they might be true – and how they jointly 
seem to entail the conclusion. Doing so will set the stage for my systematic, comprehensive 
defense of the argument in §3 to §5, where I argue that the most powerful objections to 
each of the three premises turn out to be unconvincing. 
 
2.1.  Evolutionary Explanations of Moral Belief 
 
The first premise appeals to the evolutionary explanation of moral beliefs. Very roughly, 
such explanation say that we believe what we believe in virtue of natural selection.5 For 
example, we believe that incest is wrong or that we have special moral obligations to family 
members because that proved adaptive or helped our ancestors survive. Evolutionary 
explanations share three characteristics that are crucial for evolutionary debunking. 
 
First, evolutionary explanations don’t avert to (or imply or ineliminably feature) robust 
moral facts or truths. After all, evolution hasn’t selected for robustly true, but adaptive, 
moral beliefs. As Street (2008) puts it: ‘the best explanation of why we tend to value our 
survival is not that it’s independently true that our survival is valuable ... but rather, much 
more simply, that creatures who valued their survival tended to do what promoted it, and 
therefore left more descendants’ (209). In that respect, the evolutionary explanation of 
moral belief differs significantly from that of our perceptual beliefs about, say, mid-sized 
objects. It is overwhelmingly plausible that evolution has selected for their truth. After all, 
having true perceptual beliefs would have enhanced the fitness of our ancestors, helping 
them locate food and detect environmental threats. Second, evolutionary explanations are 
– what we might call – competitive: they compete with other kinds of explanations for 
overall plausibility and, if successful, are incompatible with them. For instance, 
evolutionary explanations of moral belief cannot hold true at the same time as moral 
                                                
5 As mentioned in Chapter 1, it is implausible that evolution explains particular moral beliefs. Rather, it 
explains our capacity for moral judgment. That, in turn, can be understood as either dispositions to apply 
moral concepts (e.g. Joyce 2001, 2006) or basic evaluative dispositions that shape our moral beliefs (e.g. 
Street 2006, 2008, 2011). However, this complication doesn’t matter for my argument above. 
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explanations: explanations of moral beliefs in terms of robust moral facts.6 Rather, if the 
evolutionary explanation proves successful, that rules out moral explanations.7 
 
Third and finally, evolutionary explanations of moral beliefs are best – or, at least, better 
than moral explanations. And that seems plausible: to start with, moral explanations 
cannot be causal. After all, (most) robust moral realist deny that moral facts have causal 
powers. But if moral explanations aren’t causal, what are they – and why think of them as 
explanations at all?8 Surely, if we are unsure whether a given putative explanation is an 
explanation at all (or, more precisely, if we are unsure how a given putative explanation is 
supposed to work), that explanation cannot be as good, let alone better, than a well-
respected scientific kind of explanation such as explanation by natural selection. Further, 
evolutionary explanations of moral beliefs aren’t just widely accepted as explanations. 
Rather, they also satisfy several criteria of what makes explanations good. More specifically, 
they are more parsimonious than moral explanations: they don’t feature sui generis robust 
moral facts in the explaining phrase or explanans.9 And evolutionary explanations of moral 
beliefs are more general than moral explanations: they don’t just explain why we hold the 
moral beliefs we hold, but also other characteristics of human psychology, such as why we 
perceive the world as we do or why we reason the way we do. So, evolutionary forces 
explain why we hold certain moral beliefs and not others better than moral explanations. 
And given that evolutionary explanations of human behavior and thinking are generally 
considered superior to other kinds of explanations, it seems to follow that evolution best 
explains our moral beliefs.10 Or, put differently, robust moral facts are dispensable to the 
                                                
6 There is some disagreement in the literature about the scope of moral explanations. Some construe them 
broadly, such that a moral explanation is ‘…an[y] explanation of a particular or type of event (or fact or 
state of affairs) that features moral terms in the explaining phrase’ (Sinclair 2013: 1). So, moral facts might 
explain both other moral facts as well as non-moral facts, including facts about moral beliefs. Others have a 
narrower conception: for them, a moral explanation is an appeal to a moral property of a person or situation 
to explain the formation of a moral judgment. In what follows, I shall operate on the latter, narrower 
definition. After all, the (epistemological) problem under discussion is not that moral facts don’t explain 
anything at all, since they may explain other moral facts. Rather, the problem is that moral facts don’t ‘hook 
up properly with our ability to detect facts’ (Sayre-McCord 1988: 443), or, put differently, don’t explain 
non-moral facts, especially our making moral observations and forming moral beliefs. 
7 I discuss a prominent worry about this feature of evolutionary explanations in §3 below. 
8 I develop that issue further in §3 below. Woods (2016) emphasizes that robust moral realists cannot avail 
themselves of causal explanation – and that that puts pressure on them. He goes as far as including this 
point as an explicit premise in the formulation of his Harman-style debunking argument. For reasons of 
simplicity, I have decided against that, instead bringing up the point in the explication of the first premise 
of the argument above. 
9 See §2.2 below for more on what underwrites such a parsimony criterion. 
10 Most likely, the argument doesn’t require that strong of a claim to go through. Instead, we simply need 
the claim that evolutionary explanations of moral beliefs are better than moral explanations and/or that the 
best explanation of moral belief, evolutionary or not, doesn’t appeal to robust moral facts or truths. I take 
it that I have established that here. 
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best explanations of our moral beliefs: they play no role in the best (namely: evolutionary) 
explanation of moral belief. 
 
Together, these three characteristics of evolutionary explanations of moral beliefs prove 
crucial to evolutionary debunking: such explanations avoid robust moral truths, rule out 
moral explanations – and are better than them. So, as premise (1) states, they explain why 
we hold certain moral beliefs, not robust moral facts. 
 
2.2.  Explanatory Dispensability and Defeat 
 
The second premise articulates an epistemic principle that ties explanatory dispensability 
to the defeat of justification.11 More precisely, it says that if robust moral facts are 
dispensable to the best explanation of our moral beliefs and there are no additional, non-
abductive reasons for maintaining them, that defeats the justification of those beliefs. This 
premise is inspired by what Woods (2016) calls ‘negative inference to the best explanation’ 
or IBE-. It reads as follows: ‘If the truth and content of our moral beliefs is not involved 
in the best explanation for our possession of them, then we need additional reasons to 
believe them’ (Woods 2016: 6; emphasis mine). Importantly, these additional reasons 
aren’t abductive, but could be grounded in deliberative indispensability, common sense 
or a permissive moral epistemology.12 
 
IBE- seems plausible enough. To start with, it is intuitively compelling: just as figuring in 
the best explanation of a given phenomenon (e.g. our possession of scientific beliefs) 
generates a reason for belief in a given entity (e.g. scientific truths), not figuring in the 
best explanation of a given phenomenon (e.g. our possession of moral beliefs) raises the 
requirement of giving additional reasons in support of belief in a given entity (e.g. moral 
truths). For illustration, consider a non-moral example: belief in the axioms of set theory. 
Set-theoretical truths aren’t plausibly involved in the best explanation of our set-
theoretical beliefs. After all, set-theoretical truths plausibly lack causal powers.13 Further, 
many sophisticated set-theoretical beliefs wouldn’t have been evolutionarily advantageous 
to our ancestors. So, if we aim to maintain our set-theoretic beliefs, we need additional, 
non-abductive reasons for them. For example, set theory might be indispensable to 
                                                
11 As in the rest of my thesis, I mean ‘undermining defeater’ by ‘defeater’ here, dropping the qualifier 
henceforth. 
12 See Woods 2016: 8. I shall assess the two most plausible candidates for such additional reasons in §5 
below – and §4.3 of Chapter 5, respectively. 
13 For the sake of the illustration, I assume that we should be robust realists about set theory. If you aren’t 
on board with that, pick a different domain (e.g. mathematics, modality) that you deem more plausibly 
robust. 
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mathematics – which, in turn, might be indispensable to scientific theorizing.14 So, the 
scientific indispensability of set theory might give us additional, non-abductive reason to 
believe in set-theoretic truths. Thus, it looks like IBE- is intuitively compelling. 
 
In addition to its intuitive appeal, IBE- is also an instance of a more general, equally 
plausible principle, namely Burden Shift: ‘If our believing in certain claims of a domain D 
can be well explained without any appeal to their content and truth, then we acquire the 
epistemic burden of explaining why we should continue to believe them in spite of their 
theoretical superfluousness’ (Woods 2016: 7). Again, that seems plausible, given that 
explanatory indispensability is a very good guide to ontology15 – and if we cannot rely on 
that, we inherit the task of identifying another, similarly good ontological roadmap. But 
if Burden Shift strikes us as plausible, so must IBE-, for the latter is an instance of the 
former. 
 
Before moving on, let me stress the importance of the additional reasons clause featured 
in the second premise. If the evolutionary debunker dropped it and opted for direct, 
unconditional defeat by explanatory dispensability instead, the second premise would beg 
the question against the robust moral realist. After all, most robust moral realists reject that 
robust moral facts possess causal-explanatory powers – and therefore also reject abductive 
moral epistemology.16 In other words, they hold that moral beliefs can be justified even if 
they are not best explained by the facts that they are about. Instead, these robust moral 
realists endorse non-abductive moral epistemologies such as moral intuitionism.17 As a 
result, if debunkers dropped the additional reasons qualifier, their argument would rule 
out moral justification (for robust moral realists) ab initio, thus assuming what it sets out 
to prove. 
 
By inserting the additional reasons clause, evolutionary debunkers can avoid that 
complication. After all, neither IBE- nor Burden Shift defeat the justification of moral – 
and, more generally, apriori – beliefs outright, based solely on abductive grounds. Rather, 
those principles simply shift the burden: given the lack of abductive reasons for robust 
moral or, more generally, apriori belief, robust moral realists must provide other reasons. 
And if they fail to do so and thus cannot discharge this epistemic burden, then the 
justification of their moral beliefs has been defeated. So, IBE- and Burden Shift make 
                                                
14 For more on the scientific indispensability of mathematics and how that grounds ontological commitment 
to mathematical entities, see Colyvan 2015. 
15 See Cline 2016. 
16 For this criticism, Setiya 2013, Sinclair 2013, and Zimmerman 2010: Ch. 5. 
17 Chapter 5 will examine moral intuitionism in depth. 
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defeat conditional on the robust moral realist’s inability to provide additional reasons for 
moral belief. And by doing so, the second premise avoids begging the question. 
 
2.3.  Non-Abductive Reasons for Robust Moral Belief and Moral 
Scepticism 
 
The third premise states that there are no additional, non-abductive reasons for belief in 
robustly moral facts. This is, obviously, a substantive and controversial claim: it implies 
that many prima facie plausible candidates found in the literature prove ultimately 
unsuitable or, at least, sufficiently problematic for the argument to go through. In the 
remainder of my thesis, I shall closely examine two such candidates. In §5 below, I present 
and evaluate a recent, widely discussed proposal by David Enoch (2012, 2016), according 
to which the deliberative indispensability of robust moral facts gives us (non-abductive) 
reason to believe in their existence. In §4 of Chapter 5, I develop and criticize another 
attractive option, combining moral intuitionism with a third-factor explanation of moral 
reliability. So, a full-blown defense of premise (3) has to wait until later. For now, let me 
simply stress the importance of this premise: without it, the antecedent of the conditional 
in premise (2) won’t hold. So, defending premise (3) is crucial to the aspirations of the 
evolutionary debunker. 
 
Together, premises (1) to (3) imply that the robust moral realist’s belief in robust moral 
facts is unjustified. After all, if robust moral facts are dispensable to the best (namely: 
evolutionary) explanation of moral beliefs and robust moral realists lack additional, non-
abductive reasons for maintaining them, that seems to defeat the justification of those 
beliefs. Put succinctly, attention to evolutionary explanations of moral belief – in 
conjunction with a critique of non-abductive sources of moral justification – undermines 
the justification of their robust moral beliefs. 
 
Before moving on to a comprehensive defense of each premise, let me clarify one aspect 
of this conclusion. As it stands, the conclusion seems ambiguous between an 
epistemological and a (primarily) metaphysical interpretation. The argument could either 
show that robust moral realists don’t have justified moral beliefs (and thus, if knowledge 
requires justification, lack moral knowledge) – or that robust moral facts don’t exist (and 
that corresponding beliefs are thus unjustified).18 However, according to Alex Miller 
(2003: Ch. 8) and Neil Sinclair (2013), this ambiguity is problematic: we should clearly 
                                                
18 This ambiguity or conflation is pervasive in the large literature on Harman-style debunking arguments: 
contributors often write that (robust) moral realists are not justified in their belief in the existence of objective 
moral facts. See, for example, Majors 2007. 
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distinguish between two versions of the Harman-style debunking argument, depending 
on whether its conclusion is epistemological or metaphysical. My formulation above, 
though, blends both interpretations together impermissibly. 
 
But I doubt that the distinction between epistemology and metaphysics matters that much 
in our context. Sure, it is possible that, given robust moral realism, we might lack 
justification or knowledge of moral entities, despite the fact that those entities do exist. 
That, though, doesn’t seem more than a theoretical possibility: a realist view that would 
render moral entities systematically inaccessible to us in that manner doesn’t look 
attractive to start with (and thus won’t be worth defending). Therefore, it is unclear 
whether we can or need to draw the requisite distinction here. Further, suppose that we 
could meaningfully draw the distinction and that the conclusion of the argument 
therefore is merely epistemological: robust moral realists don’t have justified moral beliefs 
(due to evolutionary forces and the lack of additional, non-abductive reasons). In that 
case, it seems plausible that we are licensed to also draw a metaphysical conclusion.19 After 
all, if there really are no genuine reasons for belief in robust moral facts, why think that 
they even exist? So, it once again doesn’t seem problematic that the conclusion of the 
argument above is ambiguous in that sense. It is fine as is.20 
 
In this section, my aim has been to introduce the best evolutionary explanation argument 
against robust moral realism. More specifically, I explained in more detail what its 
premises mean, why we might initially think them true – and how they jointly seem to 
entail the conclusion that robust moral beliefs are unjustified. In the remainder of this 
chapter, I offer a systematic, comprehensive defense of each premise of this argument, 
starting with the claim that evolution best explains moral belief in §3. 
 
3 .  The  Na tu r e  o f  Evo lu t iona r y  Exp l a na t ions  
 
In this section, my aim is to defend the first premise of the argument articulated in §2, 
namely that evolutionary, not robust moral, facts best explain our moral beliefs. The most 
compelling criticism of that claim focuses on whether evolutionary explanations are 
competitive. Recently, some have argued that they are not: even if successful, evolutionary 
                                                
19 See Worsnip 2016: 228 for a similar point, yet in the context of the positive deliberative indispensability 
argument. 
20 Another issue: the conclusion references ‘attention to’ evolutionary explanations to accommodate 
epistemic internalism, according to which we need to be aware of defeating evidence for it to undermine 
our justified belief. I didn’t include that internalist qualifier in the formulation of the premises for reasons 
of simplicity and readability. 
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explanations don’t rule out explanations of moral beliefs in terms of robust moral facts. 
However, as I argue, that line of criticism proves untenable. 
 
Andreas Mogensen (2015) has recently put forth an objection that seems to show that the 
first premise of the argument developed above is false. More specifically, his objection 
seems to call into question an important characteristic of evolutionary explanations of 
moral belief, namely that they are competitive and, if successful, exclude or rule out moral 
explanations. To establish that, he points out that evolutionary explanations only operate 
at the level of ultimate causes: causes that belong to evolutionary history (e.g. natural 
selection). In contrast, proximate causes of a trait operate within an organism’s lifetime 
(e.g. immediate triggering causes, developmental factors). Or, put differently: while 
proximate causes explain how you get a trait (i.e. causal mechanism; ontogenesis), ultimate 
causes explain why it has been promoted by natural selection (i.e. adaptive function; 
phylogenesis). Importantly, ultimate and proximate causes do not compete: they are 
complementary. In our context then, it seems plausible that, while natural selection (as a 
process indifferent to robust moral truth) is the ultimate cause of our moral beliefs, 
robustly moral facts may be their proximate cause.21 So, it looks like evolutionary 
explanations don’t rule out moral explanations after all. Premise (1) must be false: it is not 
clear whether evolutionary forces best explain why we hold certain moral beliefs and not 
others. Or, robust moral facts are not dispensable to the best explanation of our moral 
beliefs.22 
 
However, proponents of the evolutionary debunking argument above can readily respond 
to this objection. To start with, they might take inspiration from Eleanora Severini 
(2016).23 Her argument proceeds in two steps. First, she introduces a minimal constraint 
                                                
21 Mogensen (2015: 197) credits Nozick 1981: 345 with this insight. 
22 Mogensen (2016) develops this line of thought further. In that article, he argues that the Debunking Thesis, 
i.e. selection pressures explain (and thus undermine) our moral beliefs (which isn’t identical with, yet implies 
my first premise above), conflicts with the Negative View, a widely accepted view in the philosophy of 
biology. The Negative View says that natural selection cannot explain the traits of individuals (including moral 
beliefs), but only the frequency with which traits occur in populations. (Traits of individuals, in contrast, are 
explained by inheritance, development and other proximate factors.) Therefore, ‘…it is mysterious how 
[the lack of selection for true moral beliefs] could make any difference to our reasons for revising these 
beliefs, assuming that any such reasons would have to come in the form of evidence about their discreditable 
causal origins’ (Mogensen 2016: 1805f.). However, this line of thought is – just like the more basic one of 
his (2015) – subject to the worries raised below and should thus be rejected. 
23 Evolutionary debunkers could also look towards Fitzpatrick (2016a). He argues – contra Mogensen (2015) 
– that evolutionary debunkers don’t conflate the ultimate/proximate distinction: ‘When debunkers claim 
that our moral beliefs are susceptible to evolutionary explanations, what they mean is not that there are 
evolutionary as opposed to proximate causal explanations for these beliefs, but rather that there are 
evolutionary explanations for these beliefs that, when fully filled-out, appeal at every level only to causal 
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on complementary explanations: they must be consistent or ‘one explanation cannot imply 
the negation of the other one’ (Severini 2016: 870). Second, she points out that 
evolutionary and moral explanations of moral belief are inconsistent: ‘it cannot be the case 
that the evolutionary explanation of moral beliefs rules out the justification of the realist 
claim about the existence of moral facts at the ultimately level, and, at the same time, 
moral realism holds up such an existence at the proximate level’ (ibid.). As a result, these 
evolutionary and moral explanations of moral belief cannot be complementary. But if they 
are not complementary, Mogensen’s objection above fails.24 
 
But suppose Severini’s response doesn’t succeed. Even then, as I shall argue now, 
evolutionary debunkers can defend the first premise of their argument against Mogensen’s 
(2015) objection. For suppose Mogensen is right that moral and evolutionary 
explanations of moral belief are indeed complementary: while natural selection serves as 
ultimate cause, robust moral facts serve as proximate cause. In that case, robust moral 
realists face a tricky question: what exactly is the explanatory relationship between robust 
moral facts and moral beliefs? Or, more precisely: in what sense are robust moral facts 
proximate causes of our moral belief?25 
                                                
factors [e.g. cognitive or emotional dispositions] that have nothing to do with tracking or responding to 
moral facts as such.’ (436) Still, Fitzpatrick thinks that evolutionary debunkers are mistaken: they overlook 
‘…the possibility that although the basic psychological capacities we draw on in moral thinking originally 
evolved simply for Darwinian reasons, and although we may also possess certain evolved dispositions to 
have certain moral feelings and beliefs, we may nonetheless also be able to develop our capacities for moral 
reflection and reasoning in cultural contexts [following developed, learned standards internal to intelligent 
moral inquiry] and exercise them with a considerable degree of independence from those influences [similar 
to mathematics or philosophy]’ (ibid.). What Fitzpatrick ultimately has in mind is a view of moral 
epistemology on which ‘…we come to recognize certain moral facts by grasping the reasons that justify certain 
moral propositional contents (rather than simply being caused to believe things by truth-indifferent factors)’ 
(437). Such a view isn’t ruled out by evolutionary biology or science more generally. (See Fitzpatrick 2015 
& 2016b for more on that.) Importantly, Fitzpatrick seems to concede the truth of the first premise. Instead, 
he challenges the third premise: he thinks that there are additional, non-abductive reasons for moral belief, 
having to do with a broader view on apriori knowledge on which we grasp apriori truths, etc. I shall develop 
and critically examine this strategy in depth in Chapter 5. 
24 Severini (2016: 871f.) also presses another point: proximate and ultimate causes are often not neatly 
distinguishable because they interact with each other. For instance, when constructing niches, organisms 
change the environment, transforming selective patterns and thus showing that ‘a proximate cause can lead 
to a change in selection pressure [or ultimate cause] that in turn ends up steering the evolutionary process’ 
(872). This, though, seems problematic for Mogensen’s objection, which presupposes that we can draw a 
neat ultimate/proximate distinction such that natural selection ultimately explains moral beliefs, while 
robust moral facts proximately cause them. However, it is unclear how plausible it is that moral beliefs 
evolved within a moral niche, as Severini suggests. So, evolutionary debunkers might be wary to wed their 
argument to such controversial commitments. 
25 Severini (2016) raises a similar point: if we grant that moral facts figure in proximate explanations of our 
moral beliefs, the realist must ‘point out the mechanism thanks to which we come to have true moral beliefs 
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There are compelling reasons for doubting that robust moral realists can answer that 
question satisfactorily. To begin with, as mentioned above, most robust moral realists 
cannot argue that robust moral facts literally and directly cause our moral beliefs, given 
their lack of causal powers. That rules out one plausible option from the outset.26 But 
what about indirect causal explanations? After all, we sometimes form beliefs about 
particular moral facts (e.g. that it is wrong for Felicity to withhold food from her dog). In 
those cases, it seems attractive for robust moral realists to explain the relationship between 
our moral beliefs and the corresponding particular robust moral facts indirectly, namely 
via supervenience. According to that kind of explanation, the non-moral facts in the 
supervenience base cause our moral beliefs, while we have apriori knowledge of how moral 
supervenience works.27 However, I worry that such an explanation doesn’t provide a 
completely satisfactory answer. Why? Because, as many critics have argued, robust moral 
realists struggle with offering an account of moral (or, more generally, normative) 
supervenience as a metaphysically necessary relationship between metaphysically 
discontinuous entities.28 But if they cannot offer such an account, the explanation above 
remains incomplete: while it specifies the relationship between moral beliefs and non-
moral facts as causal, it fails to explain how those non-moral facts metaphysically relate to 
the robust moral facts. As a result, the issue of the exact explanatory relationship between 
robust moral facts and moral beliefs still hasn’t been addressed satisfactorily. 
 
In short, robust moral realists face obstacles answering the question of what the 
explanatory relationship between robust moral facts and moral beliefs exactly is. But if 
they cannot adequately address that question, it remains unclear how proximate moral 
explanations are supposed to work. And if that remains mysterious, it doesn’t really matter 
whether such explanations would complement evolutionary explanations of moral belief, 
                                                
and explain why such a mechanism evolved’ (871). However, she motivates this explanatory need not the 
same way I will below. Rather, she stresses – as above – that the proximate moral explanation couldn’t 
contradict the ultimate evolutionary one, which it seems to do, though, given that we would have a belief-
forming mechanism that tracks moral facts at the proximate level without being able to explain this capacity 
at the ultimate level. (In contrast, camouflage and digestion in the insect, for example, are distinct, yet 
complementary, but ‘tracking moral facts and not tracking moral facts are not’ (871).) But since we concede 
Mogensen’s point at this stage of the dialectic, an alternative motivation for the explanatory need is required, 
which I shall provide in what follows in the main text. 
26 Oddie (2005) thinks that robust moral facts do have causal powers. So, he would be an exception. But 
since I am concerned with paradigmatic robust moral realism (and that view denies that moral facts are 
causally efficacious), I shall set him aside. 
27 For such a story, see Zangwill (2006). Note that it might not prove attractive for beliefs about general 
moral facts, given that those are, according to some robust moral realists, ungrounded (and therefore don’t 
supervene on non-moral facts). Enoch (ms) develops such a picture in detail. 
28 See McPherson 2012 and Vayrynen 2017. 
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as Mogensen (2015) alleges. So, even if Severini’s response turns out to be unconvincing, 
the first premise of the evolutionary debunking argument above can be defended.29 
 
Where does that leave us? In this section, my aim has been to defend the first premise of 
the argument articulated in §2 against a recent, initially compelling objection developed 
by Mogensen (2015). According to him, ultimate evolutionary explanations don’t rule 
out proximate explanations of moral belief in terms of robust moral facts. However, his 
objection turned out to lack bite. First, evolutionary and moral explanations of robust 
moral belief cannot be complementary, given their inconsistency. Further, even if 
evolutionary explanations are complementary, that doesn’t matter as long as the workings 
of moral explanations remain mysterious. So, the first premise emerges unscathed: 
evolutionary, not robust moral, facts best explain our moral beliefs. 
 
4 .  Comp a nions  in  Gu i l t  
 
In this section, my aim is to defend the second premise of the argument developed in §2 
against a companion in guilt strategy. According to that strategy, robust epistemic facts are 
also explanatorily dispensable, yet that doesn’t render them metaphysically problematic. 
So, the second premise must be false: even if robust moral facts are dispensable to the best 
explanation of our moral beliefs (and there are no additional, non-abductive reasons for 
maintaining them), that doesn’t mean that their justification has been defeated. But, as I 
argue, such a companion in guilt strategy doesn’t get off the ground. On reflection, robust 
epistemic facts aren’t explanatorily dispensable in the relevant sense. 
 
                                                
29 Some might worry that my point here is too nuclear, defending the first premise by seemingly establishing 
that there are no moral explanations for robust moral realists. But I think that my point is more modest: 
establishing the complementarity of evolutionary and moral explanations – as Mogensen (2015) aims to do 
– won’t be sufficient to undermine the first premise of the Harman-style evolutionary debunking arguments, 
given the difficulties involved for robust moral realists in showing how moral explanations work in the first 
place. Still, my point does have further substantive implications: it might hamper attempts at undermining 
the two other important characteristics of evolutionary explanations of moral belief that the first premise 
relies on (and thus shield the premise from such challenges). For instance, some robust moral realists (e.g. 
Roberts 2016) argue that moral explanations are better than non-moral, scientific explanations because they 
generalize and discriminate properly. (Or, put differently: such realists claim that moral facts are indispensable 
to moral explanations.) If that were correct, the first premise would be false. But my point seems to show 
that this cannot be: if the workings of moral explanations remain metaphysically mysterious, they cannot 
be better than widely-accepted scientific explanations of moral belief. 
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4.1.  Explanatory Dispensability and Companions in Guilt 
 
Robust moral realists might want to defend themselves against the evolutionary 
debunking argument developed in §2 by relying on a companion in guilt argument.30 Such 
a strategy, even though not widely used to assuage explanatory concerns,31 has proven 
successful against arguments for moral error theory centering on moral categoricity.32 So, 
it merits closer attention. 
 
Any companion in guilt strategy follows the same template. To start with, we have the 
threat to a given theory by some sceptical argument, stating that entities E1 don’t exist 
because of (metaphysical or epistemological) feature F. In response, the companion in 
guilt theorists makes two claims. First, the Parity Claim: if entities E1 don’t exist because 
of F, neither do entities E2, given that they share feature F. So, E1 and E2 are on a par 
with respect to F. Second, she puts forth the Existence Claim: we have good reason to 
think that entities E2 exist, despite feature F. So, having feature F isn’t enough to deny 
the existence of a given class of entities, including E1. We thus have good reason to think 
that entities E1 exist as well.33 
 
For illustration, take robust moral realism as the theory under threat by moral error 
theory. Moral error theory says that that robust moral facts don’t exist because they are 
categorical: they obtain, if they do, independently of our aims, desires or interests.34 In 
response, the companion in guilt theorist points out that robust epistemic facts, i.e. facts 
about the normative relation between beliefs and evidence, are also categorical. Epistemic 
facts are on a par with moral facts in that respect. For example, you should believe that 
you will die before your 125th birthday, given the available statistical evidence on average 
life expectancies – even if you desperately don’t want that to be the case.. So, if robust 
moral facts don’t exist because of being categorical, neither do robust epistemic facts. They 
are companions in guilt. However, we have excellent reason to believe in robust epistemic 
facts, despite their categoricity. For instance, denying their existence leads to implausibly 
                                                
30  See Cuneo 2007, Rowland 2013 & forthcoming, and Das 2017 & forthcoming. 
31 To my knowledge, only Cuneo (2007: 103-7) runs such a strategy in response to explanatory dispensability 
arguments against robust moral realism. 
32 See the exchange between, on the one hand, Cowie 2014 & 2016 and, on the other, Das 2017 & 
forthcoming as well as Rowland 2013 & forthcoming. In my mind, Rowland and Das competently respond 
to Cowie’s criticism of companion in guilt strategies. 
33 The terminology for the key claims follows Cowie 2014. 
34 At least, that is one strand of argument in support of moral error theory. See, for example, Mackie 1977 
or Garner 1990. Perhaps, only reasons, not facts, can be categorical. However, that complication won’t 
matter for our purposes here. 
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radical scepticism.35 So, being categorical isn’t enough to deny the existence of either 
robust epistemic or moral facts. In this manner, robust moral realism escapes the argument 
put forth by moral error theorists. 
 
To make a companion in guilt strategy work as a response to the Harman-style 
evolutionary debunking argument advanced in §2, we therefore need to establish two 
things. First, it must be prima facie plausible that robust moral and epistemic facts are on 
a par with respect to explanatory dispensability. Let’s call this Explanatory Parity. Second, 
we need to have good reason to believe in robust epistemic facts. Let’s call this Epistemic 
Existence. In the remainder of this sub-section, I shall briefly motivate both claims as well 
as explain their relevance to the evolutionary debunking argument put forth in §2. Doing 
so will provide the background necessary for developing my objection to the strategy in 
§4.2. 
 
Why think that Explanatory Parity holds between robust morality and epistemology? To 
see why robust epistemic facts might be just as problematically dispensable to our best 
explanations of epistemic beliefs as robust moral facts to our best explanations of moral 
beliefs, we can turn to an argument by Sharon Street (2009). For her, the best explanation 
of our epistemic beliefs is also an evolutionary one. Very roughly, we hold our epistemic 
beliefs in virtue of natural selection. For instance, we believe that induction is reliable or 
wishful thinking is irrational because thinking with those epistemic concepts helped our 
ancestors survive. But, importantly, this kind of explanation doesn’t avert to robust 
epistemic facts. After all, evolution didn’t select for true epistemic beliefs, but for those 
that are most fitness-enhancing.36 Or, to quote Street: ‘How does it help [for purposes of 
explaining our ancestors’ survival] to say that creatures who made the normative judgment 
expressing the rule of induction grasped a fact about [robust] normative reasons?’ (2009: 
241). So, robust epistemic facts seem dispensable to our best, namely evolutionary, 
explanations of epistemic beliefs. But that seems just as metaphysically problematic for 
epistemic facts as it is for moral ones. In this manner, we can establish the Parity Claim in 
our context.  
 
What about Epistemic Existence? We can motivate the claim that (robust) epistemic facts 
exist in at least two ways. And since Epistemic Existence, unlike Explanatory Parity, is 
                                                
35 See Rowland 2013. I shall present Rowland’s argument in more detail below. 
36 For this to work, as Street (2009) points out, we need to make the reasonable assumptions that having 
roughly true beliefs promotes survival and reproduction (see Stich 1990: Ch. 3 for discussion, Plantinga 
1993 for criticism) and that there is something that plays the role of belief as we know them (e.g. basis for 
action when combined with desires, etc.). 
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common to any companion in guilt strategy in support of robust moral realism, we can 
just borrow whatever reasons the general debate generates. 
 
To start with, as Cuneo (2007: Ch. 4) argues, anyone denying the existence of robust 
epistemic facts faces a deeply unattractive dilemma. Either, there is epistemic reason to 
believe epistemic nihilism, the view that there are no epistemic facts or reasons – in which 
case the view is self-defeating. After all, the view would then presuppose the very sorts of 
entity (e.g. facts about what we rationally ought to believe) that it claims not to exist. Or, 
there is no epistemic reason to believe epistemic nihilism, despite its truth. In that case, 
though, there are not just no epistemic reason to believe epistemic nihilism, but no 
epistemic reasons to believe anything. In other words, this implies a radical form of 
epistemological scepticism, according to which no propositional attitudes can exhibit 
epistemic merit (e.g. justification) or demerit (e.g. irrationality). Such epistemological 
scepticism, just like self-defeat, is deeply theoretically unattractive. So, we should reject 
epistemic nihilism – and affirm the existence of (robust) epistemic facts.37 
 
Further, Richard Rowland (2013: 13-15) elaborates on why the radical scepticism entailed 
by epistemic nihilism seems implausible. More specifically, he argues that we do have 
epistemic reasons for belief. After all, if we do not, that means that nobody knows 
anything. But some people do have some knowledge! For instance, I know that I don’t 
know everything (e.g. what sports fishing rods are made of), that bachelors aren’t women 
(just by understanding the concept BACHELOR) or that I am having a thought right 
now. As Rowland puts it: ‘So long as I believe that there is a thought I am right that there 
is thought – I could not be wrong about it – and so long as I believe that there is thought 
on the basis that I am thinking right now, my belief that there is thought is based in an 
appropriate way for me to know that there is thought’ (2013: 15). So, some people do 
have some knowledge. However, it is almost universally accepted that if S knows p, there 
is some epistemic justification for believing that p.38 For instance, if I know that I am 
currently walking through Edinburgh’s Old Town, there must be some justification for 
that such as my perceptual experience of St. Giles cathedral or Edinburgh castle. Further, 
                                                
37 Cuneo (2007: 120f.) also notes a third implication of the truth of epistemic nihilism. In particular, if 
epistemic nihilism were true, there couldn’t be any arguments for anything. This is because the premises of 
non-question-begging arguments offer evidential support (and thus are epistemic reasons) for the 
conclusion. But if there are no epistemic reasons, we couldn’t have any arguments (including the one above 
according to which nihilism implies radical scepticism). 
38 Rowland is quick to note that we shouldn’t confuse this claim with what the reliabilists deny. They hold 
that in order to know p, belief in p has to be true and reliably produced (and thus justified), yet we don’t 
need justification for the belief that p was reliably produced (or we don’t need to know that we know p). 
That, though, doesn’t mean that, for them, knowledge doesn’t require justification. Similarly, even for 
knowledge first theorists such as Williamson (2000), knowledge entails justification. 
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it also seems that if there is some epistemic justification for believing p, then there is 
epistemic reason for believing p. For instance, it would be odd to claim that I am justified 
in believing that I am currently walking through Edinburgh’s Old Town, but that there 
is no epistemic reason at all for me to believe that. But if knowing that p entails being 
justified in believing that p – and that, in turn, entails there being an epistemic reason for 
p, that implies that if S knows p, there is an epistemic reason to believe p. And since at 
least some S know at least some p, there must exist some corresponding epistemic reasons 
for p. So, the radical scepticism about epistemic reasons entailed by epistemic nihilism 
must be false. 
 
In sum, both Explanatory Parity and Epistemic Existence seem plausible. But how do they 
bear on the evolutionary debunking argument developed in §2 above? Jointly, those two 
claims appear to show that there is something wrong with the second premise of the 
argument. To wit, that premise states that, if robust moral facts are dispensable to the best 
explanation of our moral beliefs (and there are no other, non-abductive reasons for them), 
that defeats the justification of those beliefs. So, that premise rests on the assumption that 
being explanatorily dispensable is metaphysically problematic. That, however, seems to be 
false, in light of Explanatory Parity and Epistemic Existence: robust epistemic facts are also 
explanatorily dispensable, yet that doesn’t render them metaphysically problematic. So, 
the explanatory dispensability of robust moral facts doesn’t impose a burden on robust 
moral realists or threatens the justification of their moral beliefs. But if it does not, why 
think that the second premise of the argument in §2 is true? In this manner, the 
companion in guilt strategy helps robust moral realists defend themselves against 
evolutionary debunking. 
 
4.2.  Explanatory Dispensability and the Limits of Guilt 
 
However, any companion in guilt strategy deployed in response to evolutionary 
debunking arguments from explanatory dispensability faces a fatal issue. On reflection, 
Explanatory Parity must be false: (robust) morality and (robust) epistemology cannot be 
on a par with respect to problematic explanatory dispensability. This is because the 
Harman-style argument against epistemic, yet not moral, facts proves self-effacing. (And 
the same is true if we swap in mathematical, logical or evaluative facts.) But if robust moral 
realists cannot establish Explanatory Parity, their companion in guilt strategy fails. 
 
To see how the issue arises, note first that Explanatory Parity doesn’t just require that 
robust moral and epistemic facts are explanatorily dispensable. Rather, it requires that 
both are problematically explanatorily dispensable. After all, if explanatory idleness wasn’t 
prima facie problematic for both (and would thus make them ‘guilty’), we couldn’t mount 
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a companion in guilt argument: an argument to the effect that one class of entities (namely 
robust epistemic facts) shares the problem of another (namely robust moral facts), yet 
without suffering the consequences (in terms of plausibility, credibility or ontological 
status). To establish that moral and epistemic facts are on a par with respect to their 
problematic explanatory dispensability, we need a prima facie plausible argument 
applicable to both of them, explaining why explanatory dispensability is problematic.39 
Now, we already have such a dialectically appropriate argument in the moral case: the 
Harman-style explanatory challenge to robust moral realism developed in §2, which 
shows that the explanatory idleness of moral facts is problematic because it gives us reason 
to think that they don’t exist. (Of course, that reason might not be decisive. Rather, as we 
saw in §2, there might be further, non-abductive reasons for their existence). 
 
But what about the epistemic case? There is reason to think that there cannot be a prima 
facie plausible analogue Harman-style challenge to robust epistemic facts. To see why, 
note that any Harman-style debunking challenge to putatively apriori facts presupposes 
some epistemic facts. In particular, it presupposes facts that underwrite the epistemic 
principles such as IBE- or Burden Shift, which the challenge employs as explicit or implicit 
premises.40 That, though, wreaks havoc for the Harman-style debunking challenge to 
robust epistemic realism: it would simultaneously accept (in the second premise, by 
presupposition) and deny (in the conclusion) the existence of robust epistemic facts. 
Therefore, such a challenge would be self-effacing.41 As a result, there cannot be a prima 
facie plausible Harman-style challenge to robust epistemic realism. 
 
Now, what does that all mean for Explanatory Parity? Even though robust morality and 
epistemology might be equally explanatorily dispensable, that is only problematic for the 
                                                
39 Why not think that explanatory idleness is brutely problematic or problematic without further argument? 
Because explanatory dispensability seems like a neutral feature of (a given class of) entities: it is only once 
we combine it with an appeal to a methodological principle such as IBE-, Burden Shift or a parsimony requirement 
that the feature becomes problematic in theory construction. Combining explanatory idleness with such a 
principle, however, will amount to an argument, most likely to the conclusion that we are unjustified or have 
less reason in believing in the problematically explanatorily dispensable entities. 
40 Why assume that those facts should be construed robustly? Because a robust moral realist invested in 
epistemic-moral parity must do that. Without doing so, her companion in guilt strategy doesn’t get off the 
ground. For instance, Cline (2016) denies the existence of epistemic reasons, robustly construed, and argues 
that this needn’t imply that we cannot have serious epistemology. But he is a global normative error theorist! 
41 See Woods 2016: 16f. In addition to being self-effacing, the analogue argument of §2 against robust 
epistemic facts also shares another flaw: its premise (3) would be false. After all, denying the existence of 
robust epistemic facts leads to self-defeating epistemic nihilism or implausible epistemological scepticism, 
as my discussion of Epistemic Existence above showed. But avoiding those outcomes might give us additional, 
non-abductive reason for belief in robust epistemic facts – which means that premise (3) of the analogue 
argument must be false. 
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former, yet not the latter. By implication, robust moral realists cannot establish 
Explanatory Parity: it is false that robust moral and epistemic facts are equally problematic 
with respect to explanatory dispensability. Rather, there are limits to the guilt of robust 
epistemic facts. But, of course, if robust moral realists cannot establish Explanatory Parity, 
the companion in guilt strategy must fail.42 
 
4.3.  The Severity of The Worry 
 
To illustrate the severity of my worry, let me briefly address some potential responses on 
behalf of robust moral realism. First, proponents of that view might want to reformulate 
Explanatory Parity. For instance, they might narrow its scope, arguing that what matters 
for parity is only existential implications or entailment: if moral facts don’t exist, neither 
do epistemic facts. Meanwhile, the grounds for why this implication holds don’t enter into 
our formulation of parity. But once we conceive of parity in that manner (or endorse – 
what we might call – Existential Parity), the fact that the explanatory idleness of moral 
facts is problematic, while the explanatory idleness of epistemic facts is not, doesn’t 
undermine the parity claim. 
 
However, Existential Parity strikes me as ad-hoc and implausible, at least once we consider 
companion in guilt strategies against moral error theory more generally. To secure the 
parity claim, those strategies are committed to saying that the inexistence of robust moral 
facts implies the inexistence of robust normative facts exactly because both are categorical. 
So, the relevant ground for why the existential entailment holds does enter into their 
formulation of parity. In our dialectical context, the relevant ground won’t be categoricity, 
but problematic explanatory dispensability. And, if the above line of thought about such 
strategies more generally is correct, that ground should enter into our formulation of 
parity. Once it does, though, and we take my worry above on board, we see that robust 
epistemology and morality won’t be on a par after all. So, narrowing the scope of 
Explanatory Parity to Existential Parity won’t help the robust moral realist salvage their 
companion in guilt strategy. 
 
Conversely, robust moral realists might want to broaden the scope of parity. In particular, 
they might argue that Overall Parity matters for their argument. Even if robust morality 
                                                
42 This objection differs from Cowie’s (2014) worry for companion in guilt strategies in at least two respects. 
First, it doesn’t capitalize on the tension between Parity and Epistemic Existence, but shows that robust moral 
realists cannot establish Parity, irrespective of whether Epistemic Existence holds. Second, it isn’t open to 
Rowland’s (forthcoming) and Das’ (2017) response to Cowie’s (2014) objection on behalf of robust moral 
realism because it doesn’t mischaracterize moral-epistemic parity as parity simpliciter (but rather as parity 
with respect to problematic explanatory idleness). More on the second point follows below. 
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and epistemology aren’t on a par with respect to problematic explanatory idleness, they 
are on a par in many other respects (e.g. categoricity, authority, irreducibility). And, so the 
thought goes, that parity is all the companion in guilt theorist needs to run her strategy. 
 
But that move seems once again implausible once we factor in the dialectical situation 
properly. More precisely, moral error theory calls in to question categorical moral facts. In 
response, companion in guilt theorists argue that this implies that there aren’t any 
epistemic facts either, given that they are also categorical. So, in the context of (moral) 
error theory, all the other aspects of parity wouldn’t matter if epistemic and moral facts 
weren’t both categorical (the existence of the latter moral error theory denies). Similarly, 
all the other aspects of parity don’t matter in our context if moral and epistemic facts 
aren’t on a par in terms of problematic explanatory dispensability. In other words, to serve 
as a response to the Harman-style debunking argument against robust moral realism, the 
companion in guilt strategy must be formulated around parity regarding problematic 
explanatory idleness. So, broadening the scope of Explanatory Parity to Overall Parity 
won’t do either.43 
 
Instead of reformulating Explanatory Parity, robust moral realists might – inspired by 
Sayre-McCord (1988: 451-3) – try to harness the self-effacement insight to salvage the 
companion in guilt strategy or, at least, robust moral realism.44 How so? As we have seen, 
                                                
43 What about parity with respect to explanatory idleness only? But that wouldn’t suffice. Recall that the 
aim of the companion in guilt theorist is to respond to Harman’s challenge by drawing an analogy to 
epistemic facts and arguing that we have good reason to believe in their existence. However, drawing that 
analogy only works in our context if epistemic facts are subject to the same threat, i.e. if their explanatory 
idleness is somehow problematic. So, parity with respect to explanatory idleness alone won’t do. In sum, 
trying to reformulate Explanatory Parity strikes me as hopeless. 
44 Why only inspired? Because it is debatable whether Sayre-McCord’s (1988) proposal should be best 
thought of as a companion in guilt strategy. In conversation, he has stressed relevant differences: his 
proposal simply makes a point about the structure of reasons and normativity – without supporting any 
kind of moral or epistemic realism, it doesn’t explicitly feature a parity claim or epistemic existence claim, 
and it doesn’t emphasize guilt at all. 
But I am unsure whether, on reflection, those differences hold up. First, Sayre-McCord’s proposal cannot 
be completely non-committal with respect to the nature of normativity. After all, his must be an argument 
in support of moral realism generally, given that other meta-ethical views aren’t troubled by Harman’s 
challenge. Of course, that doesn’t mean that his proposal supports a specific form of moral realism such as 
robust moral realism (as a standard companion in guilt argument would). Still, that shouldn’t stop the robust 
moral realist from adopting his proposal – and us from examining it accordingly. Second, it seems to me 
that Sayre-McCord’s proposal involves, albeit implicitly, both a parity and epistemic existence claim. After 
all, he stresses that evaluative, epistemic and moral facts are all normative such that any attack against one 
entails attacking the others. In other words: they are on a par with respect to normativity. Further, even 
though Sayre-McCord doesn’t endorse the epistemic/evaluative existence premise, he offers a functionally 
equivalent claim: that Harman’s challenge presupposes epistemic/evaluative facts – and that this is a reason 
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the Harman-style debunking challenge against robust epistemic realism presupposes 
epistemic facts – and therefore defeats itself. So, epistemic facts are insulated from it. But 
since robust epistemic facts are metaphysically and epistemologically on a par with robust 
moral facts (or: they are similarly normative), that insulation extends to moral facts as well. 
So, there is no such thing as a stable (and selective) Harman-style debunking argument 
against robust moral facts. Such an explanatory challenge either undermines all of 
normativity (thus leading to self-effacement) – or none. 
 
However, this response suffers from an obvious flaw: it relies on Overall Parity (e.g. 
‘similarly normative’) – which is, as we saw above, dialectically inappropriate. If it relied 
on Explanatory Parity instead, it clearly wouldn’t work. After all, robust moral facts are 
not on a par with robust epistemic facts with respect to problematic explanatory idleness 
exactly because the Harman-style debunking argument against moral facts doesn’t 
presuppose moral facts – and thus doesn’t self-defeat. So, the Harman-style debunking 
argument is not unstable when it comes to robust moral facts. The instability through self-
defeat for all of normativity, including morality, in the face of explanatory challenges, just 
isn’t there. So, while we shouldn’t worry about robust epistemology, we should worry 
about robust morality in light of the evolutionary debunking argument put forth in §2 
above45. 
 
Where does this leave us? My worry shows that companion in guilt strategies fail as a 
response to the Harman-style evolutionary debunking challenge to robust moral realism. 
As I have argued, the reason for that is straightforward: Harman’s challenge to robust 
epistemic realism is self-defeating, while the one to robust moral realism is not. As a result, 
robust epistemic and moral facts just cannot be on a par with respect to how explanatorily 
problematic they are. Explanatory Parity thus cannot be established, and the strategy 
remains incomplete. But if the strategy remains incomplete, we don’t have reason to doubt 
the truth of the second premise: that, if robust moral facts are dispensable to the best 
explanation of our moral beliefs (and there are no other, non-abductive reasons for them), 
that defeats the justification of those beliefs. 
 
                                                
to believe in their existence. So, Sayre-McCord’s proposal seems to involve claims about both parity and 
evaluative/epistemic existence. Third, the fact that Sayre-McCord shuns accusations of guilt doesn’t seem 
relevant. After all, the companion in guilt theorists uses such emotionally charged notions merely in a loose 
and metaphorical way. What truly matters are the underlying argumentative mechanics – and those Sayre-
McCord’s proposal seems to share. 
45 Put differently, robust moral realists just cannot hold on to both parity (with respect to problematic 
explanatory idleness) and epistemic presupposition, given that the latter undermines the former, as my 
worry above shows. 
81  
5 .  De l ib e r a t i ve  Ind i sp ens a b i l i ty  
 
In this section, my aim is to defend the third premise of the evolutionary debunking 
argument developed in §2, namely that there are no additional, non-abductive reasons for 
belief in robust moral facts. Recently, David Enoch (2012, 2016) has argued that robust 
moral facts, despite not figuring in our best scientific explanations, are indispensable to 
practical deliberation. And that, his thought goes, gives us non-abductive reason to believe 
in their existence.46 If that was indeed correct, the third premise would be false – and my 
evolutionary debunking argument unsound. However, as I shall argue, Enoch’s appeal to 
deliberative indispensability turns out to be implausible. 
 
5.1.  The Deliberative Indispensability Argument 
 
In more detail, Enoch’s (2012: Ch. 3, 2016) line of argument runs as follows: 
 
(1) If something is instrumentally indispensable to an intrinsically indispensable 
project, then we are epistemically justified (for that very reason) in believing that 
that thing exists.  
(2) The deliberative project is intrinsically indispensable.  
(3) Robustly normative truths are instrumentally indispensable to the deliberative 
project.  
(4) Therefore, we are epistemically justified in believing that there exist robustly 
normative truths. 
 
Before assessing the plausibility of this argument, let me briefly motivate each premise and 
its conclusion. The first premise articulates a very general view about (the grounds of) 
epistemic justification and ontological commitment. To see how Enoch arrives at it, we 
must take several steps back. First off, note that scientific realists often use considerations 
of explanatory indispensability to justify ontological commitments. More precisely, they 
put forth explanatory indispensability arguments: if an entity proves indispensable to our 
best scientific explanations, we have reason to believe (or are justified in believing) that it 
exists.47 For instance, if our best scientific theories quantify over electrons, that gives us 
reason to think that electrons exist. Importantly, such arguments rely on a rule of 
reasoning called inference to the best explanation: an inference from a higher-order claim 
                                                
46 As mentioned in §2, deliberative indispensability is just one initially attractive candidate. I critically 
examine another one, namely the combination of moral intuitionism and a third-factor explanation of moral 
reliability, in Chapter 5. 
47 See Colyvan 2015. 
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that some first-order claim C is the best explanation of the data (e.g. the vapor trail in a 
cloud chamber is best explained by the existence of electrons) to C itself (e.g. there are 
electrons).48 This inference rule, in turn, is plausibly fundamental or basic (just like 
perception, memory or modus ponens). In other words, we can employ inference to the 
best explanation to form epistemically justified beliefs. However, we do not possess 
epistemic justification for the inference rule itself. After all, there seems to be something 
wrong about asking for further justification for employing inference to the best 
explanation. Still, while some belief-forming methods (e.g. perception, memory, inference 
to the best explanation) qualify as properly basic, others (e.g. wishful thinking) do not. 
Thus, there must be some deeper, principled, positively justification-relevant difference 
between them, vindicating the former while incriminating the latter. But what could that 
difference be?49  
 
According to Enoch, the difference is pragmatic: belief-forming methods are vindicated as 
properly basic if their success is the only relevant hope of successfully engaging in an 
extremely important project.50 Or, more technically, basic belief-forming methods are 
vindicated if they are instrumentally indispensable to an intrinsically indispensable project. 
To illustrate, take again inference to the best explanation. Plausibly, the scientific-
explanatory project is intrinsically indispensable in the sense that we cannot rationally opt 
out of it.51 Further, inference to the best explanation seems instrumentally indispensable 
to the scientific-explanatory project: given our constitution, we can only hope to make 
the world intelligible if this rule of inference is reasonably reliable.52 After all, as Enoch 
puts it, ‘…if not even IBE works, all is lost’ (2012: 60). So, we have a pragmatic 
vindication of inference to the best explanation as a basic belief-forming method.53 And 
                                                
48 See Worsnip 2016: 227.  
49 See Boghossian 2000: 239 and Peacocke 2003. Of course, the vindication in question wont’ be epistemic 
justification, since such justification comes to an end at our basic belief-forming methods. 
50 For more on how to understand the relevant pragmatic modality, see Enoch 2012: 63. 
51 This non-optionality is normative: it involves a project we have strong reason or rationally out not to 
disengage from. As Enoch (2012: 84, fn. 33) points out, that only begs the question against the normative 
error theorist, for the premise is the normative proposition itself, not the robust realist understanding of it. 
Also, the normativity of the non-optionality is important: it means that we cannot discard the (e.g. 
explanatory-scientific) project – and must thus buy into the indispensable method (e.g. inference to the best 
explanation). 
52 More precisely, ‘something is instrumentally indispensable for a project […] just in case it cannot be 
eliminated without undermining […] whatever reason we had to engage in that project in the first place’ 
(Enoch 2012: 69). 
53 But why think that basic belief-forming methods, vindicated thus, are reliable? According to Enoch (2012: 
66), we have evolutionary reason to think that they are reliable, as he discusses further in Ch.7 of his book. 
However, we shall revisit the relationship between justification and truth below, when rehearsing Plunkett 
& McPherson’s (2015) criticism. 
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since that method generates ontological commitments to scientific entities such as 
electrons, we are justified in believing in their existence.54 Given the plausibility of a 
similar vindicatory story about perception, memory or modus ponens, we have arrived at 
the first premise of the argument above: if something is instrumentally indispensable to 
an intrinsically indispensable project, then we are epistemically justified (for that very 
reason) in believing that that thing exists. 
 
Importantly, the vindicatory account of basic belief-forming methods that the first 
premise articulates proves crucial to Enoch’s ambition of mounting his deliberative 
indispensability argument for the existence of robust normative truths. After all, given the 
truth of the first premise, he now only needs to show that its antecedent holds: that 
deliberation is intrinsically indispensable and that robust normative truths are 
instrumentally indispensable to it. So, can he? The next two premises try to establish 
exactly that. 
 
The second premise states that the deliberative project is intrinsically indispensable or 
rationally non-optional. That strikes me as fairly uncontroversial. After all, as Enoch 
points out, it might be that we are, as human beings, essentially or fundamentally 
deliberative creatures, given that we rely on practical deliberation to successfully navigate 
the world. Alternatively, it might be that deliberation can be opted out of, yet not 
rationally. Further, there does not seem to be a reason for thinking that the explanatory-
scientific project must somehow be privileged over the deliberative one when it comes to 
intrinsic indispensability.55 Just as we rationally ought not disengage from explaining the 
world within and around us, we rationally ought not stop deliberating about what to do.  
 
The third premise amounts to the claim that robust normative truths are instrumentally 
indispensable to the deliberative project. In other words, robust normative truths cannot 
be eliminated without undermining the project of practical deliberation. In support of 
that, Enoch tells us to pay attention to the phenomenology of practical deliberation. 
Suppose you deliberate about what future career to pursue: you could either write a PhD 
thesis in philosophy – or take up a job at a big consulting firm in the City. What should 
you do? According to Enoch, when trying to make up your mind, ‘it feels like trying to 
                                                
54 The analogue inference from vindicated basic method to existence of entities doesn’t seem to hold in the 
deliberative case, given that inference to the presupposition of deliberation doesn’t generate ontological 
commitment. See Cline 2016 for discussion below.  
55 As Enoch (2012: fn. 52) points out, the deliberative project may even be privileged over the explanatory 
one, given that explanation involves evaluation. For more, see Sayre-McCord 1988: 277-81. 
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make the right choice’ (2012: 72; emphasis mine), not just an arbitrary one.56 The 
phenomenology of deliberation, not unlike the one of finding the answer to a factual 
question, seems to involve discovery, not creation.57 Deliberation seems to be about 
attempting to eliminate arbitrariness by discovering robust normative reasons. So, 
deliberation commits us to the existence of robust normative reasons relevant to 
deliberation.58 Thus, it looks like robust normative reasons and truths are instrumentally 
indispensable to practical deliberation.59 
 
Together, these premises imply that we are justified in believing in the existence of robust 
normative truths. After all, being instrumentally indispensable to an intrinsically 
indispensable or rationally non-optional project confers justification. Practical 
deliberation has all the hallmarks of a rationally non-optional project, while robust 
normative reasons or truths appear instrumentally indispensable to practical deliberation. 
So, our belief in the existence of robust normative truths must be justified on grounds of 
deliberative indispensability. That, though, has important ramifications for the 
evolutionary debunking argument put forth in §2 above. After all, if Enoch is right, the 
robust moral realist has an additional, non-abductive reason to hold on to her moral belief 
in robust moral facts. The crucial third premise of the Harman-style evolutionary 
challenge seems to have been proven false – and it therefore doesn’t pose a legitimate 
epistemological threat to robust moral realism. 
 
5.2. Why The Deliberative Indispensability Argument Fails 
 
How plausible is Enoch’s deliberative indispensability argument? While few take issue 
with the rational non-optionality of practical deliberation, the other two premises have 
faced severe criticism. After all, it is far from uncontroversial whether indispensability 
confers justification (and/or generates ontological commitment) and whether practical 
deliberation really commits us to robustly normative reasons. 
 
                                                
56 Sometimes, of course, we merely make an arbitrary choice or pick. That, though, differs from deliberation, 
as Enoch (2012: 73) rightly notes: it doesn’t involve a commitment to reasons – and can be done even in 
the believed absence of them. 
57 See Nagel 1986: 149. 
58 That doesn’t mean that we must hold an explicit belief in that commitment, just as we don’t hold an 
explicit belief in ontological commitment when employing IBE. See Enoch (2012: 75) for that point.  
59 But even if we concede that deliberation commits us to the existence of normative reasons based on 
phenomenological grounds, why think that those reasons are robustly normative? Enoch admits that the 
success of his deliberative indispensability argument depends on rejecting meta-ethical alternatives, which 
he motivates in various ways in other parts of his book. Still, we shall revisit that question below when 
discussing Lenman’s (2014) objection to the third premise of the deliberative indispensability argument. 
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David Plunkett and Tristram McPherson (2015) have recently raised an epistemological 
worry for the first premise of Enoch’s deliberative indispensability argument. Recall that 
this premise articulates a pragmatic vindication of the basic sources of epistemic 
justification. More precisely, it says that ‘…[o]ne complete ground for the fact that 
something is a source of basic epistemic justification is the fact that treating it as such a 
basic source is instrumentally indispensable to an intrinsically indispensable project [such 
as practical deliberation]’ (Plunkett & McPherson 2015: 110). Initially, this pragmatic 
vindication looks attractive. After all, it correctly classifies intuitively basic sources (e.g. 
perception, memory, inference to the best explanation). Further, it explains why epistemic 
normativity is substantive (namely by grounding it in practical normativity). However, as 
Plunkett and McPherson argue, this pragmatic vindication suffers from a fatal 
shortcoming. In particular, it conflicts with a distinctive feature of epistemic justification, 
namely its truth bias or – what they call – Truth-Directedness: ‘the sources of basic 
epistemic justification have the content that they do (in part) because of some positive 
connection between those sources and the truth of the beliefs that they govern’ (114).60 
The pragmatic vindication violates this constraint because ‘…the fact that the belief that 
p is indispensable to our deliberative projects bears no positive relationship to the truth of 
p’ (121). 
 
To illustrate that, they develop several counterexamples to the pragmatic account of 
epistemic basicness. For example, consider Sparky, an artificial intelligence that is identical 
to Sally, an ordinary human being, in every respect other than one: unlike Sally, Sparky 
cannot deliberate about practical matters (and thus also lacks any respective introspective 
or mnemonic beliefs). Intuitively, Sparky seems almost always justified to the same extent 
as Sally in believing the very same propositions, including moral or more generally 
normative ones. But Enoch’s account cannot allow for that: since Sparky lacks the project 
of practical deliberation, ‘…Sally has some defeasible epistemic justification for believing 
that there are ethical facts that Sparky lacks’ (118). That, though, seems odd. And it seems 
odd exactly because whatever Sally has, yet Sparky lacks, doesn’t have anything to do with 
the (moral) truth. And if it doesn’t have anything to do with the truth, how could Sally 
be more justified than Sparky? Or, put differently, what explains the counter-intuitive 
                                                
60 Plunkett & McPherson (2015: 114-17) hasten to qualify Truth-Directedness in three ways. First, they stress 
that it is neutral with respect to accounts of truth. So, it is compatible with correspondence, deflationary or 
epistemic notions of truth. Second, Truth-Directedness is not a constraint on the basic sources of epistemic 
justification themselves. Rather, it is a constraint on theories that purport to explain why something is a basic 
source of epistemic justification. Third, the positive connection to truth should be understood ecumenically. 
It might involve modal notions such as safety or sensitivity, constitutive goals, or else. Further, it is also 
distinct, yet compatible, with epistemic constitutivism, epistemic teleology or pragmatic encroachment. The 
indeterminacy is dialectically crucial: ‘we take commitment to something like Truth-Directedness to be close 
to common ground in many parts of epistemology’ (116). 
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diagnosis that Enoch’s account provides for cases such as this one is that it violates Truth-
Directedness: it says that levels of justification may vary irrespective of their connection to 
truth. So, it looks like Enoch’s pragmatic vindication fails to capture a distinctive feature 
of epistemic justification.61 And since it is deficient in that crucial respect, it cannot be a 
plausible vindicatory account of basic belief-forming methods. By implication, this story 
cannot underwrite the first premise of Enoch’s argument – or ground deliberative 
dispensability as a basic source of epistemic justification.62 
 
The third premise has also attracted critical attention. James Lenman (2014) has argued 
that – contra Enoch – robust normative truths are not instrumentally indispensable to 
practical deliberation.63 Recall that Enoch offers a phenomenological argument: in 
deliberation, it feels or seems like we are trying to make the right choice (e.g. about what 
career to pursue), based on normative reasons – as opposed to merely picking arbitrarily 
(e.g. between two qualitatively identical pens at the stationary store). Therefore, we must 
be committed to the existence of robust normative reasons. However, Lenman argues that 
this inference is invalid. To see that, he asks us to imagine schmeliberation: ‘the sort of 
practical thinking where we try to do well with respect to standards of evaluation set by 
all those deeply entrenched concerns and aspirations we humans happen to have, 
aspirations for pleasure, flourishing, love, prosperity, peace, justice, security, country air 
and all that other stuff we happen to like, but remain cheerfully indifferent to normative 
truths as Enoch conceives them’ (Lenman 2014: 839). According to Lenman, two aspects 
of schmeliberation stand out. First, we can do better or worse (or: succeed or fail) at 
schmeliberating. So, schmeliberation is a standard-regulated intellectual practice.64 Second 
(and more importantly), the difference between deliberation and schmeliberation isn’t 
like the difference between choosing, governed by the recognition of normative reasons, 
and arbitrary picking. After all, the phenomenology of schmeliberation isn’t like the 
phenomenology of arbitrary picking, but just like the one of deliberation. Or, 
                                                
61 In case you remain unconvinced by the Sally & Sparky counterexample, check out the other two that 
Plunkett & McPherson (2015: 120) present, namely Declan and Marjorie.  
62 Plunkett & McPherson (2015: 124-29) also make the case that their worry generalizes to pragmatic 
accounts other than Enoch’s that aim to vindicate deliberative indispensability. Since deliberative 
indispensability is unconnected to truth, anyone defending it as a basic source of epistemic justification 
faces the following dilemma: either try to vindicate deliberative indispensability as a basic source of 
justification and violate Truth-Directedness – or develop a vindicating account that is compatible with 
Truth-Directedness (e.g. Goldman’s (2008) reliabilism), yet won’t vindicate deliberative indispensability as 
a basic source of epistemic justification. 
63 For a similar argument, see also Olinder & Bjoernsson 2016: 105-8. 
64 In response, Enoch might press the Kantian line of asking where normativity gets into the mere desires. 
However, for Lenman, the space of reasons is just (and unmysteriously) the space of one’s own, first-person 
(self- and other-regarding) desires – and normativity is just the ‘…force that attaches to the motivation we 
feel from unalienated desires, desires with which we stably reflectively identify’ (2014: 840). 
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schmeliberating doesn’t feel arbitrary like picking, but rather just like deliberation. As a 
result, Enoch’s phenomenological argument fails: the phenomenology of deliberation isn’t 
rich enough to license the inference to the existence of robustly normative reasons. Rather, 
the phenomenology of deliberation seems to support the existence of normative reasons 
simpliciter. For all we know, however, those reasons might as well reduce to complex 
human desires or those ‘deeply entrenched concerns and aspirations we humans happen 
to have’.65 So, robustly normative truths are not instrumentally indispensable to practical 
deliberation.66 
 
But even if the first and third premise escape these worries, some have recently questioned 
the argument’s validity. Brendan Cline (2016) has argued that deliberative 
indispensability cannot be a legitimate, independent guide to (normative) ontology. That 
is so even if – pace Plunkett & McPherson (2015) – deliberative indispensability is 
vindicated as a basic source of justification and – pace Lenman (2014) – robust normative 
truths are instrumentally indispensable to practical deliberation.67 After all, even if some 
entity (such as robustly normative truth) is deliberatively indispensable, it is still an open 
question whether that entity exists. That question, though, need be settled by additional 
explanatory work, given that it doesn’t remain open if an entity is indispensable to an 
actual explanation of a phenomenon. So, deliberative indispensability cannot 
independently ground ontological commitments – and thus secure the conclusion of 
Enoch’s argument. 
 
Cline (2016) formulates his objection in two steps. First, he reminds us how inference to 
the best explanation (or, henceforth: IBE) generates ontological commitment. IBE treats 
explanatory considerations as a guide to inference: it helps us spot the actual explanation 
                                                
65 Lenman is a (Humean) naturalist moral realist. As a result, he is primarily interested in showing that 
Enoch’s phenomenological argument doesn’t rule out normative reasons understood as complex human 
desires. But I think that Lenman’s point doesn’t just exonerate naturalist moral realism, but any meta-ethical 
view committed to the existence of normative reasons. After all, his point is simply that the phenomenology 
of deliberation (unlike the one of arbitrary picking) seems to commit us to the existence of normative reasons 
– but (contra Enoch) doesn’t put any further constraints on their nature. So, his point is also good news for, 
say, moral constructivists or dispositionalists or conventionalists, for whom normative reasons derive from 
moral attitudes, dispositions or institutional norms. 
66 For those unconvinced by his point about the shared phenomenology of deliberation and schmeliberation, 
Lenman also offers a thought-experiment in support of this conclusion. He surmises that if Enoch 
renounced his belief in robust normative realism, he wouldn’t stop deliberating and ‘[n]otwithstanding the 
loss of his belief in robustly real normative truths, he still cares about his own prosperity and happiness, 
about the wellbeing of his family and friends and the continued flourishing of his relationships with them, 
about the success of his various projects (finishing that book, building that outhouse), about living a whole 
life that will bear his survey in the light of such ideals of the person as he stably reflectively endorses (all this 
of course just a load more ‘‘mere’’ desires)’ (841). 
67 Bjoernsson & Olinder 2016: 106 develop a similar worry. 
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by making us collect plausible potential explanations and examine them for their indicators 
of accuracy (such as coherence, predictive power, simplicity, generality, precision, etc.).68 
So, IBE helps us move from potential to actual explanations.69 Importantly, for scientific 
realists, only (approximately) true hypotheses actually explain anything.70 So, if an actual 
explanation is committed to a particular kind of entity, that entity must exist (because the 
hypothesis wouldn’t be true otherwise). Actual explanations, then, involve true existential 
claims. IBE thus generates ontological commitment by linking potential to actual 
explanations which, in turn, involve true existential claims. Or, put differently, ‘this link 
between actual explanations and reality is what makes explanatory indispensability well 
suited to play a privileged role in ontological construction’ (Cline 2016: 3245). 
 
Second, Cline shows why, unlike IBE, deliberative indispensability cannot generate 
ontological commitment. More precisely, suppose there is an inference rule called 
Inference to the Commitments of Deliberation (ICD): ‘we should try to discern and then 
embrace entities that are deliberately indispensable’ (3245). However, that rule – unlike 
IBE - is not ontologically committing because, importantly, something can be 
deliberatively indispensable, yet false. To illustrate, consider free will. Many hold that 
libertarian free will is deliberatively indispensable, given that ‘we cannot deliberate if we 
just sit back and try to see what happens’ (3246).71 Still, even if libertarians are right about 
our sense of freedom and its incompatibility with determinism, it remains an open question 
whether determinism is true and whether we are free in the relevant sense. Put differently, 
it is possible that deliberation simply commits us to falsehoods.72 Or, we can coherently 
acknowledge the deliberative indispensability of free will and simultaneously doubt it.73 
So, even if we correctly characterize the indispensable commitments to deliberation, more 
work is needed to get to the bottom of things. And, given the points above, that work is 
plausibly explanatory, not deliberative: we should look for explanatory considerations to 
                                                
68 See Harman 1965. As Cline points out, given the notion of actual explanation below (according to which 
only true hypotheses are actual explanations), the label ‘IBE’ is misleading: it cannot be IBAE, since that 
would be trivial and presupposes that we already know which explanation is true. Rather, following Lipton 
(2004: 59), we should introduce potential explanation (i.e. a claim that would, if true, provide an actual 
explanation of some phenomenon) – and read IBE as IBPE. Nothing in what follows hinges on that, 
though. 
69 Of course, as Cline reminds us, there is still a risk of misstepping (because the actual explanation might 
rate poorly or won’t be on our list of potential explanations) – inviting IBE-scepticism. Enoch’s story about 
the justification of IBE aims to address sceptical worries about IBE, but also leads to his overlooking that, 
in successful cases, the best-looking potential explanation will be the actual explanation – which is 
ontologically committing. 
70 See Lipton 1991: 129, 174 and Field 1989: 15.  
71 See, for example, Searle 2001: 13. 
72 Searle 2001: 17, 67, 71, 278f. 
73 See Nagel 1986: 117. 
89  
examine the commitments of deliberation. In Cline’s words: ‘Thus ICD, even when 
successful, is in principle incapable of settling ontological disputes. This is why ICD is 
not fit to serve as an independent guide in our quest to work out what there is’ (3247). In 
short, deliberative indispensability is not a legitimate guide to (normative) ontology.74 But 
if it is not, then the conclusion of Enoch’s argument doesn’t follow, even if it is true that 
deliberative indispensability is a basic source of epistemic justification, deliberation is 
rationally non-optional and robust normative reasons are indispensable to it. It still won’t 
be true that robust normative reasons exist. 
 
Where does that leave Enoch’s deliberative indispensability argument? The worry arising 
from the truth-bias of epistemic justification (Plunkett & McPherson), the instrumental 
dispensability of robust normative truths to practical deliberation (Lenman), and the 
failure of deliberative indispensability to generate ontological commitment (Cline) all 
seem to render the argument implausible. But if Enoch’s argument is implausible, an 
appeal to deliberative indispensability won’t help robust moral realists in response to the 
Harman-style evolutionary debunking argument developed in §2. After all, deliberative 
indispensability doesn’t give us non-abductive reasons to believe in the existence of robust 
moral facts. By implication, the third premise of the debunking argument still holds true. 
Robust moral realists must look elsewhere to avoid moral scepticism. 
 
6 .  Conclu s ion  
 
In this chapter, I offered a systematic, comprehensive defence of an evolutionary 
debunking argument inspired by the epistemic principle that, for our beliefs to be 
justified, they must be best explained by the facts they are about. According to the more 
specific argument, since robust moral facts are dispensable to the best (namely: 
evolutionary) explanation of our moral beliefs and there are no additional, non-abductive 
reasons to maintain them, those beliefs lose their justification. As my discussion showed, 
this argument proves compelling: on reflection, it withstands the most powerful 
challenges to the truth of its premises. 
 
To begin with, I argued that – contra Mogensen (2015, 2016) – evolutionary and moral 
explanations of moral belief are not compatible (and that, even if they were, it wouldn’t 
matter, given that the latter remain metaphysically mysterious). So, evolution does best 
explain moral belief. Further, I made the case that – contra Cuneo (2007) – robust 
epistemic facts aren’t objectionably explanatorily dispensable and thus cannot serve as 
                                                
74 Cline stresses – rightly in my mind – that deliberative indispensability might still be a source of 
preliminary evidence that we can subject to scrutiny (comparable to perceptual indispensability). 
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companions for robust moral facts. So, robust moral facts remain metaphysically 
problematic, which defeats our belief in them, unless we have some other, non-abductive 
reasons for their existence. Finally, I rejected Enoch’s (2012, 2016) proposal that the 
deliberative indispensability of robust moral facts gives us exactly such reasons. 
 
Where does that leave us? This chapter concludes the second step of my investigation. 
After two failed attempts in Chapters 2 and 3, we finally hit on a compelling evolutionary 
debunking challenge to robust moral realism, based on an independently plausible 
epistemic principle. That, of course, is good news for evolutionary debunkers. In contrast, 
robust moral realists seem to be in deep epistemological trouble. If they cannot find 
another way of faulting the argument developed in this chapter, they are saddled with 
implausible moral scepticism. Chapter 5 amounts to the third and final step of my 
investigation into evolutionary debunking. It focuses on moral intuitionism, the most 
popular, best-developed, non-abductive moral epistemology available to robust moral 
realists. More precisely, Chapter 5 addresses the following question: does moral 
intuitionism have the conceptual tools to tackle the worry about epistemic luck raised in 
Chapter 2 – as well as offer additional, non-abductive reasons for robust moral belief (thus 
staving off the sceptical worry developed in this chapter)? 
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CHAPTER 5: EVOLUTION AND THE POSSIBILITY OF ROBUSTLY 
MORAL KNOWLEDGE 
 
1 .  In tr oduct ion  
 
While Chapter 1 set the stage, Chapters 2 to 4 took the second step in my investigation. 
In them, I developed and critically assessed evolutionary debunking arguments based on 
independently plausible epistemic principles, informed by cutting-edge debates in 
contemporary epistemology. My discussion showed that, upon closer inspection, robust 
moral realism faces two distinct epistemic worries. The first, developed in Chapter 2, is 
loosely inspired by evolutionary debunking arguments and centers on knowledge-
undermining epistemic luck. Meanwhile, the second, as discussed in Chapter 4, is directly 
raised by evolutionary considerations, focusing on whether robust moral realists have 
compelling non-explanatory reasons for maintaining their moral beliefs.1 
 
Chapter 5 amounts to the third and final step. Its overall aim is to argue that, while robust 
moral realism can tackle the worry about epistemic luck, it cannot offer compelling non-
explanatory reasons for robustly moral belief. As a result, the evolutionary debunking 
argument developed in Chapter 4 succeeds, saddling robust moral realism with 
implausible moral scepticism: we cannot justifiably believe robustly moral facts. However, 
achieving that overall aim necessitates a slight shift in methodology. While Chapters 2 to 4 
remained largely neutral with respect to the correct first-order moral epistemology for 
robust moral realism, those minimal assumptions won’t suffice for figuring whether (and, 
if so, how) robust moral realism can tackle the residual worries raised (or inspired) by 
evolutionary debunking arguments.2 Rather, doing so requires an idea of how we form 
true, justified beliefs about and acquire knowledge of moral facts. Only then can we 
meaningfully gauge whether robust moral realism survives evolutionary debunking. Now, 
contemporary moral intuitionism is the most popular and best-developed moral 
                                                
1 Recall that, upon closer inspection, the worry about irrelevant evolutionary influence on robustly moral 
belief discussed in Chapter 3 did not prove compelling. So, robust moral realists don’t need to address it. 
2 In fact, all I assumed in Chapters 2 to 4 was that robust moral realists are non-sceptics: they hold that we 
can have knowledge of robust moral facts, at least under epistemically favorable conditions. Assuming that 
little was enough to assess whether the three epistemic principles outlined in Chapter 1 proved generally 
plausible and, more specifically, whether they combined with evolutionary explanations to undermine 
robustly moral knowledge. 
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epistemology available to robust moral realism.3 It therefore offers the best chance of 
dealing with the worries about epistemic luck and the putative lack of non-explanatory 
reasons for robustly moral belief. And if even moral intuitionism failed to do so, robust 
moral realism would be in serious trouble. So, my inquiry in this chapter henceforth 
focuses on moral intuitionism.4 
 
The overall aim of this chapter breaks down into two more specific goals. First, I intend 
to argue that, on reflection, moral intuitionism isn’t vulnerable to the worry about 
epistemic luck developed in Chapter 2. However, examining closely why that is helps 
uncover the most compelling version of moral intuitionism. According to that view, you 
know (an intuitive moral) p if and only if you (truly) believe that p, justified on the basis 
of a veridical intellectual seeming that p that results from adequately understanding p. 
Second, I aim to show that even this version of moral intuitionism cannot stave off the 
worry raised by best evolutionary explanation argument in Chapter 4. As I argue, moral 
intuitionism, by itself, cannot give us additional, non-explanatory reasons for robustly 
moral beliefs. Rather, the view must be supplemented with a third-factor explanation of 
moral reliability. To avoid begging the question against the evolutionary debunker, 
however, any such explanation can only rely on formal moral intuitions: intuitions that 
impose formal constraints on ethical viewpoints, yet without evaluating anything 
positively or negatively. I argue, however, that these intuitions cannot underwrite many 
substantive moral beliefs, even when combined with rational reflection. Therefore, moral 
intuitionism cannot give us additional, non-explanatory reasons for anything beyond our 
beliefs about the form of morality. As a result, the best evolutionary explanation argument 
in Chapter 4 succeeds. At last, robust moral realism is saddled with unacceptable moral 
scepticism: we cannot justifiably believe substantive facts about morality, robustly 
construed. While evolution doesn’t imperil the mere possibility of robustly moral 
knowledge, it undermines any claim to know what robust morality is substantively like. 
 
Here is my plan. §2 sets the stage by introducing moral intuitionism in broad strokes. §3 
develops the most compelling version of this view in response to the worry about epistemic 
luck. §4 argues that moral intuitionism cannot accommodate the best evolutionary 
explanation argument against robust moral realism. In more detail, it makes the case that 
the view requires a third-factor explanation of moral reliability (§4.1 & 4.2), that any such 
                                                
3 With respect to popularity: Shafer-Landau (2003), Huemer (2005) and Parfit (2013) are all, inter alia, 
prominent contemporary robust moral realists and moral intuitionists. That moral intuitionism is well-
developed as a view in moral epistemology will become apparent in §2 and §3 below. 
4 Importantly, I henceforth don’t assume that moral intuitionism is true or correct. Rather, I simply (and 
charitably) assume that it is the best option available to robust moral realism. But, as I shall argue at length 
in this chapter, I don’t think even that option pans out. 
93  
explanation must rely on formal moral intuitions only to avoid begging the question 
(§4.3), and that such intuitions cannot underwrite belief about the substance of robust 
morality (§4.4). §5 summarizes the discussion of Chapters 2 to 5 and develops some 
further insights into evolutionary debunking arguments and theorizing in moral 
epistemology more generally. 
 
2 .  A Sk e tch  o f  Mor a l  In tu i t i on i sm 
 
In this section, my aim is to introduce moral intuitionism in broad strokes, thus providing 
the background necessary for developing the most compelling version of this view in 
response to the worry about epistemic luck in §3. I start by briefly characterizing and 
motivating moral intuitionism in general terms (§2.1.), before presenting two more 
specific versions of it, based on diverging conceptions of moral intuitions (§2.2.). 
 
2.1.  What It Is and Why It Seems Attractive 
 
Moral intuitionism, as defended by Robert Audi (1999), Michael Huemer (2005), Russ 
Shafer-Landau (2003) and Philip Stratton-Lake (2016), is the epistemological view that 
moral knowledge is true moral belief, justified on the basis of moral intuition. 5 Or, more 
precisely, you know that p if you have a true belief that p, justified by a corresponding 
moral intuition that p. For instance, consider the true moral proposition that honesty is a 
virtue.6 According to moral intuitionism, intuiting or having the intuition that honesty is 
a virtue is sufficient for being justified in believing and therefore knowing that honesty is 
a virtue. So, moral intuitionism aims to provide a partial analysis of moral knowledge: it 
is in the business of stating sufficient conditions on it. By doing so, it provides us with a 
partial answer to one of the central questions of moral epistemology, namely the question 
of what moral knowledge is.7 
 
Before proceeding, two qualifications are worth making. First, the conditional above only 
concerns basic moral propositions: those that can be known by moral intuition. In other 
                                                
5 My exposition and subsequent dialectic focus on contemporary moral intuitionism exclusively. For more 
on its connection to classical forms such as Price’s (1758/1969) view, see Stratton-Lake 2014: §1. 
6 This example is due to Huemer 2005: 102. See ibid. and Shafer-Landau 2003: 248 for other allegedly true 
and intuitively compelling moral propositions. All these propositions should be understood ceteris paribus.  
7 Why only a partial analysis of moral knowledge? Because some moral intuitionists such as Shafer-Landau 
(2003) allow for non-intuitive moral knowledge. So, for them, intuition cannot also be necessary for moral 
knowledge. A full analysis, however, would feature both necessary and sufficient conditions. For my 
purposes, the complication doesn’t matter too much. The epistemic luck problem discussed in §3 below 
primarily concerns the sufficiency condition – and the anti-luck condition I advocate in response is necessary 
only for intuitive moral knowledge. So, I am happy to allow for non-intuitive moral knowledge. 
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words, moral intuitionism does not state that we can know any moral proposition by way 
of moral intuition. For instance, as Huemer (2005: 102) points out, we could not know 
by moral intuition whether abortion is morally permissible or not. Rather, we would know 
that based on inference from other moral and non-moral beliefs (e.g. about moral criteria 
for personhood, about whether a human fetus meets these criteria). Of course, it is a 
matter of dispute whether and, if so, which moral propositions can be known by moral 
intuition. But, for the purposes of my argument in this chapter, I shall simply grant that 
some can. I will have more to say about the nature of those basic moral propositions in 
§4 below. 
 
Second, intuiting or having an intuition that p, even where p is a moral truth, need not 
always mean being justified in believing p – and therefore knowing p. Rather, the moral 
intuition that p also has to remain undefeated. For instance, if you were in possession of 
better evidence that not-p or suitably good evidence that your intuition that p is 
misleading or formed unreliably, you would no longer be justified in believing p.8 A more 
precise formulation of moral intuitionism would acknowledge that. As we shall see, this 
complication proves irrelevant for our discussion of the epistemic luck problem in §3 
below, given that scenarios used for illustrating it don’t feature any such defeaters.9 
However, the no-defeater clause will take center stage in our discussion of the best 
evolutionary explanation argument in §4 below. If successful, that very argument forces 
robust moral realists into moral scepticism by articulating an undermining defeater for 
their moral beliefs, showing that none of their (atomic) moral intuitions ever remains 
undefeated. 
 
Moral intuitionism is an attractive positive, non-sceptical moral epistemology for robust 
moral realists. To begin with, it nicely fits with their moral metaphysics. One of the core 
metaphysical intuitions animating robust moral realism is that the normative is sui generis 
or just ‘too different’ to be reduced to or identified with anything in the world described 
by the natural sciences.10 But if the normative is metaphysically different in that way, it 
seems plausible that we get to know about normativity a similarly epistemically different 
way. More specifically, we don’t access normative reality with the epistemic tools used to 
gain knowledge of the natural world, such as perception or scientific theorizing. Rather, 
                                                
8 See, for instance, Audi 1999: 219f. and Huemer 2005: §5.3. 
9 Or, more precisely, there is a potential defeater in scenarios such as Brain Lesion, namely the unreliability 
of moral intuition, but – by stipulation – the subject in my case lacks evidence for it. As a result, her belief 
remains justified. So, the complication proves irrelevant in the end. 
10 See Enoch 2012: Ch. 5. 
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we do so using moral intuitions. In that manner, moral intuitionism, as a moral 
epistemology, fits nicely with the metaphysics of robust moral realism. 
 
Further, contemporary moral intuitionism simultaneously manages to demystify moral 
intuitions. They are not the product of an ad-hoc, obscure faculty of moral intuition, but 
a kind of mental state essential to how we acquire apriori knowledge more generally.11 
After all, it seems plausible that we come to know at least some logical (e.g. the Law of 
the Excluded Middle), mathematical (e.g. that 2 + 2 = 4), modal (e.g. that necessity entails 
possibility) and philosophical (e.g. that true, justified belief isn’t knowledge) facts by 
having corresponding logical, mathematical, modal and philosophical intuitions. Intuitive 
moral knowledge is therefore nothing mysterious, but a species of intuitive apriori 
knowledge. 
 
2.2.  The Nature of Moral Intuitions 
 
We can distinguish two dominant strands of contemporary moral intuitionism, 
depending on what moral intuitions are (or what it means to intuit a moral proposition). 
According to the first account, defended by Audi (1999) and Shafer-Landau (2003), 
moral intuitions are beliefs in self-evident moral propositions, where self-evident 
propositions are propositions that can be known on the basis of adequate understanding 
alone.12 For instance, according to Shafer-Landau (2003: 248), it is a self-evident (or self-
evidently true) that pain is bad or that one should not punish the innocent.13 So, on this 
account, having a moral intuition means holding a belief about a moral truth that one 
adequately understands. 
 
But what exactly is adequate understanding, according to Audi or Shafer-Landau? Neither 
gives us a full analysis. Still, Audi (1999: 207f.) helpfully contrasts adequate 
understanding with a variety of defective understandings such as mistaken, insufficient, 
distorted and clouded understanding. For instance, thinking that there is a minimal level 
of epistemic confidence appropriate to knowledge would mean distortedly understanding 
(the sentence expressing) the proposition that knowledge entails true belief. After all, even 
though the former is compatible with the latter, it is not entailed by it. Further, he 
distinguishes adequate understanding from mere semantic understanding: ‘[a]dequacy 
here implies not only seeing what the proposition says but also being able to apply it to 
                                                
11 See Audi 1999 and Huemer 2005: Ch. 5. 
12 It’s important to keep moral intuitions and self-evident propositions apart. See Stratton-Lake 2014: 4f. 
13 What is self-evidence? For Audi, self-evidence is ‘…a kind of manifest truth of a proposition in itself…’ 
(1999: 206).  
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(and withhold its application from) an appropriately wide range of cases, and being able 
to see some of its logical implications, to distinguish it from a certain range of close 
relatives, and to comprehend its elements and some of their relations’ (208). So, 
adequately understanding that, say, honesty is a virtue means more than simply 
understanding what the proposition means: it involves not applying the proposition in 
cases in which honesty is not a virtue (e.g. when talking to a friend about their dire job 
prospects), observing logical implications (e.g. that honesty should be cultivated because 
it is a virtue), not confusing it with close relatives (e.g. being trustworthy) and 
comprehending its elements (e.g. that virtues are positive character traits, that honesty 
involves not lying or cheating).  
 
When we integrate the self-evidence account of moral intuitions into the general 
characterization offered above, we get the self-evidence version of moral intuitionism. 
According to it, ‘p is self-evident provided an adequate understanding of it is sufficient for 
being justified in believing it and for knowing it if one believes it on the basis of that 
understanding’ (Audi 1999: 206; emphasis mine). For instance, consider again the self-
evident proposition that honesty is a virtue. According to the self-evidence version, when 
you adequately understand that honesty is a virtue, you are justified in believing it (barring 
defeaters) – and, if you form the corresponding belief based on that understanding, you 
also know that honesty is a virtue. 
 
Yet not all construe moral intuitions as beliefs in self-evident moral propositions. Instead, 
inspired by George Bealer’s (1999) work on intuitions more generally, Michael Huemer 
(2005) and Philip Stratton-Lake (2016) take moral intuitions to be intellectual seemings: 
non-inferential, non-doxastic mental states that result from thinking about certain moral 
propositions.14 For instance, it might seem true to you that enjoyment is better than 
suffering, that it is unjust to punish a person for a crime she did not commit, or that it is 
morally impermissible to kill one healthy patient to save the lives of five terminally ill 
patients in need of organ transplants.15   
 
                                                
14 Note that, for Huemer (2005: §5.1) not all seemings are intellectual: there are also perceptual, 
introspective and mnemonic seemings. Further, not all intellectual seemings are moral seemings. Rather, 
there are logical, mathematical and modal seemings, too. For instance, it might seem to you that an 
argument is valid or that 2 + 2 = 4. Finally, intellectual moral seemings can differ along several dimensions: 
their strength, how widely they are shared, how simple or complex their contents are, etc. For more, see 
Huemer 2005: § 5.2.  
15 For further examples, see Huemer 2005: §5.2. As mentioned above, all the intuitive moral propositions 
are supposed to be understood as holding true ceteris paribus. For examples of non-intuitive moral 
propositions, see Huemer 2005: ibid. 
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When we combine this intellectual seemings account with the view that true moral beliefs, 
justified by moral intuition, are sufficient for moral knowledge, we get the intellectual 
seemings version of moral intuitionism. According to it, if you form the true moral belief 
that p, justified on the basis of the intellectual seeming that p, you know that p. Or, to 
quote Stratton-Lake: ‘[Intuitive] propositions are truths such that (a) a clear intuition [or 
intellectual seeming] of them is sufficient justification for believing them, and (b) 
believing them on the basis of a clear intuition [or intellectual seeming] of them entails 
knowing them’ (Stratton-Lake 2016: 16).16 For instance, take the true moral proposition 
that enjoyment is better than suffering. According to the intellectual seemings version of 
moral intuitionism, if you form the true moral belief that enjoyment is better than 
suffering, justified on the basis of the corresponding clear intellectual seeming, you know 
that enjoyment is better than suffering.  
 
Of course, not all intellectual seemings are veridical. For instance, suppose that act- 
consequentialism is in reality our best moral theory. If so, even though it seems morally 
impermissible to kill one healthy patient to save the lives of five, it would not in fact be 
so. Accordingly, your corresponding moral belief would be justified, yet false. Still, many 
intellectual seemings are probably veridical: they concern moral truths. For instance, it 
seems plausible to say that the intellectual seeming that, all things being equal, enjoyment 
is better than suffering is most likely veridical. In those cases, the beliefs you form on their 
basis are not just justified, but amount to knowledge. 
 
Which version of moral intuitionism should the robust moral realist endorse? In the next 
section, I turn towards discussing the problem of epistemic luck, as developed in Chapter 
2. And as I shall suggest, one version of moral intuitionism is particularly well-placed to 
address that worry – and should thus be preferred as the most compelling one available. 
 
3 .  Mor a l  In tu i t ion i sm a nd  Ep i s temic  Luck  
 
In this section, my aim is to argue that moral intuitionism isn’t vulnerable to the worry 
about epistemic luck raised in Chapter 2. However, examining closely why that is helps 
uncover the most compelling version of the view. That, in turn, prepares us well for the 
                                                
16 Stratton-Lake (2016: 16) calls these truths ‘self-evident’, despite having previously argued against the 
notion of self-evidence, which seems misleading. I therefore call them ‘intuitive’ truths instead. What does 
a clear moral intuition amount to, though? According to Stratton-Lake, ‘[b]y getting a proposition clearly 
in view I mean pretty much what Audi calls having an adequate understanding of it’ (Stratton-Lake 2016: 
13, fn.25). So, clear intellectual seemings concern (moral) propositions that we also adequately understand. 
For more on the – probably problematic – role of adequate understanding in Stratton-Lake’s account, see 
§3 below. 
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discussion in §4 about whether moral intuitionism can handle the best evolutionary 
explanation argument developed in Chapter 4. I start by briefly re-introducing the 
problem of epistemic luck (§3.1.), before proposing an intuitionist response based on 
adequate understanding (§3.2.). Then, I argue that a specific form of the intellectual 
seemings version of the view can avail itself most readily of my response (§3.3). 
 
3.1.  The Problem of Epistemic Luck 
 
In Chapter 2, I argued that there are widely overlooked instances of true, justified, yet 
epistemically lucky moral belief that fall short of moral knowledge. To illustrate that, I 
developed the following Gettier-style case: 
 
Brain Lesion: suppose that you highly reliably intuit (and thus know) various 
moral truths. However, curiously enough, you have never thought about 
whether honesty is a virtue or not. One night, without realizing, you suffer a 
brain lesion, which has the following effect: you find intuitively compelling 
any moral proposition you entertain. Luckily for you, though, the first moral 
proposition you entertain the next morning and form a corresponding belief 
about is that honesty is a virtue, which is necessarily true. 
 
Here, your belief that honesty is a virtue is true because honesty is indeed a virtue (and 
necessarily so). Further, your belief is justified: you have the moral intuition – which you 
take to be veridical or reliably formed – that honesty is a virtue.17 Still, you don’t appear 
to know that honesty is a virtue. After all, you were lucky that the first moral proposition 
that you entertained was true. Had your moral intuition been about the false moral 
proposition that courage is a vice instead, you would have ended up with a false moral 
belief.18 So, it is a matter of luck that your belief is true.19 
 
                                                
17 Note that the unreliability of your moral intuition (due to the brain lesion) does not defeat your justified 
moral belief that honesty is a virtue. By stipulation, you do not have any evidence about it in Brain Lesion. 
However, such evidence would be required, given that moral intuitionism is a form of epistemic internalism 
about justification. For more on moral intuitionism and epistemic internalism, see Audi 1999: 213f. 
18 I don’t think you could really intuit that courage is a vice (or any other moral falsehood) if moral intuitions 
were beliefs in self-evident propositions. After all, a self-evident proposition is a proposition that you 
adequately understand. Adequate understanding, though, is factive (at least on some conceptions): you can 
only adequately understand moral truths. Therefore, you could not adequately understand – and thus not 
intuit – that courage is a vice. More on that below. 
19 In Chapter 2, I also offered a further explanation as to why epistemic luck undermines knowledge: it 
renders beliefs unsafe, i.e. in most nearby possible worlds in which you employ the same method of belief-
formation, you end up with false beliefs.  
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What relevance does epistemic luck have for moral intuitionism? The Gettier-style case 
above illustrates that epistemic luck undermines knowledge: you can form a true moral 
belief that p, justified on the basis of a moral intuition that p, without knowing that p. So, 
there is something wrong with moral intuitionism as an analysis of moral knowledge: it is 
not the case that you know that p if you form the true moral belief that p, justified on the 
basis of the moral intuition that p. True moral belief, justified by moral intuition, is 
insufficient for moral knowledge. In Chapter 2, I called this challenge the problem of 
epistemic luck. 
 
3.2.  Adequate Understanding as a Potential Solution 
 
How should moral intuitionists respond? In my view, their most promising response 
involves an appeal to adequate understanding (or conceptual competence). Recall that, 
following Audi’s (1999) definition introduced in §2.2. above, adequately understanding 
a (moral) proposition implies ‘…not only seeing what the proposition says but also being 
able to apply it to (and withhold its application from) an appropriately wide range of 
cases, and being able to see some of its logical implications, to distinguish it from a certain 
range of close relatives, and to comprehend its elements and some of their relations’ (208). 
However, it is questionable whether you adequately understand that honesty is a virtue in 
Brain Lesion above.20 Even though it seems plausible that you understand what the 
proposition says (namely that honesty is a virtue), the brain lesion appears to undermine 
your ability to both distinguish it from close relatives and comprehend its elements and 
some of their relations. More specifically, due to the brain lesion, you could easily have 
had a moral intuition about the false moral proposition that, say, insensitivity is a virtue 
(and thereby confused honesty with a close relative) or the moral falsehood that pride is a 
virtue (and thereby failed to comprehend what a virtue is). So, it is questionable whether 
you adequately understand that honesty is a virtue in Brain Lesion. If you do not and 
adequate understanding is a necessary condition on intuitive moral knowledge, though, 
you don’t know that honesty is a virtue in Brain Lesion. So, the case cannot serve as a 
counterexample to moral intuitionism. After all, the verdict the view yield aligns with our 
intuition about that case, namely that you lack moral knowledge. On reflection, moral 
intuitionism therefore doesn’t seem vulnerable to the problem of epistemic luck. 
 
                                                
20 Riaz (2015: 115-21) seems to share my intuition with respect to moral understanding (of contingent 
moral proposition) and veritic luck: she argues – pace Hills (2009) – that we don’t morally understand p in 
Gettier-style cases where belief in p is veritically lucky. However, she takes that to be evidence that moral 
understanding is a species of contingent moral knowledge. Of course, I don’t think we should draw the 
analogous conclusion regarding apriori moral knowledge. Adequate understanding is a necessary condition, 
not species, of apriori, intuitive moral knowledge. 
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But the discussion doesn’t end here. Suppose that it is indeed plausible that you don’t 
adequately understand that honesty is a virtue in Brain Lesion. Still, a further question 
remains: which version of moral intuitionism can most readily avail itself of this response? 
Now, you might think that the answer is obvious (no pun intended): it must be the self-
evidence version of the view, according to which adequately understanding that p is 
central to having a moral intuition that p. But that, as I shall argue now, would be too 
hasty. Instead, to answer that question properly, we must figure out in what sense 
adequate understanding might be most plausibly construed as necessary for intuitive moral 
knowledge. And there are at least two ways of integrating adequate understanding into 
the architecture of the intellectual seemings version of moral intuitionism as well. More 
specifically, adequate understanding could either serve as a condition on the justificatory 
force of intellectual seemings – or as a wholly separate anti-luck condition on moral 
knowledge. Upon closer examination, it is this third and final candidate, namely adequate 
understanding as an anti-luck condition, that proves most compelling – and thus helps us 
adjudicate the dispute between different versions of moral intuitionism in favor of the 
intellectual seemings view. Adjudicating that dispute, meanwhile, is important: 
ultimately, we are interested in developing the strongest possible version of moral 
intuitionism before confronting it with the best evolutionary explanation argument in §4 
below. That way, we respect charity and can be sure that, if even that version fails, there 
is little hope for moral intuitionism – and robust moral realism. 
 
3.3  What Role Should Adequate Understanding Play Within Moral 
Intuitionism? 
 
According to the first proposal, adequately understanding that p is central to what it 
means to have a moral intuition and thus being justified in believing that p in the first 
place. This seems to be what Audi (1999) and Shafer-Landau (2003) have in mind. After 
all, for them, moral intuitions are beliefs in self-evident moral propositions, where self-
evident propositions are propositions that can be known on the basis of adequate 
understanding alone. Further, they both hold that adequately understanding that p is 
sufficient for being justified in believing p. But if you don’t adequately understand that 
honesty is a virtue, as is plausibly the case in Brain Lesion, you cannot justifiably believe 
it either. And if moral knowledge requires justification, you don’t know in Brain Lesion. 
In that manner, self-evidence theorists such as Audi and Shafer-Landau could solve the 
problem of epistemic luck. 
 
However, adequate understanding isn’t a plausible condition on justification. As Philip 
Stratton-Lake (2016: 4-9) has recently argued while criticising the self-evidence view, 
adequately understanding a self-evident moral p cannot justify the corresponding moral 
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belief in p. For instance, ‘because I understand that pleasure is better than agony’ seems 
an odd response to the question ‘Why do you believe that pleasure is better than agony?’. 
Or, it seems odd to justify the belief that pleasure is better than agony by appeal to 
adequately understanding it. Where does this oddity come from? According to Stratton-
Lake, epistemic justification for beliefs in synthetic propositions requires evidence, where 
evidence is ‘…something that raises the (epistemic) probability of the truth of the 
proposition for which it is evidence’ (Stratton-Lake 2016: 5). But our understanding of a 
synthetic apriori proposition does not provide evidence for its truth.21 So, understanding 
a synthetic (moral) proposition cannot justify believing it.  
 
It is important to stress that this issue runs deep and cannot be fixed easily. For instance, 
suppose self-evidence theorists just claimed that moral intuitions about apriori synthetic 
moral propositions – instead of adequate understanding – provide evidence for their truth. 
But that doesn’t address the issue. After all, as Stratton-Lake points out, ‘…our intuition 
of a self-evident proposition cannot justify us in believing that proposition […] because 
an intuition is, on [Audi’s] account, a certain type of belief, and my belief that p cannot 
justify my belief that p.’ (Stratton-Lake 2016: 9). So, it remains unclear what justifies 
moral beliefs on the self-evidence version of moral intuitionism. That, though, proves 
highly problematic for the view, especially given the key role the justifying force of 
adequate understanding is supposed to play in addressing the worry about epistemic 
                                                
21 Apart from some self-referential cases such as ‘I understand this proposition’ (cf. Stratton-Lake 2016: 5). 
But these cases don’t bear on self-evident moral propositions.  
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luck.22 So, it looks like the view faces what we might call the justification problem.23 And 
that might be enough to start looking for alternatives.24 
 
The second proposal takes adequate understanding not as a justifier, but as a necessary 
condition on the justificatory power of intellectual seemings. So, the idea is that the 
intellectual seeming that honesty is a virtue justifies the corresponding moral belief only if 
it is grounded in adequate understanding. This seems to be what, on a charitable 
interpretation, Stratton-Lake (2016) suggests. In more detail, he writes that 
‘…understanding is a necessary condition of a seeming having the sort of justificatory 
force it has by figuring in the right sort of explanation of why that proposition seems true.’ 
(Stratton-Lake 2016: 17). So, for your intellectual seeming that p to justify your belief 
that p, you must adequately understand that p.25 
 
                                                
22 Of course, Stratton-Lake’s argument might not be water-tight. Here are two ways of pushing back. First, 
self-evidence theorists might point out that responding ‘Because I believe p’ to the question ‘Why do you 
believe (self-evident) p?’ loses some of its oddity when we spell out exactly what adequately understanding 
that p entails. After all, adequate understanding, at least on some conceptions, might be factive: if you 
adequately understand p, p is true. So, adequately understanding that p seems to raise the epistemic 
probability of the truth of p – and therefore counts as evidence in favour of p. For instance, suppose I ask 
you why you believe that 5 + 7 = 12. You answer my question by saying that you adequately understand 
that 5 + 7 = 12. By that, you don’t just mean that you know what it says, but that you are able to correctly 
apply it, see some of its logical implications, and so forth. In that case, it strikes me that your adequate 
understanding of 5 + 7 = 12 gives you at least some evidence for believing it to be true. Second, another 
issue arises for Stratton-Lake’s probabilistic account of evidence. Synthetic apriori propositions are either 
true or false as a matter of (conceptual or metaphysical) necessity. If they are necessarily true, their 
probability must be 1. Conversely, if they are false, their probability must be 0. Given that their probability 
must either be 1 or 0, it makes little sense to understand evidence for synthetic apriori propositions as raising 
the probability of their truth. As a result, it remains somewhat moot why adequate understanding of p could 
or should be evidence for p. (See Clarke-Doane forthcoming 2017 for a similar worry.) However, at the 
end of the day, I don’t need Stratton-Lake’s argument to be water-tight. Rather, it suffices if it shows that 
self-evidence theorists struggle with justification, while other version of moral intuitionism don’t. That 
alone is reason to prefer the latter over the former. 
23 According to Stratton-Lake, that is not the only problem for the view. Rather, the self-evidence view also 
struggles to accommodate the recalcitrance of moral intuitions: sometimes, we intuit p without believing 
that p. For instance, a moral error theorist might intuit that pleasure is better than suffering, yet fail to 
believe so due to her theoretical commitments. See Stratton-Lake 2016: 9-15 for further discussion. 
24 According to Stratton-Lake, this means that self-evidence and adequate understanding shouldn’t play a 
distinctive role in intuitionist moral epistemology. That, though, turns out to be slightly misleading: as we 
shall see shortly, he seems to think that adequate can play a role in moral intuitionism, just not the role of 
a justifier. 
25 Elsewhere, Stratton-Lake calls such justifying intellectual seemings clear, i.e. ‘[b]y getting a proposition 
clearly in view I mean pretty much what Audi calls having an adequate understanding of it’ (Stratton-Lake 
2016: 13, fn.25), and insists that only moral beliefs formed on the basis of such intellectual seemings suffice 
for knowledge. However, as I shall explain below, this combination of theoretical commitments renders 
Stratton-Lake’s view unattractive. 
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Given Stratton-Lake’s proposal regarding the role adequate understanding should play, 
the intellectual seemings version of moral intuitionism quite straightforwardly 
accommodates Gettier-style counterexamples like Brain Lesion. After all, if you don’t 
adequately understand that honesty is a virtue and justification requires adequate 
understanding, you are not justified in believing that honesty is a virtue in Brain Lesion. 
But, since, on any form of moral intuitionism, justification is necessary for intuitive moral 
knowledge, you don’t know that honesty is a virtue. In that manner, Stratton-Lake’s view 
avoids the problem of epistemic luck. Further, unlike the self-evidence version of moral 
intuitionism just discussed, Stratton-Lake’s form of the intellectual seemings view doesn’t 
face the justification problem. After all, as both Huemer (2005: §5.1.) and Stratton-Lake 
(2016: 13) stress, intellectual seemings are comparable to perceptual seemings – and 
perceptual seemings can justify corresponding perceptual beliefs. For instance, if it seems 
to you that the Swiss flag features a white cross and you form a perceptual belief on the 
basis of such a perceptual seeming (and you are unaware of any defeaters), your perceptual 
belief that the Swiss flag features a white cross is justified. Similarly, if you form a moral 
belief based on your intellectual seeming that enjoyment is better than suffering (and you 
are not aware of any defeaters), your corresponding moral belief is justified. So, it looks 
like the intellectual seemings version of moral intuitionism avoids the problem with 
justification that the self-evidence version of the view faces.26 
 
Contrary to initial appearances, however, we should still not opt for Stratton-Lake’s view 
– and thus the second way of integrating adequate understanding into moral intuitionism. 
How so? Stratton-Lake’s view seems to run into – what I shall call – the conflation problem: 
it conflates the distinction between justification and knowledge. To see that, it suffices to 
reconsider the Brain Lesion scenario: according to Stratton-Lake, the epistemic subject is 
neither justified in believing nor knows that honesty is a virtue, given that she doesn’t 
adequately understand – and adequate understanding is a necessary condition on the 
justificatory power of intellectual seemings. That verdict, though, seem implausible: 
intuitively, the subject in that scenario does have a justified belief, yet not knowledge, that 
honesty is a virtue. After all, she has the corresponding intellectual seeming – and isn’t 
aware of any defeaters for it. So, why wouldn’t her moral belief be justified? While 
Stratton-Lake’s proposal might address the problem of epistemic luck, it does so only at 
the cost of blurring a widely accepted distinction between justification and knowledge. 
That cost, of course, might not be decisive. Still, it strikes me as providing motivation 
enough to seek a form of moral intuitionism that doesn’t incur that cost. 
 
                                                
26 The intellectual seemings view also neatly accommodates the recalcitrance of moral intuitions: we need 
not believe what seems true to us. See Stratton-Lake 2016: 9-15 for further discussion. 
104  
The third and final way of integrating adequate understanding into moral intuitionism 
construes adequate understanding as a distinctive necessary anti-luck condition on 
intuitive moral knowledge. In other words, for you to know by intuition that, say, honesty 
is a virtue, you must adequately understand it. Importantly, unlike the other two options 
examined above, adequate understanding neither justifies nor is required for having a 
justified moral belief based on a corresponding intellectual seeming. The resulting view 
says that you know an intuitive moral proposition p if you (truly) believe that p, justified 
on the basis of a veridical intellectual seeming that p, which results from adequately 
understanding p. 
 
This seems to be what Michael Huemer (2005: 123-27) has in mind. To address the 
problem of epistemic luck or ‘…to explain how it would be anything more than chance 
if my moral beliefs were true’ (123), Huemer sketches a more general account of apriori 
knowledge that prominently features adequate understanding as an anti-luck condition. 
His account contains four key elements (cf. 2005: 124-26): (i.) that mind-independent 
universals (including moral properties and relations) exist necessarily, (ii.) that having an 
adequate (i.e. consistent, clear, and determinate) concept constitutes the grasping of a 
mind-independent universal, (iii.) that adequately grasping a universal puts you in a 
position to see that it has certain properties and/or relations to other universals that one 
adequately grasps, and (iv.) that all apriori knowledge derives from knowledge of 
universals. Together with plenitude, i.e. the claim that having an adequate concept suffices 
for grasping a universal and thus that ‘there is no possibility of one’s failing to refer to 
anything…’ (126),27 (i.) to (iv.) allow Huemer to argue that  ‘…when one’s intuitions are 
caused (only) by clear, consistent, and determinate understanding […] the internal 
process by which one forms beliefs guarantees their truth’ (2005: 126). So, adequate 
understanding effectively serves as an anti-luck condition on intuitive apriori knowledge. 
And it is easy to see how this condition allows Huemer to handle cases involving moral 
belief such as Brain Lesion: your intellectual seeming that honesty is a virtue is caused by 
your brain lesion, not adequate understanding. Therefore, you cannot have intuitive 
moral knowledge. 
 
Importantly, Huemer’s way of integrating adequate understanding into moral 
intuitionism neither faces the justification problem nor the conflation problem. To begin 
with, intellectual seemings about moral propositions still serve as the justifier for 
corresponding moral beliefs. So, unlike the self-evidence version of moral intuitionism, 
                                                
27 Werner (2018) alerts us to the crucial role of plenitude in Huemer’s account, which he characterizes as 
follows: ‘For every possible adequate (consistent, clear, and determinate) concept, there is a corresponding 
mind-independent universal’ (622). We shall return to discussing plenitude in §4 below. 
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we have a plausible story about what justifies basic moral beliefs. Further, unlike Stratton-
Lake’s version of the view, it doesn’t conflate the distinction between justification and 
knowledge. After all, according to Huemer, you do have a justified belief in Brain Lesion, 
given your corresponding intellectual seeming. Still, you don’t know, given that your 
intellectual seemings isn’t caused by adequate understanding. So, Huemer’s view respects 
our intuitive epistemic verdict about Brain Lesion – and thus doesn’t conflate justification 
and knowledge. That, though, is good news: it shows that there is a version of moral 
intuitionism, namely Huemer’s (2005), that addresses the problem of epistemic luck, yet 
doesn’t do so at the cost of complicating moral justification or violating central tenets of 
epistemological theorizing. Therefore, if we want to be intuitionists about moral 
knowledge, we should endorse a view according to which you know (an intuitive moral) 
p if you (truly) believe that p, justified on the basis of a veridical intellectual seeming that 
p that results from adequately understanding p. 
 
Where does this leave us? In this section, I have argued that there are conceptual tools 
available to moral intuitionists to handle the problem of epistemic luck raised in Chapter 
2, namely an appeal to adequate understanding. But, as I have shown above, it isn’t 
obvious what role adequate understanding should play within the architecture of 
intuitionist moral epistemology. In response, I have made the case that adequate 
understanding is most plausibly construed as a necessary anti-luck condition on intuitive 
moral knowledge, since that avoids complicating moral justification and its relationship 
to moral knowledge. As a result, we end up with a version of moral intuitionism close to 
the one defended by Huemer (2005). But can this view double as an effective response to 
the best evolutionary explanation argument that I developed in Chapter 4? The next 
section addresses that question in depth. 
 
4 .  Mor a l  In tu i t ion i sm a nd  the  Bes t  Evo lu t iona r y  
Exp l a na t ion  Ar gument  
 
In this section, my aim is to examine whether moral intuitionists can respond to the best 
evolutionary explanation argument identified in Chapter 4. I first set the stage by re-
introducing the argument, outlining the desiderata on any plausible response and arguing 
that moral intuitionism, by itself, doesn’t meet them (§4.1). Then, I suggest that 
supplementing the view with a third-factor explanation of moral reliability seems to do 
the trick instead (§4.2). However, as I argue, any such explanation must rely only on 
formal moral intuitions to avoid begging the question (§4.3) – and those intuitions cannot 
underwrite substantive belief about morality (§4.4). So, moral intuitionists cannot 
respond to the best evolutionary explanation argument of Chapter 4. By implication, 
robust moral realists are saddled with implausible moral scepticism: they cannot make 
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sense of moral knowledge or even justified beliefs about morality, construed as a realm of 
robustly moral facts. 
 
4.1.  Setting the Stage 
 
In Chapter 4, I argued that the following is a powerful abductive argument against robust 
moral realism:  
 
(1) Evolutionary, not robustly moral, facts best explain why we hold certain moral 
beliefs and not others. (Or, robustly moral facts are dispensable to the best 
explanations of our moral beliefs.) 
(2) If our moral beliefs are not best explained by robustly moral facts and there are 
no additional, non-abductive reasons for maintaining them, that defeats their 
justification. (Or, if robust moral facts are dispensable to the best explanation of 
our moral beliefs and there are no additional, non-abductive reasons for 
maintaining them, that defeats the justification of those beliefs (that purport to 
represent them).) 
(3) There are no additional, non-abductive reasons for belief in robust moral facts. 
(4) Therefore, (attention to) facts about evolution defeat the justification of our 
moral beliefs, robustly construed. 
 
Importantly, this argument, as seen in Chapter 4, shifts the argumentative burden onto 
robust moral realism. The burden amounts to an epistemological challenge, based on the 
principle that ‘[i]f the truth and content of our moral beliefs is not involved in the best 
[evolutionary] explanation for our possession of them, then we need additional reasons to 
believe them’ (Woods 2016: 6; emphasis mine). And if robust moral realists cannot meet 
the challenge by providing such additional, non-abductive reasons, they acquire an 
undermining defeater for the justification of their moral beliefs. Moral scepticism follows. 
 
What does it take to resist this argument? In Chapter 4, I suggested that the most 
promising way involves questioning the truth of premise (3) by offering plausible non-
abductive reasons for maintaining robust moral belief. That way, robust moral realists 
could meet the challenge head-on and straightforwardly discharge the argumentative 
burden. But what do such reasons look like? In Chapter 4, I critically examined a recent, 
widely discussed proposal by David Enoch (2012, 2016): that robust moral facts are 
indispensable to practical deliberation – and that this gives us reason to believe in their 
existence. In my view, that proposal fails. Its failure, though, proves instructive for our 
purposes. More precisely, I take it to reveal a minimal standard of plausibility for any non-
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explanatory reason to maintain robust moral beliefs. How so? As David Plunkett and 
Tristram McPherson (2015) point out, deliberative indispensability, construed as a 
pragmatic vindication of the basic sources of epistemic justification,28 conflicts with a 
distinctive feature of epistemic justification, namely its Truth-Directedness.29 That feature 
states that ‘the sources of basic epistemic justification have the content that they do (in 
part) because of some positive connection between those sources and the truth of the 
beliefs that they govern’ (2015: 114). Deliberative indispensability violates this constraint 
because ‘…the fact that the belief that p is indispensable to our deliberative projects bears 
no positive relationship to the truth of p’ (2015: 121). What does that mean for us? It 
means that any plausible non-explanatory reason for maintaining robust moral beliefs 
must at least respect Truth-Directedness: it must explain how our basic moral belief-
forming methods are positively connected to the moral truth. If it failed to do so, it 
wouldn’t qualify as a plausible non-explanatory reason for robust moral belief. And if it 
didn’t give us such a reason, robust moral realists couldn’t resist the argument above by 
denying premise (3). So, the failure of deliberative indispensability helps us articulate a 
desideratum for any successful response to the best evolutionary explanation argument on 
behalf of robust moral realism. 
 
In §3 above, I argued for a Huemer-style view as the most compelling version of 
contemporary moral intuitionism. Can that view double up as a response to the critical 
argument just rehearsed? In other words, maybe some of our robust moral beliefs are based 
on veridical intellectual seemings, resulting from adequate understanding. Is that a 
plausible non-explanatory reason to maintain them? At first glance, we might think so, 
given that Huemer-style moral intuitionism seems to respect Truth-Directedness. After all, 
according to Huemer, ‘…when one’s intuitions are caused (only) by clear, consistent, and 
determinate understanding […] the internal process by which one forms beliefs 
guarantees their truth’ (2005: 126). Clearly, if everything goes right on his view, moral 
intuitions are positively connected to the moral truth. So, as long as our beliefs are based 
on moral intuition in the right way, we have reason to maintain our robust moral beliefs 
– and premise (3) of the argument above must therefore be false. 
 
                                                
28 More precisely: they take issue with the first premise of the argument in support of deliberative 
indispensability, which says that ‘…[o]ne complete ground for the fact that something is a source of basic 
epistemic justification is the fact that treating it as such a basic source is instrumentally indispensable to an 
intrinsically indispensable project [such as practical deliberation]’ (Plunkett & McPherson 2015: 110). 
29 They write that the positive connection to truth should be understood ecumenically (e.g. in terms of 
modal notions such as safety or sensitivity) and that this indeterminacy is dialectically crucial: ‘we take 
commitment to something like Truth-Directedness to be close to common ground in many parts of 
epistemology’ (116). 
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On reflection, however, that move proves too hasty. To see why, we can lean on a recent 
observation by Preston Werner (2018: 622-24). In short, he argues that Huemer’s moral 
intuitionism, as an account of moral knowledge, doesn’t just have to guarantee that our 
normative beliefs, when based on veridical intuitions grounded in adequate 
understanding, are true. Rather, moral intuitionism must also connect our thus formed 
beliefs to relevantly robust normative truths. After all, given the contingency of our 
normative conceptual framework, ‘the normative concepts that we’ve developed may not 
have latched onto the robustly normative properties [but rather only onto ‘merely’ 
normative properties]’ (2018: 620). To develop his worry, Werner first distinguishes 
between mere and robust normativity.30 The rules of chess, etiquette and legal proceedings 
are merely normative: they offer no practice-independent reason to care and aren’t 
authoritatively binding. In contrast, the edicts of morality are robustly normative: they 
have genuine normative force and are intrinsically binding.31 That, in turn, motivates a 
constraint on any adequate, non-sceptical moral epistemology that robust moral realists 
put forward: it cannot just exclude epistemic luck for some of our true, justified, 
paradigmatically normative beliefs. Instead, any such epistemology also needs to explain 
how some of our normative beliefs are about genuinely robust normative truths. Werner 
calls this requirement Content Success: ‘…at least some of our justified, first-order, and 
paradigmatically normative beliefs contain robustly normative contents’ (2018: 619).32 
 
Is there reason to think that Huemer’s moral intuitionism cannot make good on Content 
Success? To see that there is, Werner invites us to imagine Lucy and Carol. Both of them 
are in the epistemically speaking good case, by Huemer’s lights: they form moral beliefs 
on the basis of veridical intellectual seemings, resulting from adequate understanding. In 
other words, their moral concepts are adequate, allowing them to successfully refer to and 
thus grasp mind-independent moral properties. They both have intuitive moral 
knowledge. But here is the rub: by stipulation, Lucy and Carol have moral intuitions with 
inconsistent normative contents. While Lucy has the intuition that lying is intrinsically 
bad, Carol has the intuition that lying is not intrinsically bad.33 How can we make sense 
                                                
30 Werner (2018) calls it ‘formal’, not ‘mere’, normativity. However, I reserve ‘formal’ for a slightly different 
notion introduced in §4.3 below. 
31 More precisely: ‘An entity is robustly normative iff it is either fundamentally intrinsically binding (in the 
way that [merely] normative entities are not), or not fully explicable without reference to some 
fundamentally intrinsically binding entity’ (Werner 2018: 618). 
32 Werner also stresses that any adequate moral epistemology must meet the anti-luck condition and Content 
Success simultaneously with respect to many of the same beliefs. In other words, it must show that Overlap 
is true: ‘at least some of our justified, first-order, and paradigmatically normative beliefs are both non-
accidentally true and contain robustly normative contents’ (619). 
33 As Werner (2018: 623f.) points out, Huemer cannot just respond by denying the possibility of such cases. 
After all, according to him, the defining characteristics of adequately grasping, namely consistency, clarity 
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of this incompatibility on Huemer’s picture? Plausibly, rather than being mistaken, they 
both have different moral concepts altogether, namely BADNESS (Lucy) and BADNESS 
(Carol). They wouldn’t genuinely disagree but talk past each other. That diagnosis, though, 
raises an important question: which moral concept adequately characterizes the robustly 
normative property? According to Werner, Huemer’s moral intuitionism ‘…has provided 
no reason to accept that Lucy’s normative concepts actually refer to the robustly normative 
properties, and thus no reason to accept that her normative beliefs were of the robustly 
normative facts’ (624).34 In other words, Huemer’s moral epistemology, despite excluding 
epistemic luck, doesn’t meet Content Success. It thus isn’t a fully adequate moral 
epistemology for robust moral realism. 
 
What implications does that have for our dialectic? Werner’s discussion shows that 
Huemer’s moral intuitionism isn’t sufficient as a response to the best evolutionary 
explanation argument.35 Sure, the view offers a positive, non-accidental connection to 
moral truth – and thus, unlike deliberative indispensability, appears to satisfy Truth-
Directedness. However, as it stands, it struggles to meet Content Success, failing to explain 
why our moral beliefs connects to the right kind of moral truth. In other words, Huemer’s 
moral intuitionism might give us a non-abductive reason to maintain our moral beliefs, 
yet not those in robust moral facts. So, to call into question the truth of premise (3) and 
sabotage the argument above, moral intuitionism requires further revision. But what 
might that look like? 
 
4.2.  Third-Factor Explanations 
 
In this sub-section, my aim is to argue that moral intuitionists should supplement their 
view with a third-factor explanation of moral reliability. Such an explanation promises to 
satisfy the remaining desideratum articulated above: it explains why our moral beliefs, 
based on the right kind of intuition and grounded in conceptual competence, connect to 
robustly moral truths. 
                                                
and determinacy, are intrinsic or belong to the concepts themselves. So, as long as those characteristics are 
present, an epistemic subject would grasp moral properties, irrespective of whether they are ultimately robust 
or not. 
34 In response, why couldn’t Huemer pack into Lucy’s concept that it refers to robustly normative badness, 
if it refers at all? Because this, as Werner helpfully points out, means rejecting Plenitude, which implies that 
Non-Accidentality is no longer met, given that ‘…there becomes a non-trivial chance that an adequate concept 
will fail to target any property’ (2018: 624). 
35 To some extent, that is unsurprising. Sure, moral intuitionism features a no-defeater clause. However, it 
doesn’t tell us in detail when and why that clause remains met. Adding adequate understanding as an anti-
luck condition takes care of one source of defeat, namely knowledge-undermining epistemic luck. But it 
doesn’t address other kinds of defeaters, including the one articulated by the best evolutionary explanation 
argument. So, moral intuitionism requires supplementation, which I shall provide below. 
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In response to evolutionary debunking arguments, robust moral realist such as David 
Enoch (2010, 2012: Ch. 7), Knut Olav Skarsaune (2011), Erik Wielenberg (2010) and 
others have recently defended so-called third-factor explanations of moral reliability.36 For 
them, the challenge raised by those arguments consists in explaining the correlation 
between our moral beliefs and the corresponding robust moral truths. As we saw in 
Chapter 2, explaining that correlation is complicated by two prominent features of robust 
realist metaphysics. On the one hand, moral beliefs cannot be caused by moral truths, 
given their causal inefficacy and irreducibility to natural truths. And on the other, moral 
beliefs cannot ground moral truths, given their objectivity. So, those realists propose a 
third factor: a putative normative truth such as that survival is good (Enoch), pain is bad 
(Skarsaune) or that we, as human beings, have certain moral rights (Wielenberg). That 
normative truth, despite being shaped by evolutionary forces, causes our moral beliefs, 
while at the same time constituting or cohering with the robust moral truths. In that 
manner, the third factor explains the correlation (or, in Enoch’s terminology: pre-
establishes the harmony) between our moral beliefs and their corresponding robust moral 
truths. So, the mystery of moral reliability has been dispelled. 
 
Admittedly, third-factor explanations were originally developed in the context of the 
reliability challenge to robust moral realism. As I argued in Chapter 2, that challenge – 
interpreted modally – does not amount to more than the problem of epistemic luck and 
is therefore unlikely to motivate evolutionary debunking. So, there might be no need for 
third-factor explanations in response to the reliability challenge. That, though, doesn’t 
mean that we cannot combine them with moral intuitionism and put them to work in 
our context. After all, that combination promises to meet the two desiderata we discussed 
above on any plausible response to the best evolutionary explanation argument. 
 
First off, recall Truth-Directedness, which says that ‘the sources of basic epistemic 
justification have the content that they do (in part) because of some positive connection 
between those sources and the truth of the beliefs that they govern’ (Plunkett & 
McPherson 2015: 114). As we saw above, Huemer’s moral intuitionism already seems to 
satisfy that requirement. At least when one’s moral intuitions result from adequate 
understanding, they are a basic moral belief-forming method positively connected to the 
moral truth. Still, adding a third-factor explanation might render the account even deeper 
and powerful, situating moral intuitions squarely within a broadly evolutionary 
framework. 
                                                
36 See also Brosnan 2011 and Schafer 2010. 
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Second and more importantly, appealing to a third-factor explanation promises to help 
moral intuitionists with respect to Werner’s (2018) Content Success. This requirement 
states that any suitably non-sceptical moral epistemology needs to explain how some of 
our justified normative beliefs are about genuinely robust normative truths. As we saw 
above, moral intuitionism alone doesn’t offer anything to address that, even once we add 
adequate understanding as an anti-luck condition. However, a third-factor explanation 
might help. Suppose it is a robust normative fact that survival is good (as Enoch suggests) 
– and robust moral realists are entitled to that supposition. Further, suppose that, as any 
third-factor explanation states, this fact causes our corresponding normative belief. In that 
case, we have least one normative belief that is about a robustly normative fact, namely 
the goodness of survival. Further, that robustly normative fact makes up, entails or coheres 
with other robustly normative facts such as, say, that avoiding danger is (pro tanto) good. 
Then, by figuring out how those facts relate to each other, we can acquire further beliefs 
about robustly normative facts. In this manner, third-factor explanations can help moral 
intuitionism give an account of how some of our normative beliefs, based on veridical 
intellectual seemings resulting from adequate understanding, concern genuinely robust 
normative truths. Content Success can be met after all.37 
 
But how plausible is that strategy overall? Many have argued that third-factor explanations 
beg the question against the evolutionary debunker. In the remainder of §4, I shall tackle 
this issue in depth. As I suggest, such explanations aren’t problematically circular, yet fail 
to underwrite most of our substantive moral beliefs. By implication, third-factor 
explanations cannot stave off the sceptical worry raised by best evolutionary explanation 
argument in Chapter 4. 
 
4.3.  Formal Moral Intuitions and Begging the Question 
 
Third-factor explanations crucially hinge on a normative claim such as that, say, survival 
is good. But doesn’t that beg the question against the evolutionary debunker? In this sub-
section, I argue that it does not. But to avoid begging the question, such explanation must 
rely on formal moral intuitions exclusively.38 As the first step of my argument, I clarify the 
                                                
37 In fact, David Enoch (2012: 177-84) sketches such a line in response to the worry that robust moral 
realists cannot explain semantic access to moral properties. 
38 Behrends (2013) also develops a third-factor explanation along those lines. However, he simply assumes 
that relying on formal moral (or normative) assumptions does not beg the question in the context of third-
factor explanations of moral reliability. That assumption, however, is itself highly controversial and in need 
of detailed defense. And that defense is exactly what I offer in this sub-section. For more on Behrends 
(2013), see §4.3.4 below. 
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issue by distinguishing defeater-deflectors from defeater-defeaters (§4.3.1.). Then, I 
suggest that formal moral intuitions, such as that betterness is transitive, can serve as 
defeater-deflectors, given their likely exemption from noxious evolutionary influence 
(§4.3.2.). Finally, after addressing a complication with the origins of moral reliability 
(§4.3.3.), I propose a third factor derived purely from formal moral intuitions (§4.3.4.). 
 
4.3.1.   Begging The Question and Deflecting Defeat 
 
Many critics of third-factor explanations argue that they beg the question.39 After all, such 
explanations crucially depend on a normative claim such as that survival is good, that pain 
is bad, and so forth. Without that claim, nothing pre-establishes the harmony between 
moral beliefs and robustly moral facts. But, of course, the best evolutionary explanation 
argument articulates a potential undermining defeater for exactly such claims. Or, more 
precisely, the argument asks for non-explanatory reasons for robustly moral beliefs. In 
response, robust moral realists cannot just assume that some of their moral beliefs are true 
– and that this gives them such a reason to maintain their robustly moral beliefs. Doing 
so would be dialectically inappropriate. So, by depending on a normative claim, third-
factor explanations assume ab initio what they set out to prove. Now, the validity of this 
criticism has been hotly debated in the literature.40 In fact, Katia Vavova (2015) goes so 
far as to call it the ‘heart of the debate between the realist and the debunker’ (111). Still, 
no resolution has been reached yet. So, how can we make progress on the issue? 
 
To make progress, we should heed the lessons from a parallel debate in religious 
epistemology about Alvin Plantinga’s (1993) evolutionary argument against naturalism. 
According Plantinga, those who accept naturalism and evolutionary theory have a defeater 
for the belief that their cognitive faculties are reliable. By implication, all their beliefs are 
defeated, including their beliefs in naturalism.41 For critics, it is crucial to determine which 
beliefs they may use to respond to this potential evolutionary defeater. As Andrew Moon 
(2017) suggests, those critics face a situation similar to the one that proponents of third-
                                                
39 See Fraser 2014: 471, Street 2008 or Vavova 2015: 111. In response, Berker 2014, Schafer 2010 and 
White 2010 argue that circularity is inherent in the explanation of reliability of any class of beliefs. Note 
that those contributions are primarily concerned with versions of the evolutionary debunking argument 
based on the reliability challenge or higher-order evidence of error. However, I take their worry to carry 
over to third-factor explanations as a response to the best evolutionary explanation argument. 
40 The discussion of the self-defeat objection in Chapter 3 also touches on this issue, albeit in a different 
theoretical framework, namely in terms of defeat by higher-order evidence of error. 
41 For discussion, see Fitelsen & Sober 1998, Fodor 2002 or Ginet 1995. 
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factor explanations find themselves in vis-à-vis evolutionary debunking arguments.42 
Interestingly, most contributors to the debate about Plantinga’s argument agree that 
relying on F-faculty to avoid potential defeat of F-beliefs is not always problematically 
circular. To see that, Moon (2017: 213) urges us to consider the following scenario: 
 
XX Defeater-Deflector: You learn that a pill, called ‘XX’, destroys the 
cognitive reliability of 95% of those who ingest it. Before taking the pill, 
however, a scientist you know to be trustworthy informs you that you are one 
of the 5% who is immune to the drug. You then take XX while knowing that 
you are one of the immune 5% and P(R/Iʹve ingested XX and I am one of 
the immune 5%) is high. 
 
Usually, believing that you have ingested XX and that XX destroys cognitive reliability 
gives you a defeater for R: that human cognitive faculties are generally reliable. But above, 
things are different: the scientific testimony you acquire before taking XX serves as – what 
Moon (2017) and others call – a defeater-deflector.43 A defeater deflector is a belief (or 
proposition) that prevents a potential defeater from becoming an actual defeater. Here, 
your belief that you are one of the immune 5% deflects the potential defeater that you 
have ingested XX and P (R/You’ve ingested XX) is low. Put differently, the potential 
defeater ‘…would never gain defeating power in the first place’ (Moon 2017: 213), or you 
never have reason to doubt your cognitive reliability. Epistemically speaking, there is 
nothing to worry about. Importantly, the case illustrates that avoiding potential defeat of 
F-beliefs by relying on the F-faculty itself can sometimes be epistemically innocuous. In 
the scenario above, you would not beg the question by insisting that you were XX-
immune or cognitively reliable. That, however, is an important insight, for it tells us how 
robust moral realists must interpret their third-factor explanations. For those not to beg 
the question or be objectionably circular, the normative claim at their heart must serve as 
a defeater-deflector. Or, put differently: for the third-factor explanations to work, robust 
moral realists must plausibly be in an epistemic situation comparable to the XX Defeater-
Deflector case above.44 
 
                                                
42 Moon’s (2017) discussion focuses on the evolutionary debunking argument based on the principle that 
reliability requires explanation developed in Chapter 2. However, I take his suggestion to generalize to 
arguments based on other principles, including that that justification requires explanation. 
43 See Plantinga 2002: 224, fn. 30, and Moon 2017: 211. 
44 Moon (2017: 221) is ultimately agnostic about whether the third-factor explanations provide robust moral 
realist with a defeater-deflector, but has a hunch that they do not. 
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However, we might worry that robust moral realists don’t find themselves in anything 
close to XX Defeater-Deflector. As Michael Klenk (2017) suggests, their situation differs 
significantly. The scenario above prominently features trustworthy scientific testimony to 
corroborate one’s immunity to the noxious, cognition-destroying effects of the XX pill. 
But nothing plausibly plays that role for the robust moral realist in an evolutionary 
debunking scenario. After all, all their moral beliefs have an evolutionary history. Thus, 
they lack an independent, reliable source of moral information.45 But without such a 
source, why think that robust moral realists are immune to distorting evolutionary 
influence? At best, they find themselves in the equivalent of the following scenario:  
 
XX Defeater-Defeater: You learn that a pill, called ‘XX’, destroys the cognitive 
reliability of 95% of those who ingest it. Two hours after having taken the 
pill, a scientist you know to be trustworthy informs you that you are one of 
the 5% who is immune to the drug. You come to believe that you are one of 
the immune 5% and that P(R/Iʹve ingested XX and I am one of the immune 
5%) is high.46 
 
Here, unlike above, believing that you have ingested XX and that XX destroys cognitive 
reliability does give you a defeater for R: that human cognitive faculties are generally 
reliable. After all, the scientific testimony you acquire after taking XX cannot serve as a 
defeater-deflector. Rather, it would have to play the role of a defeater-defeater: a belief (or 
proposition) that defeats something that is already an actual defeater.47 But, importantly, 
the defeater-defeater is clearly inadmissible in this context: given that you knowingly took 
the reliability-destroying XX pill, you already have reason to distrust any belief you form 
going forward, including the belief that you are XX-immune, based on putative scientific 
testimony.48 So, an appeal to scientific testimony would beg the question in XX Defeater-
Defeater. And if the robust moral realist’s epistemic position is relevantly similar, so would 
their appeal to a third factor. Accordingly, proponents of third-factor explanations 
wouldn’t avoid the charge of begging the question.49 
                                                
45 In Klenk’s (2017) own words: ‘…in the moral case, we would have to accept another extremely 
controversial assumption: namely, that the scientist’s testimony is reliable in the first place’ (236). 
46 See Moon 2017: 213. 
47 See Moon 2017: 211. 
48 Or, more technically: ‘any potential defeater-defeater will itself already be defeated by the original defeater 
for R’ (Moon 2017: 210). 
49 Klenk (2017: 232-36) also criticizes the XX Defeater-Deflector case in another regard: according to him, 
it is committed to epistemic externalism (about defeat), which is incompatible with robust moral realism. 
Since I argue below that robust moral realists don’t occupy a position relevantly similar to the XX Defeater-
Deflector case anyway, Klenk’s criticism misses the mark. Thus, I won’t engage with it further here. 
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4.3.2.   Deflecting Defeat with Formal Moral Intuitions 
 
But Klenk’s worry proves unfounded, as I shall argue now. Sure, robust moral realists, 
and especially moral intuitionists, may not be in a situation as favorable as the XX 
Defeater-Deflector case. But neither are they in a position as epistemically dire as XX 
Defeater-Defeater. To see that, it suffices to highlight a significant difference between the 
nature of XX pills and evolutionary influence. The XX pill – by stipulation – destroys all 
of one’s cognitive reliability and calls all of one’s beliefs into question, except for the beliefs 
that one took the pill and that it had exactly those noxious epistemic effect.50 The potency 
of the pill neatly explains why gaining (putative) scientific testimony after taking the pill 
doesn’t improve one’s epistemic position. In contrast, evolutionary influence isn’t an all-
or-nothing affair. Rather, it is overwhelmingly likely that it didn’t disrupt all of our moral 
reliability equally. While some kinds of moral belief are at epistemic risk due to their 
evolutionary origin, others won’t be as much. Further, we might be able to tentatively 
categorize moral beliefs correspondingly and make educated guesses about how that risk 
is distributed. If that line of thought had promise, robust moral realists would most 
definitely not be as badly off as anyone stuck in XX Defeater-Defeater. Rather, they would 
have a potential defeater-deflector, namely those moral beliefs less likely affected by 
disrupting evolutionary influence. 
 
But which moral beliefs are least likely to be disrupted by evolutionary influence? 
Following Michael Huemer (2008), I think we should distinguish three kinds of moral 
intuitions – and their respective susceptibility to epistemically bad evolutionary (and 
other) influence. First, there are concrete, single-case moral intuitions. Examples include 
intuitions about Philippa Foot’s (1967) trolley cases, Peter Singer’s (1972) shallow pond 
thought-experiment, special kind obligations or the prohibition against incest. Such 
intuitions are most likely to be vulnerable to – what Huemer (2008: 376) calls – 
‘biological programming’, given their obvious link to adaptive behavior. In addition, 
concrete moral intuitions are also susceptible to other biases, especially cultural 
indoctrination, emotions and personal interest. After all, they often concern culturally 
sensitive, emotionally charged or personally significant situations.51 As a result, we should 
treat concrete moral intuitions with caution in moral theorizing. 
 
                                                
50 In the XX Defeater-Deflector case, it also leaves intact one’s belief or memory about XX-immunity, based 
on trustworthy scientific testimony acquired before taking the pill. 
51 In Huemer’s words: ‘…when we are emotional about moral issues or when our own interests are at stake, 
the danger that our intuitions will be biased is too great for us to be justified in relying on those intuitions, 
in the absence of independent corroboration’ (2008: 378). 
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Second, we have mid-level moral intuitions: intuitions about moral principles of 
intermediate generality. For instance, consider the intuition that, all things equal, one 
ought to keep one’s promises or that adultery is wrong. Such intuitions share the epistemic 
risks of concrete moral intuitions: they are equally susceptible to biological, cultural and 
emotional biases. But, additionally, mid-level moral intuitions are prone to the problem 
of overgeneralization: judging the truth of a generalization in terms of typical cases, thus 
overlooking atypical ones. For instance, we might judge that we must keep our promises, 
despite the existence of atypical cases in which breaking promises seems morally 
permissible, perhaps because doing so would save numerous human lives. Given that mid-
level moral intuitions are prone to both bias and overgeneralization, we should avoid them 
in moral theorizing. 
 
Third and finally, there are abstract moral intuitions: intuitions about very general moral 
principles. For example, take the intuition that it is wrong to treat individuals as mere 
means or that the betterness relation is transitive.52 Unlike concrete or mid-level moral 
intuitions, abstract moral intuitions are less likely to be influenced by evolutionary, 
cultural, emotional or personal bias. After all, they concern moral matters that are not 
obviously adaptive, culturally informed, emotionally charged or personally meaningful. 
Instead, they are plausibly the upshots of rational reflection. They also avoid 
overgeneralization, given that they don’t arise from considering merely typical cases.53 
Since they are largely exempt from sources of error that plague concrete or mid-level moral 
intuitions, these intuitions are unusually trustworthy – and should thus guide our moral 
theorizing. Amongst abstract moral intuitions, we should particularly focus on formal 
moral intuitions: intuitions that impose formal constraints on moral theories without 
positively or negatively evaluating anything. Despite not generating a substantive moral 
system, these intuitions may still help us adjudicate moral disagreements by ruling out 
otherwise attractive combinations of moral commitments.54 Therefore, according to 
Huemer, ‘…formal ethical intuitions should be given special weight in moral reasoning’ 
(2008: 387). 
 
How is this typology of moral intuitions (and their associated epistemic risks) relevant for 
our discussion – and, in particular, for whether the normative claim at the heart of third-
factor explanations can deflect evolutionary defeat? As we have just seen, it is plausible 
                                                
52 See Huemer 2008: 386 for more examples. 
53 By implication, as Huemer (2008: 386f.) points out, putative counterexamples lead to a paradox, as 
opposed to forcing us to give up those principles straight away. See, for instance, Rachels’ (1998) putative 
counterexamples to the transitivity of ‘better’. 
54 Take, for example, Huemer’s (2003) own criticism of welfare egalitarianism or Parfit’s (1984: 419-30) 
discussion of the repugnant conclusion. 
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that not all moral beliefs are equally subject to problematic evolutionary influence. 
Instead, some moral beliefs, namely those formed on the basis of formal moral intuitions, 
are most likely exempt. That, though, is great news for the advocate of third-factor 
explanations. After all, if robust moral realists managed to appeal to those moral (or 
normative) beliefs as their third factor, they could use them as a defeater-deflector – instead 
of a defeater-defeater. How so? Because those formal moral beliefs, like any paradigmatic 
defeater-deflector, would prevent the potential evolutionary defeater from becoming an 
actual one. With them in place, robust moral realists never gain reason to doubt their 
reliability with respect to formal moral matters. To illustrate, they would find themselves 
in an epistemic situation relevantly similar to this: 
 
YY Color Defeater-Deflector: You learn that a pill, called ‘YY’, destroys the 
reliability of color vision in 100% of people who ingest it. Two hours after 
taking the pill, a scientist you know to be trustworthy informs you that, upon 
further inquiry, it turns out that the pill doesn’t affect all color vision equally: 
while it renders the perception of blue and green tones unreliable, it leaves 
perception of red tones intact. You come to form a corresponding belief about 
the partial reliability of your color vision.55 
 
Here, just like in the problematic XX Defeater-Defeater case, you receive the trustworthy 
scientific testimony after taking the pill. However, this case differs in two crucial, 
redemptive respects.  
 
To begin with, the YY pill doesn’t destroy your cognitive reliability totally or globally. 
Rather, it only negatively affects your color vision. As a result, it is epistemically 
permissible for you to rely on scientific testimony and any cognitive capacity other than 
color vision. Similarly, evolutionary influence doesn’t negatively affect all the robust moral 
realist’s cognitive faculties. Most likely, she can trust her basic perceptual, inductive, 
arithmetical, logical and even some other apriori belief-forming processes, despite their 
evolutionary history. Importantly, that implies that robust moral realists can also help 
themselves to the typology of moral intuitions (and their associated epistemic risks) above. 
After all, devising the typology combines scientific theorizing (about the scope of 
evolutionary explanations), non-moral philosophical reasoning (about their epistemic 
implications) and the minimal moral phenomenology required to identify kinds of moral 
                                                
55 This is very loosely inspired by a case about color vision introduced by Moon (2017: 219f.) and discussed 
by Klenk (2017: 238-40). Importantly, their case doesn’t feature partial reliability of color vision – and 
doesn’t spell out the analogy with moral belief at all. 
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intuitions. None of those cognitive process has been negatively affected by evolutionary 
influence.56 
 
Second, YY Color Defeater-Deflector above has yet another crucial, redemptive feature: 
once you rely on the scientific testimony, you learn that not all color beliefs are suspect. 
The pill actually only defeats blue and green color beliefs, while leaving red ones 
undefeated. Similarly, once robust moral realists take the typology of moral intuitions 
(and their associated epistemic risks) into account, they recognize that not all moral 
intuitions are dubious. Rather, noxious evolutionary influence only concerns concrete and 
mid-level moral intuitions, while formal moral intuitions are off the hook. That, in turn, 
means that robust moral realists don’t occupy epistemic conditions as dire as XX Defeater-
Defeater. In fact, they have access to a defeater-deflector, namely beliefs based on formal 
moral intuitions. And if those moral beliefs could play the role of a third factor, the 
resulting explanation would not beg the question against the evolutionary debunker. So, 
the worry introduced in §4.3.1 above proves unfounded. 
 
4.3.3.   A Complication: Contesting the Origins of Moral Reliability 
 
Before wrapping up my argument that third-factor explanations do not always beg the 
question, let me address one complication. You might issue the following complaint: the 
typology of moral intuitions (and their associated epistemic risks) only shows that a certain 
sub-set of moral beliefs are unlikely to be defeated by evolutionary influence. But, 
importantly, the typology doesn’t establish that those beliefs are reliable.57 (Analogously, 
we might ask in the YY Color Defeater-Deflector introduced above: why think that 
undefeated red beliefs are reliable in the first place?) So, some distinctively non-moral 
vindication of moral reliability seems still required. But, you might continue, it is hard to 
see where that would come from.58 For instance, take evolutionary considerations. While 
such considerations might help vindicate perceptual, logical or epistemological beliefs as 
reliably formed, the same cannot be said for robustly moral beliefs.59 After all, as we have 
                                                
56 The capacity for moral phenomenology (i.e. seemings with distinctively moral contents) is most likely 
adaptive, even if having veridical seemings or corresponding true robustly moral beliefs is not. 
57 Klenk (2017: 238-42) seems to voice a complaint along those lines. He argues that robust moral realists 
can employ undefeated sources of moral belief as a defeater-deflector ‘…only if they can tap into a source 
of information that is both distinct from (i.e. not a product of) the deliverances of moral cognition and yet 
indicative of the reliability of moral cognition’ (Klenk 2017: 240). However, it remains unclear whether 
Klenk criticizes as nuanced a proposal as the one I developed above. So, the following complaint is a 
charitable reconstruction. 
58 See Chapter 2 for what makes explaining moral reliability tricky. 
59 See de Cruz et al. 2011 for an evolutionary vindication of epistemology, Schechter 2013 for logic and 
Boudry & Vlerick 2014 for perception. 
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heard by now, evolutionary explanations of moral beliefs don’t avert to their truth. In 
addition, robust moral realists typically don’t accept empirical vindications anyway, given 
their commitment to robustly moral properties.60 So, it looks like robust moral realists 
cannot just appeal to formal moral intuitions as defeater-deflectors. Rather, they face a 
further, significant hurdle: explaining why those moral intuitions are reliable in the first 
place. 
 
On reflection, however, this complaint can be dismissed rather straightforwardly. First, 
the robust moral realist might reject the demand for an evolutionary vindication of moral 
reliability as dialectically inappropriate. To argue for that, we distinguish two kinds of tasks 
in epistemological theorizing: vindicating a source of information – and merely showing 
that it remains undefeated. Importantly, our context seems to require only the latter, not 
the former. To see that, recall XX Defeater-Deflector: initially, you consider yourself 
cognitively reliable. Then, there is a potential defeater for cognitive reliability, namely the 
XX-pill. Finally, before ingesting the pill, you receive trustworthy scientific testimony that 
the defeater won’t apply to you. Importantly, the scientific testimony doesn’t have to 
establish or vindicate your cognitive reliability. Rather, it only has to inform you that the 
defeater won’t apply. Similarly, consider the epistemic situation that robust moral realists 
find themselves in, namely a moral analogue of the YY Color Defeater-Deflector 
developed above. To wit, the typology of moral intuitions (and their associated epistemic 
risks) results from a combination of scientific theorizing, non-moral philosophical 
thinking as well as moral phenomenology. Importantly, those forms of reasoning, 
themselves undefeated and potentially evolutionarily vindicated, don’t need to establish 
that formal moral intuitions are reliable. Rather, they only have to make the case that the 
evolutionary defeater isn’t likely to apply – which they seem to do in compelling fashion. 
So, the complaint that formal moral intuitions haven’t been shown to be reliable risks 
conflating an important distinction between vindication and showing the absence of 
defeat. As a result, the complaint formulates a demand that is dialectically unfitting.  
 
Second, suppose that the demand for vindicating moral reliability is legitimate, contrary 
to what I have just argued. Even then, the robust moral realist isn’t lost, for she can 
plausibly accommodate the demand. After all, it is very likely that formal moral intuitions 
– unlike concrete and mid-level ones – are the product of a more general capacity for 
rational reflection or apriori reasoning. The reliability of that capacity, in turn, can be 
vindicated by appeal to evolutionary considerations.61 Either way, then, the robust moral 
                                                
60 See Klenk 2017: 241. 
61 For more on that line of defense, see Fitzpatrick 2015 & 2016b. 
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realist can address the complaint that formal moral intuitions aren’t demonstrably 
reliable.62 
 
4.3.4.   Closing the Gap: From Formal Moral Intuitions to Third Factors 
 
At last, I am in a position to complete my defense of third-factor explanations in the face 
of the begging the question charge. Above, I have argued that, when constructing their 
explanation, the robust moral realist must appeal to formal moral intuitions exclusively. 
That alone, however, won’t get them home dry. After all, they cannot just appeal to any 
formal moral intuition. Rather, they must find formal moral intuitions that motivate a 
corresponding normative claim fit to play the role of third factor. In particular, that claim 
must not just derive from purely formal moral intuitions, but also be plausibly shaped by 
evolutionary forces (or be consistent with the overall aim of evolution). So, what might 
those formal moral intuitions in question be? To address that issue, Jeff Behrends (2013: 
493-6) has recently put forward the following argument: 
 
(5) If we have reason to do something or other, then we have reason to pursue the 
means necessary to doing it.63 
(6) Our existence is necessary for our doing anything. 
(7) Therefore, if we have reason to do something or other, then we have reason to 
pursue our own existence. (1, 2). 
(8) If robust normative realism is true, then we have reason to do something or 
other. 
(9) Therefore, if robust normative realism is true, then we have reason to pursue 
our own existence. (3, 4). 
 
Importantly, both key premises of the argument, namely (1) and (2), are based on purely 
formal moral intuitions. Neither generate substantive moral claims or evaluate actions, 
states of affairs or character traits. Rather, they impose constraints on the form of any given 
moral theory. For instance, (1) ‘…seems to be required by the very nature of normative 
reasons, by the concept of something’s being a reason’ (495). If a theory didn’t accept (1), 
it would hardly qualify as an action-guiding system of moral rules. Similarly, (4) is 
                                                
62 Of course, a third option would be to re-run my argument from Chapter 2: the challenge to explain why 
formal moral beliefs are reliably formed – construed modally – boils down to a more general worry about 
epistemic luck. 
63 Behrends (2013: 494f.) mentions two caveats. First, the (instrumental) reason isn’t all-things-considered, 
yet could be outweighed by competing demands. Second, since it doesn’t invoke desires, it isn’t Humeanism 
– and is, in fact, neutral about the grounds of normative reasons. 
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uncontroversial: it is equivalent to the conditional that ‘if [robust normative] realism is 
true, then there exists at least one fact that counts in favor of some action or other on our 
part’ (Behrends 2013: 495). That, however, simply expresses the core metaphysical 
commitment of robust normative realism, which we can take for granted in this context. 
After all, the best evolutionary explanation argument grants that robust moral facts exist, 
yet questions whether we can ever justifiably form beliefs about them. Together, (1) – (4) 
entail that, given the truth of robust normative realism, we have reasons to pursue our 
own existence or survival. That normative claim, in turn, can serve as a plausible third 
factor: a robustly normative truth that evolutionary forces would have pushed us towards. 
Or, in Behrends’ (2013) words: ‘…evolutionary forces have pushed us toward holding the 
belief that we have reason to pursue our own survival, and as it turns out, the truth of 
[robust normative] realism entails that we do have such a reason’ (494). So, the conclusion 
of the argument above offers exactly what we were looking for: a robustly normative claim, 
derived from purely formal moral intuitions, yet also plausibly shaped by evolutionary 
forces. Of course, the argument might not be sound as it stands. In particular, (2) might 
require some finessing, as even Behrends readily admits.64 Still, it suffices to illustrate my 
point: that it is in principle possible to derive a third factor from purely formal moral 
intuitions. The gap can be closed. And if that is possible, robust moral realists can 
construct a non-question-begging third-factor response. 
 
Where does that leave us? In this sub-section, I have argued that third-factor explanations 
don’t beg the question – as long as they rely exclusively on formal moral intuitions. To 
establish that, I first clarified the issue by distinguishing defeater-deflectors from defeater-
defeaters. Then, I suggested that formal moral intuitions can serve as defeater-deflectors, 
given that they are likely exempt from noxious evolutionary influence. After addressing a 
complaint about the reliability of these intuitions, I concluded by deriving a third factor 
from purely formal moral intuitions. 
 
But does that mean that robust moral realists can respond to the best evolutionary 
explanation argument? In the remainder of this chapter, I argue that it does not: on closer 
examination, the non-question-begging third-factor explanation just developed cannot 
underwrite belief about the substance of morality, even when combined with rational 
reflection. 
 
                                                
64 For further discussion, see Behrends 2013: 495-98. 
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4.4  Rational Reflection, Formal Moral Intuitions and The Scope of 
Intuitive Moral Knowledge 
 
Suppose that the third-factor explanation developed above does indeed not beg the 
question. In that case, we have normative reasons to pursue our own survival. But what 
are those reasons exactly? Typically, third-factor explanations assume – rather 
optimistically – that rational reflection can answer that question. By thinking rationally, 
we can bridge the gap between the third factor and substantive knowledge of robustly 
normative (or moral) reasons. In this sub-section, my aim is to argue that this optimism 
is unfounded: formal moral intuitions cannot underwrite many beliefs about the substance 
of morality, even when combined with rational reflection. That, however, is bad news for 
robust moral realists: it forces them into moral scepticism. My argument starts with some 
stage-setting (§4.4.1), before rejecting extreme forms of optimism (§4.4.2) as well as 
pessimism (§4.4.3) about rational reflection. It concludes by settling for moderate 
pessimism about our rational powers (§4.4.4) – and highlighting its sceptical implications 
for robustly moral knowledge. 
 
4.4.1.   Third-Factor Explanations and Rational Reflection  
 
Suppose that, for the sake of argument, the third-factor explanation developed above is 
plausible. Then, robust moral realists or moral intuitionists still haven’t quite averted 
moral scepticism yet. After all, the explanation only gives us an approximately true 
normative starting point, namely that there are reasons to pursue our own existence. What 
those reasons are, however, the explanation doesn’t say. To bridge the gap between the 
third factor and substantive knowledge of those normative reasons, proponents of third-
factor explanations appeal – either explicitly or implicitly – to rational reflection or 
reflective equilibrium. Most prominently, David Enoch (2012) writes that ‘…given a 
starting point of normative beliefs that are not too far-off, presumably some reasoning 
mechanisms (and perhaps some other mechanisms as well) can get us increasingly closer 
to the truth by eliminating inconsistencies, increasing overall coherence, eliminating 
arbitrary distinctions, drawing analogies, ruling out initially justified beliefs whose 
justificatory status has been defeated later on, etc.’ (166). In a similar vein, Jeff Behrends 
(2013) argues that ‘…more normative knowledge can be gained so long as it is plausible 
that our knowing that we have reason to pursue our own persistence (partially) justifies 
us in making inferences to further normative claims’ (498). So, rational reflection enables 
us to see how the normative truth that plays the role of third factor makes up, entails or 
informatively coheres with other normative truths. In that manner, robust moral realists 
can allegedly underwrite significant amounts of robustly normative knowledge. 
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But is that optimism about our reflective powers warranted? In what follows, I shall 
address that question, both generally and specifically in light of the appeal to formal moral 
intuitions discussed above. To begin with, I shall look at and ultimately reject more 
extreme answers, before settling for a form of moderate pessimism that robust moral 
realists must find unacceptable. 
 
4.4.2.   Radical Optimism 
 
Jeff Behrends (2013) subscribes to radical optimism: rational reflection is the right tool for 
discovering robust moral truths – and takes us from the third factor (nearly) all the way 
to substantive moral knowledge. In more detail, he discusses the objection that his third-
factor explanation doesn’t gain much epistemological ground and forces robust moral 
realists into ‘…an objectionably impoverished amount of normative knowledge’ (2013: 
498). In response, he articluates two kinds of consideration. 
 
First, he sketches out how to generate further normative knowledge out of the knowing 
that we have reason to pursue our continued existence. For instance, we might be justified 
in inferring that we have normative reason to pursue those means necessary to securing 
our persistence. That, in turn, allows us to arrive at many normative truths: that we have 
reason to exercise and eat well, avoid danger, co-operate with others, and so forth. In that 
manner, we could construct a crude version of social contract theory exclusively out of the 
third factor that we have reasons to survive, together with empirical claims about our 
psychology and surroundings. 
 
Second, Behrends emphasizes that it is easy to underestimate the epistemic significance of 
his third-factor explanation. After all, the evolutionary challenge (in the shape of the best 
evolutionary explanation argument, in our case) formulates a potential undercutting 
defeater for any positive realist moral epistemology, including the kind of moral 
intuitionism developed in §2 and §3 above. His third-factor explanation, if plausible, 
prevents that potential undercutting defeater from actualizing. But then, ‘…realists get to 
help themselves [absent further objections] to the justificatory story that they take to be 
most plausible [e.g. moral intuitionism]’ (2013: 499). And it is this justificatory story that 
primarily explains why we have reason to think that the normative facts are one way rather 
than another. So, the non-question-begging third-factor explanation amounts to a highly 
significant epistemological achievement: it allows robust moral realists to simply proceed 
with first-order normative theorizing, whatever that looks like. (In our case, moral 
intuitionism would play a crucial role in that endeavor.) And it is that theorizing that 
gives us epistemic reason for thinking that the normative facts have a particular content, 
as opposed to any other.  
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However, I worry that Behrends’ radical optimism is misplaced for two reasons. To begin 
with, the normative knowledge inferred from Behrends’ third factor, namely that we have 
reasons to survive, still seems insular or limited in crucial respects. After all, whatever it 
entails seems to primarily cover self-regarding moral duties, while leaving open other-
regarding moral duties (beyond the mere moral demand to cooperate with others to 
survive) and how to balance the former with the latter. At this stage, Behrends might 
suggest that first-order moral epistemology and normative theorizing can help resolve this 
under-determination. But I remain sceptical: as we saw above, to avoid begging the 
question, the proponent of third-factor explanations may only rely on formal moral 
intuitions. That, though, will significantly constrain both first-order moral epistemology 
and normative theorizing, making it difficult to comprehensively specify the content of 
first-order moral theory. So, the normative knowledge recaptured still seems limited or 
insular.  
 
My second reason for doubting Behrends’ radical optimism has to do with Werner’s 
(2018) Content Success requirement: ‘…at least some of our justified, first-order, and 
paradigmatically normative beliefs contain robustly normative contents’ (2018: 619). In 
particular, it remains questionable whether Behrends’ third-factor helps moral 
intuitionists meet that desideratum. To see that, recall the disagreement between Lucy 
and Carol. While one believes that lying is intrinsically bad, the other holds the contrary. 
Now, it seems to me that Behrends’ third factor cannot resolve that disagreement and tell 
us whose concepts latch onto the robust moral truth. After all, that we have reasons to 
survive seems consistent with either stance – as long as they both agree that lying is often 
instrumentally bad. But if that is correct, Behrends’ strategy cannot meet Content Success: 
when it comes to many disagreements about mid-level and concrete moral matters, it fails 
to help us figure out whose intuitively justified moral beliefs have robustly normative 
contents. In conclusion, Behrends seems to underestimate the revisionary nature of his 
proposal with respect to common sense morality. Therefore, his radical optimism about 
rational reflection seems unwarranted. 
 
4.4.3.   Radical Pessimism 
 
In stark contrast, some doubt that rational reflection is ever the right tool for discovering 
robust moral truths, at least in the context of evolutionary debunking. They subscribe to 
– what we might call – radical pessimism about rational reflection. Max Hayward 
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(forthcoming) has recently put forth an argument in support of this position.65 He 
understands rational reflection as the method according to which ‘…[w]e revise our 
opinions by using some beliefs to evaluate others, checking for consistency between 
individual judgments, and searching for greater coherence and systematicity within our 
belief-set as a whole’ (2017: 1). Then, he argues that this method ‘…shouldn’t be expected 
to guide us to truth in ethics, even from somewhat correct starting points’ (2017: 2). Why? 
His pessimism seems based on two lines of criticism.66  
 
First, he takes issue with those who hold – like Thomas Scanlon (2014: 82, 84) and others 
– that rational reflection or reflective equilibrium only applies to ‘considered judgments’ 
or intuitively ‘plausible’ beliefs. After all, our intuitive assessments of plausibility are just 
as likely to be unreliable as our moral beliefs, given their evolutionary history. In fact, such 
a capacity for plausibility verdicts might well be counter-adaptive, given that it is often 
adaptive to have false moral beliefs. So, we must expect our plausibility judgments to be 
a ‘mixture of truth and error’.  
 
Second, even if, following Kagan (1989), rational reflection is about searching for 
coherence (beyond mere logical consistency) as well as other theoretical virtues (e.g. 
systematicity, simplicity, explanatoriness), there is no apriori reason to think that the 
robust moral truth must mirror those theoretical virtues.67 To insist that robust moral 
truth must be coherent and conflict-free just begs the question: we must assume that meta-
moral beliefs about the structure of the moral truth are a mixed bag of truths and 
falsehoods, just like moral beliefs and plausibility judgments. Therefore, there is ‘…no 
reason to expect any methodology of rational reflection that goes further than simply 
avoiding logical contradiction to bring us closer to the truth’ (Hayward forthcoming: 11). 
 
                                                
65 A note on the dialectical background: Hayward discusses the role of rational reflection against the 
backdrop of the modest evolutionary debunking argument. According to that argument, we cannot assume 
that biological and cultural evolution gave us totally reliable dispositions, given that moral truth didn’t 
causally regulate evolution and natural selection favors some immoral dispositions (e.g. nepotism). Rather, 
our moral starting points are probably error-riddled and our dispositions only partially reliable, or that ‘we 
should expect to start with a pretty mixed bag [with respect to moral truths and falsehoods]’ (Hayward 
forthcoming: 6). Still, to avoid general scepticism, we may assume that moral truth is roughly as we take it 
to be. Hayward’s dialectical situation seems comparable to ours: Behrends’ (2013) third-factor guarantees 
that the moral truth is roughly as we take it to be, but it remains an open question whether we can reclaim 
substantive moral knowledge. 
66 A third line of criticism concerns another account of rational reflection, namely conceived as a method 
for internal value assessment and resolution of inconsistencies. For more, see Hayward forthcoming: 8-10. 
However, since that doesn’t appear to be the method of reflection that proponents of third-factor 
explanations have in mind, I shall set it aside for now. 
67 See Griffin 2015 against simplicity, Williams 1973: Ch. 11 on moral coherence and conflict, or Scanlon 
2014 on moral indeterminacy. 
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However, Hayward’s pessimism strikes me as too extreme. To begin with, it is unclear 
whether our intuitive assessments of plausibility are just as likely to be unreliable as our 
moral beliefs, given their evolutionary history. After all, as we saw in §4.3 above, formal 
moral intuitions (and corresponding judgments of plausibility) are less likely to be the 
product of problematic evolutionary pressure. In fact, they might very well originate from 
the same general apriori reasoning capacities as logic, mathematics and modality, which 
hardly count as counter-adaptive. 
 
Further, I am ready to admit that there is probably no apriori reason to think that the 
robust moral truth must mirror theoretical virtues such as coherence, systematicity or 
simplicity. That, however, doesn’t mean that there are no reasons whatsoever to think that 
human morality has a certain structure. To see that, just consider the complex defence of 
formal moral intuitions as exempt from noxious evolutionary influences rehearsed above, 
based on scientific theorizing, non-moral philosophical reasoning and some moral 
phenomenology. That defence should offer a reason to assume that meta-moral beliefs 
about the structure of moral truth are not just a mixed bag of truths and falsehoods. In 
addition, suppose that we are not allowed to make any assumptions about the structure 
of robust moral truth. In that case, we seem to just invite global moral scepticism – which 
is something that Hayward is at pains to avoid himself. In short, it looks like Hayward 
must grant us some formal constraints on morality. Given that both lines of criticism that 
Hayward develops can be dealt with, his radical pessimism about rational reflection 
appears unreasonably extreme. 
 
4.4.4.   Moderate Optimism – or Pessimism? 
 
That leaves us with more moderate views about the powers of rational reflection. One 
such view is moderate optimism, as presented in Huemer (2008). Even though he doesn’t 
defend a third-factor explanation, his account of moral reasoning is highly relevant to our 
purposes. According to him, rational reflection is the right tool, at least when guided by 
formal moral intuitions, for discovering some substantive truths about robust morality. 
Yet, importantly, rational reflection cannot take us all the way towards common sense 
morality – or towards all the items of robustly moral knowledge that robust moral realists 
want to take for granted. So, unlike Hayward (forthcoming), Huemer puts faith in the 
powers of rational reflection. But unlike Behrends (2013), he doesn’t consider them all-
conquering. 
 
In more detail, Huemer advocates shifting the methods of ethics from narrow reflective 
equilibrium towards – what he calls – ‘cautious critical intuitionist methodology’ (2008: 
381). That methodology lays out the following criteria for moral intuitions:  
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(1) Seek a substantial, coherent body of moral intuitions;  
(2) Avoid intuitions that are only shared by a few, culturally specific and patriotic;  
(3) Avoid intuitions that favor reproductive fitness, especially if they don’t cohere 
with other intuitions; 
(4) Avoid intuitions that differentially favor oneself;  
(5) Avoid intuitions that line up with strong emotions.  
 
As we saw above, once we adhere to those criteria, we end up privileging formal moral 
intuitions, since they are most likely to avoid various biases. Unlike concrete or mid-level 
ones, those intuitions don’t positively or negatively evaluate anything. Yet, they impose 
formal constraints on ethical theories. And we can then assess combinations of moral 
commitments in light of them, thus resolving moral disagreements. According to 
Huemer, an account of rational reflection informed by both formal constraints and the 
rejection of unreliable moral intuitions is likely to be revisionary. How far that moral 
revision will go remains an open question. Still, Huemer singles out sexual morality and 
deontology as two moral issues ripe for a shake-up. After all, common moral intuitions 
about sexuality are susceptible to emotional, cultural and biological biases. So, ‘…one’s 
initial, intuitive opposition to those arrangements or forms of sexual activity ought not to 
be treated as serious evidence of their wrongness’ (Huemer 2008: 388). And similar 
diagnoses might be developed for core deontological commitments.68 Thus, Huemer 
seems moderately optimistic about the prospects of rational reflection. Reliance on moral 
reasoning helps us gain some moral knowledge, yet significantly less than the 
overwhelming majority of robust moral realists typically take for granted. So, if moderate 
optimism is correct, robust moral realists cannot justifiably believe many robustly moral 
facts. That, by itself, should worry them. 
 
However, I suspect that Huemer’s optimism, despite already being tempered, might still 
be too excessive. To see why, let’s briefly recapitulate the three key steps of Huemer’s 
proposed moral methodology: (1) eliminate questionable or probably unreliable concrete 
and mid-level moral intuitions (based on the criteria above); (2) generate views (on various 
moral issues) based on the residual intuitions; (3) appeal to formal moral intuitions to 
adjudicate between competing or conflicting views. There are three kinds of worries 
associated with this procedure. To begin with, (2) might be problematic, especially if the 
residual intuitions don’t feature enough content to generate informative views on the key 
moral questions of that domain. For instance, take Huemer’s own example, namely sexual 
                                                
68 For a sketch, see Huemer 2008: 389f. 
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morality. It could well be the case that, once are done rejecting moral intuitions about 
sexual activity with dubious pedigree, that few moral intuitions will be left to inform our 
view on the domain. And that seems problematic, given the domain’s significance to 
leading a good human life. Second, there might be trouble with (3). More specifically, 
formal moral intuitions might be too formal or permissive to help us adjudicate between 
competing views on a given moral issue. To see why and for illustration, it pays to revisit 
Werner’s (2018) conflict between Lucy and Carol about the intrinsic badness of lying. 
Formal moral intuitions might just not tell us who is right on that score. Third and finally, 
suppose the procedure outlined above is successful, i.e. we have gone through steps (1) – 
(3) without fail, setting the two worries just raised aside. Even then, we might end up in 
an epistemically sub-optimal situation: the moral intuitions that provide a disproportional 
amount of content to a given moral view will always be the less formal ones – and thus 
the less reliable ones. It might well be that we end up with views about a given moral 
domain that are based on barely acceptable moral intuitions, but cannot be ruled out by 
our moral certain formal moral intuitions. 
 
Together, these three worries suggest that Huemer’s methodology, on closer inspection, 
isn’t just revisionary, but properly sceptical (and surely more sceptical than he is prepared 
to admit). If that is correct, however, we shouldn’t be moderate optimists about rational 
reflection. Rather, we should be moderate pessimists: given the robust normative truth that 
we have reasons to survive, we won’t be able to recover much substantive moral knowledge. 
To do so would require relying on concrete or mid-level moral intuitions, yet most of 
those are epistemically suspect. Therefore, rational reflection is a good tool for discovering 
some robust moral truths, yet decidedly less than robust moral realists usually want to take 
for granted. 
 
4.4.5.   What It All Means 
 
Where does that leave us? In this sub-section, I examined whether rational reflection 
allows us to bridge the gap between the third factor derived in §4.3 above, namely that 
we have normative reasons to pursue our own survival, and substantive knowledge of 
further robustly normative (or moral) reasons. As I argued, we should be moderate 
pessimists: even assuming we know the supposedly robust normative truth that we have 
reasons to survive, we won’t be able to recover much substantive moral knowledge. After 
all, doing so would require relying on concrete or mid-level moral intuitions, yet most of 
those are epistemically suspect, for precisely the reasons debunkers argued. So, the third-
factor explanation developed above might not beg the question against the evolutionary 
debunker, but it fails to underwrite many substantive moral beliefs, even when combined 
with rational reflection. 
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What does that mean for the fate of robust moral realism more generally? My discussion 
shows that even the most compelling version of moral intuitionism, supplemented by a 
non-question-begging third-factor explanation for moral reliability, fails to identify 
additional, non-explanatory reasons for much beyond our beliefs about the form of 
morality. Thus, the view cannot stave off the sceptical worry raised by best evolutionary 
explanation argument in Chapter 4. By implication, robust moral realism is saddled with 
unacceptable moral scepticism: if they are conceived as metaphysically robust, we cannot 
justifiably believe many facts about the substance of morality. 
 
5 .  Conclu s ion  
 
This chapter concludes my comprehensive, three-step assessment of evolutionary 
debunking arguments against robust moral realism. Chapter 1 took the first step, 
distinguishing three independently plausible epistemic principles that, combined with 
evolution, seemed to render knowledge of objective moral facts problematic. These 
principles were informed by cutting-edge debates in contemporary epistemology, from 
the nature of reliability to the epistemic significance of higher-order evidence and the 
relevance of explanation to justification. Chapters 2 to 4 then took the second step, 
developing and critically assessing refined evolutionary debunking arguments based on 
those epistemic principles. My discussion showed that, although not all forms of the 
evolutionary debunking argument are successful, robust moral realism faced two distinct 
epistemic worries. (The worry about irrelevant evolutionary influence on robustly moral 
belief discussed in Chapter 3 did not prove compelling.) The first, developed in Chapter 
2, was loosely inspired by evolutionary debunking arguments and centered on knowledge-
undermining epistemic luck. Meanwhile, the second, as discussed in Chapter 4, was 
directly raised by evolutionary considerations, focusing on whether robust moral realists 
have compelling non-explanatory reasons for maintaining their moral beliefs. 
 
This chapter amounted to the third and final step. I argued that, while robust moral 
realism can tackle the worry about epistemic luck, it cannot offer compelling non-
explanatory reasons for robustly moral belief. As a result, the evolutionary debunking 
argument developed in Chapter 4 succeeds, saddling robust moral realism with 
implausible moral scepticism: we cannot justifiably believe robustly moral facts. To 
establish that conclusion, I closely examined moral intuitionism, the most popular and 
best-developed moral epistemology available to robust moral realism. First, I 
demonstrated that moral intuitionism isn’t vulnerable to the worry about epistemic luck 
developed in Chapter 2. Still, its immunity helped me uncover the most compelling 
version of the view, according to which adequate understanding serves as a necessary anti-
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luck condition on intuitive moral knowledge. Then, I argued that even this version of 
moral intuitionism cannot stave off the worry raised by best evolutionary explanation 
argument in Chapter 4. After all, the view required a third-factor explanation of moral 
reliability: by itself, moral intuitionism doesn’t provide non-explanatory reasons for belief 
in robust moral facts. However, any such explanation must depend on formal moral 
intuitions only. Otherwise, it risks begging the question against the evolutionary 
debunker. But these formal intuitions, as it turned out, cannot underwrite many 
substantive moral beliefs, even when combined with rational reflection. Therefore, moral 
intuitionism cannot give us additional, non-explanatory reasons for anything beyond our 
beliefs about the form of robust morality. Robust moral realist thus become moral sceptics: 
they cannot justifiably believe facts about the substance of robust morality. 
 
But suppose that you are not entirely convinced by this chapter’s argument. Even then, 
my discussion holds some valuable insights. To conclude, I shall briefly elaborate on three 
of them. First, by tackling the issue of epistemic luck raised in Chapter 2, §3 developed 
the most compelling version of moral intuitionism. On the resulting view, you know an 
intuitive moral proposition p if you truly believe that p, justified on the basis of a veridical 
intellectual seeming that p, which is grounded in adequately understanding p. 
Importantly, the view features adequate understanding as a separate necessary anti-luck 
condition on intuitive moral knowledge. By doing so, this version of moral intuitionism 
avoids complicating moral justification and honors the difference between justification 
and knowledge. So, even if they don’t accept my radical, sceptical conclusion, there is a 
lesson here for moral intuitionists: they should endorse the version of their view developed 
in §3. 
 
Second, §4 also featured two lessons about how to most effectively defend third-factor 
explanations of moral reliability. To begin with, such explanations do not beg the 
question, contrary to what many critics allege. But to avoid doing so, the third factor can 
only be derived from formal moral intuitions that are likely exempt from distorting 
evolutionary pressures. So, this is the structure such an explanation should take.69 That, 
in turn, is helpful for any robust moral realist turning towards a third-factor explanation 
in the face of the best evolutionary explanation argument (as I argue they should). In 
addition, my discussion indicated how to complete this defense of third-factor 
explanations. In particular, such explanations must be combined with an argument 
                                                
69 This also means that – contra Behrends (2013) and Enoch (2010, 2012) – third-factor explanations aren’t 
plausibly neutral with respect to first-order moral epistemologies. Rather, they are best paired with a form 
of moral intuitionism that allows us to distinguish between concrete, mid-level and abstract moral 
intuitions. 
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showing how rational reflection can systematically bridge the gap between formal moral 
beliefs and ordinarily held beliefs about the substance of morality. So, developing such an 
account of moral reasoning is what robust moral realists should focus their resources on. 
 
Third and finally, §4 contributed towards the most accurate taxonomy of responses to 
evolutionary debunking. Typically, contributors to the literature distinguish between 
exemption and alignment strategies.70 While exemption strategies aim to show that 
robustly moral beliefs are exempt from noxious evolutionary influence, alignment 
approaches such as third-factor explanations aim to demonstrate that evolved moral beliefs 
– against first appearances – actually align with the robust moral truth. However, my 
discussion of third-factor explanations in §4 gives us reason to believe that there is no 
deep distinction along those lines. Rather, the best strategy available to the robust moral 
realist against the evolutionary debunker combines an alignment response, namely a third-
factor explanation, with an exemption response, namely an appeal to formal moral 
intuitions. So, in light of my discussion, we should revise how we ordinarily taxonomize 
responses to evolutionary debunking arguments. 
 
But what are the implications of my discussion in Chapters 2 to 4 for meta-ethics and 
epistemology more generally? In Chapter 1, I mentioned that my overall argument should 
also be more broadly relevant beyond evolutionary debunking and robust moral realism. 
After all, the three general epistemic principles framing my investigation of evolutionary 
debunking arguments are central to any foundational debate in the epistemology of the 
normative and, more generally, the apriori. Further, applying these general epistemic 
principles extensively to the evolutionary debunking of robust moral belief promised ways 
of refining them. So, what insights into how to formulate those principles most 
compellingly can we glean from Chapters 2 to 4? To begin with, consider the principle 
that reliability about a given domain requires explanation – and that, if we fail to provide 
one, our beliefs about that domain are unjustified. Chapter 2 taught us that the most 
plausible interpretation of the principle threatens knowledge, not justification. What’s 
more, ‘explaining reliability’ doesn’t really amount to showing that our moral, normative 
or apriori beliefs are true. Rather, it involves demonstrating why a given account of moral, 
normative or apriori knowledge isn’t vulnerable to epistemic luck. Further, Chapter 3 held 
a lesson on how to properly apply the principle that higher-order evidence of error 
undermines justification. As we saw, the principle defeats itself when the higher-order 
evidence of error in question concerns all beliefs about a given domain. That suggests that 
we should restrict its application to kinds of higher-order evidence of error that target 
                                                
70 See, for instance, Fitzpatrick 2016b or Wielenberg 2016. 
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particular beliefs or beliefs about sub-domains only.71 For instance, we could rely on the 
principle when assessing higher-order evidence of error about specific color beliefs, yet not 
all color beliefs. Finally, Chapter 4 focused on the principle that, for our beliefs to be 
justified, our having them must be best explained by the facts they are about. My 
discussion suggested how to best formulate that principle, too. In particular, we must 
supplement it with a clause stating that we lack additional, non-abductive reasons for 
belief in moral, normative or apriori facts. Otherwise, the principle would beg the question 
against any non-abductive moral, normative or apriori epistemology. Of course, this is 
but a rough sketch. Still, it illustrates that my overall argument informs how to most 
plausibly formulate those general epistemic principles. As a result, the dialectic in Chapters 
2 to 4 should be of value to anyone working on the epistemological foundations of the 
normative and, more generally, the apriori. 
 
                                                
71 Vavova (2014) argues that debunking arguments based on that principle are governed by – what she calls 
– the Inverse Rule of Debunking: ‘The potential strength [i.e. how much it requires us to revise] of a 
debunking argument is inversely proportional to its ambition [i.e. how much it targets]’ (98). She 
recommends – in line with my suggestion in the main text – that we thus focus on local, not global, defeat 
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